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PREFACE 
The debate between those espousing the gains from free trade and 
those concerned with protecting domestic industries has had a long his-
tory. Although international trade negotiations under the auspices of 
GATT have made much progress toward the goal of free trade, formidable 
problems remain for future negotiations of trade agreements. This study 
estimates the economic impact of trade liberalization for the United 
States chemical industry. 
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for his suggestions regarding the sections of the dissertation concerned 
with labor markets and to Dr. Rudolph W. Trenton for his encouragement 
and valuable insights regarding the subject of the study. Dr. H. Evan 
Drunnnond provided constructive connnents concerning both the analysis and 
policy conclusions for which I am grateful. 
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Phillips, Mr. John Dana, and Mr. John Phillips of the Government Docu-
ments section of the library at Oklahoma State University who provided 
invaluable assistance in the search for data sources. 
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appreciative of my husband, Joe, for his continuous encouragement, 
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understanding, patience throughout my entire doctoral program. My 
parents, John and Lucille Wickstead, have my deepest gratitude for 
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iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter 
I. INTRODUCTION • 
II • THE FRAMEWORK 
III. 
IV. 
v. 
Introduction 
The Chemical Industry • 
Trade Barriers for Chemicals 
The United States' Participation in 
Trade Negotiations 
Sunun.ary • 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
Survey of Previous Studies 
The Static Model 
The Model Over Time • 
Summary • 
THE DATA • 
Introduction 
Classification Schedules 
Import and Export Data 
Production Data • 
Domestic Consumption Estimates 
Tariff Data • 
Price Elasticities 
Effects in U. S. Import and Export Markets 
Labor Data 
Summary • 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Introduction 
Elasticity Estimates 
Price and Trade Effects of Tariff Elimination • 
Labor Dislocation • 
Estimated Changes in Social Welfare • 
Comparison of Results from Disaggregated 
Data and from Aggregate Data 
Summary • 
v 
Page 
1 
6 
6 
6 
9 
16 
24 
32 
32 
36 
46 
47 
54 
54 
54 
60 
62 
66 
66 
70 
76 
77 
78 
90 
90 
90 
96 
155 
168 
183 
185 
Chapter 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS • . . 
Summary • • • 
Conclusions 
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
. . . . 
. . . 
. . . . 
. . . 
. . . . . 
. . 
Page 
195 
195 
199 
202 
APPENDIX A - THE CONCESSIONS OF BOTH KENNEDY ROUND PACKAGES. • 209 
APPENDIX B - DERIVATIONS OF THE EQUATIONS 213 
APPENDIX C - SAMPLE WORKSHEETS • • • • • • . . . . . . . . 224 
vi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
I. Standard International Trade Classification, Revised • 55 
II. Estimated Elasticities for the u. s. 92 
III. Estimated Foreign Elasticities . . . . 94 
IV. Survey of Price and Trade Effects of U. S. Tariff 
Removal on the U.S. Import Market: First Scenario 98 
v. Survey of Price and Trade Effects of Foreign Tariff 
Removal on the U.S. Export Market: First Scenario 101 
VI. Survey of Price and Trade Effects of U.S. Tariff 
Removal on the U.S. Import Market: Second Scenario 104 
VII. Survey of Price and Trade Effects of Foreign Tariff 
Removal on the U.S. Export Market: Second Scenario 107 
VIII. Value of Trade Effects From Tariff Elimination for 
the U.S. Chemical Industry • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 110 
IX. Estimated Price and Trade Effects of U.S. Tariff 
Removal on the u.s. Import Market: First Scenario 
X. Estimated Price and Trade Effects of Foreign Tariff 
Removal on the U.S. Export Market: First Scenario 
XI. Estimated Price and Trade Effects of u.s. Tariff 
Removal on the U.S. Import Market: Second Scenario 
XII. Estimated Price and Trade Effects of Foreign Tariff 
Removal on the U,S. Export Market: Second Scenario 
XIII. Estimated Value·'·Of Trade Effects of the Supplemental 
Agreement • • • • • • • • .• , •.• 
XIV. U.S. Value of Exports and Imports, and the Short-Run 
Trade Balance Effects • • • • • • ••• 
xv. Estimated Total Loss From Labor Displacement 
. . . 114 
117 
133 
• . 136 
139 
152 
Assuming Segregated Markets: First Scenario • • • • • • 156 
vii 
Table Page 
XVI. Estimated Total Loss From Labor Displacement 
Assuming Netted Markets: First Scenario • • • • • • • • 159 
XVII. Estimated Total Loss From Labor Displacement 
Assuming Segregated Markets: Second Scenario • • • • • 162 
XVIII. 
XIX. 
xx. 
XXI. 
Estimated Total Loss From Labor Displacement 
Assuming Netted Markets: Second Scenario 
Impact of the Supplemental Agreement on 
Segregated Labor Markets • • • • • 
. . . . . . . 
Impact of the Supplemental Agreement on Netted 
Labor Markets • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . . . 
Effects on Social Welfare: First Scenario • . . . . 
XXII. Effects on Social Welfare: Second Scenario . . . . . . . 
XXIII. The Components of the Welfare Effect: Second 
163 
166 
169 
171 
172 
Scenario, Labor Variant, I, d = '3'lo • • • • • • • • • • • 176 
XXIV. The Components of the Welfare Effect: Supplemental 
xxv. 
Agreement, Labor Variant I, d = 5% • • •••• 
Comparison of Trade Effects Estimated From 
Disaggregated Data and Those From Aggregate 
Data: First Scenario • • • • • • • • • • • 
viii 
180 
184 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
1. Graphic Analysis for Imported Commodity 
(A) U.S. Import Market; (B) u.s. Domestic Market . . . . 39 
2. Graphic Analysis for an Exported Commodity 
(A) U.S. Export Market; (B) U.S. Domestic Market • 42 
3. Tariff Comparison: First Scenario 112 
4. Tariff Comparison: Second Scenario • . . . . . . . 113 
5. Import Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . 216 
6. Export Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 
ix 
d 
D 
M 
p 
LIST OF SYMBOLS 
a change in the variable which follows 
quantity of domestic demand 
domestic demand 
import demand function 
export demand exclusive of tariff 
export demand inclusive of tariff 
number of jobs (employees) 
quantity of imports (without subscript: u. S.; subscript "i": 
country "i:" subscript "w:" world) 
initial duty-free price 
P' commodity price inclusive of tariff, i. e., P' = P + T 
P price resultant from tariff elimination 
0 
Q quantity of domestic output 
s a fraction 
S quantity of domestic supply 
S domestic supply function D 
SM import supply exclusive of tariff 
S import supply inclusive of tariff M,t 
SX export supply 
S . quantity of output for SITC category xxx by country "i" 
xxx,1 
t ad valorem tariff or tariff equivalent 
t* average of foreign ad valorem tariffs, levied on a c. i. f. basis 
t** f. o. b. equivalent of the foreign tariff average 
x 
T per-unit value of tariff, i. e •' T = tP 
VD value of domestic demand 
VM value of imports 
vs value of domestic supply 
vs value of country "i"'s shipments of SITC category xxx 
xxx,i 
VX value of exports 
~i 
n 
M 
social welfare, as traditionally measured, for the import market 
social welfare, as traditionally measured, for the export market 
quantity of exports (without subscript: u. s. ; subscript "i"; 
country "i"; subscript "w": world) 
price elasticity of u. S. domestic supply 
price elasticity of the rest-of-the-world's supply of imports 
into the u. S. 
price elasticity of U. S. supply of exports to the rest-of-the-
world 
price elasticity of export supply from country "i" (from the 
world, "w") 
price elasticity of u. s. domestic demand 
price elasticity of u. s. demand for imports 
price elasticity of the demand fo! imports in country "i" (in 
the world, "w") 
price elasticity of the rest-of-the world's demand for U. s. 
exports 
* superscript to indicate a long-run elasticity 
used in tables when the necessary data is not available 
used in tables when category not applicable 
xi 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The gains from free world trade have been demonstrated and vigor-
ously espoused by economists for centuries both in scholarly journals 
and popular literature. Indeed, the existence of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rests on this premis.e. Still the public and 
its political representatives jump quickly and easily onto the protec-
tionist bandwagon as the solution to many prol:>lems. Are politicians so 
naive? Are economists that ignored -- or that ignorant? One suggested 
explanation for the divergence between theory and policy is that the 
gains from free trade are long-run gains whereas politicians have short-
run time horizons and ignore any gains from freer trade that might be 
achieved by their policy-making but occur after the next election. An-
other suggested explanation is that economists assume that all adjust-
ments. to changes in the parameters of the model are instantaneous and 
ignore any transitional dislocations. 
The GATT negotiations have been continuing for many years and have 
made much progress toward the ideal of free trade. The. emphasis has been 
on the visible barriers to trade tariffs -- and the approach has been 
multilateral and multisectoral. With successful tariff reductions, at-
tention now shifts toward the wide array of nontariff barriers, which 
have become relatively more important. In an attempt to cope with these 
more formidable problems, GATT now is tending toward sectoral negotia-
tions. 
1 
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The chemical industry posed just such a formidable problem for the 
Kennedy Round of GATT and was treated as a sector separate from the 
general negotiations in an effort to retain chemicals as negotiable pro-
ducts. The great controversy over the chemical sector arose because of 
the United States' American Selling Price System of valuation for cer-
tain chemical products. 
The chemical sector is not insignificant in its importance in world 
trade. The sector ranks fourth in OECD exports, accounting for 10 per-
cent of OECD industrial exports, and ranks sixth in OECD imports with 8 
f . 1 percent o imports. Imports of chemicals are an important factor in 
the economies of the major industrial countries of the world. For the 
u. S., the European Economic Community (EEC), the u. Ke, Canada, and 
Japan, chemical imports ranked, respectively, as the eighth, fifth, 
fifth, fourth, and sixth largest import sectors in 1970. 2 Chemical pro-
ducts form the third largest category of u. S. sector exports. 3 These 
five countries account for over 85 percent of world chemical exports and 
4 7 5 percent of world chemical imports. 
The present study examines the economic impact that would follow 
the elimination of tariffs on internationally traded products of the 
chemical industry. One purpose of the study is to estimate the probable 
changes in price, quantity, and value of trade for the United StatesG 
These estimates then permit the computation of the effects on the so-
cial welfare for the u. s., which includes both the present-value of the 
flow of long-term gains from the expansion of trade and the present-
value of the costs resulting from temporary labor dislocations. 
The analysis is conducted on the most disaggregated level feasible 
given the data. The study employs data for the 63 product subgroups 
contained within the chemical industry as defined by the Standard 
International Trade Classification, Revised (SITC). The countries in-
cluded in the study are the five major chemical trading countries (the 
U. S., the EEC, the U. K., Japan and Canada) and the other countries 
3 
of the GATT Tariff Study (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, 
and Switzerland). 5 The trade data are for 1972 which is the first year 
the concessions of the Kennedy Round were fully in effect and before 
the British entry into the EEC. 
This subject is important in two respects. Previous studies of 
similar purpose are at a high level of aggregation and, thereby, ob-
scure much of the variation which occurs within such broadly-defined 
categories. Furthermore, most of the studies analyze either the price 
and trade effects, the labor market effects, or the trade and welfare 
effects, ignoring or assuming the remaining effects. 6 Second, the 
sectoral approach to trade negotiations is likely to become more preva-
lent in future negotiations. Faced with the problem of quantifying and 
negotiating non-tariff barriers, future trade sessions will more than 
likely discover the increasing necessity of separating problem sectors 
from the general trade negotiations, as has been already experienced in 
the Kennedy Round for five industries. 
The subsequent chapters of this study cover the following topics. 
Chapter II establishes the context for the study. It outlines the 
structure and behavior of the chemical industry and discusses the his-
tory of tariffs levied on chemicals and of the American Selling Price 
system. In addition, the chapter summarizes the nontariff barriers to 
chemical trade and reviews the history of U. S. participation in trade 
negotiations focusing especially on the Kennedy Round. It also 
4 
discusses briefly the Trade Expansiop Act of 1962, including the impact 
on the chemical industry of its provisions for domestic relief from im-
port competition, and the negotiating authority of the Trade Act of 
1974. Chapter III begins with a survey of the previous studies which 
serve as a foundation for the analysis of the study. The chapter then 
presents the theoretical model utilized for the study. The model is 
composed of four parts. The first three are static, partial equilibrium 
analyses of the U. S. import and export markets and their respective 
labor markets. The fourth part of the model considers the net social 
welfare effects as flows and discounts them over the selected time hori-
zons. Chapter IV concerns the data used in the study, exposing the 
problems of their collection and adjustment preparatory to use. Chapter 
V presents the empirical results. The model of the effects of tariff 
elimination is applied to two different sets of data: one assumes the 
existing tariffs are those resulting from the Kennedy Round including 
the elimination of ASP; the other assumes post-Kennedy Round tariffs 
with the continued existence of ASP. For each scenario the effects of 
free trade are estimated in terms of changes in prices, trade volume, 
employment, and social welfare. Comparison of the results for each 
scenario provides a measure of the impact of the Supplemental Agreement 
on Chemicals had it been approved. Chapter VI provides a brief summary 
of and the conclusions for the study. 
ENDNOTES 
1united States Tariff Commission, "Major Industrial Sectors: Tar-
iffs and Other Trade Barriers," Part III of Trade Barriers, TC Publica-
tion 665 (Washington, D. C., 1974), p. 181. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4 Ibid. , p. 183. 
5The Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, Basic Documentation for Tariff Study: Summary Table No. 1 
Tariff and Trade Summaries by BTN Headings (Geneva, July, 1970). Here-
after referred to as GATT Tariff Study. The "other" countries of the 
study are the member nations of EFTA less Portugal and plus Finland. 
6The other studies are: Bela Balassa, Trade Liberalization among 
Industrial Countries (New York, 1967); Robert E. Baldwin and John H. 
Mutti, "Policy Problems in the Adjustment Process (U.; S.)," (unpublished 
paper); Craig R. MacPhee, Restrictions on International Trade in Steel 
(Lexington, Mass., 1974); and Stephen P. Magee, "The Welfare Effects of 
Restrictions on U. S. Trade," Brookings, Paper on Economic Activity, No. 
3 (1972). Only the Magee study estimates all the effects, but is at an 
aggregated level. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
This chapter establishes the background for the study. The initial 
presentation, which describes the character of the chemical industry, is 
followed by a discussion of some facets of the barriers faced by trade 
in the chemical industry and the negotiations concerning such barriers. 
The Chemical Industry 
Although industry boundaries are often determined by substituta-
bility-in-use of the industry's output, the chemical industry is de-
lineated on the basis of common industrial inputs. In either case, the 
definition of an industry is neither as evident nor as clear-cut as one 
might surmise initially. This is particularly true for the chemical in-
dustry for which the definitions vary greatly. The firms of the indus-
try all use the techniques basic to chemical technology and move easily 
from supplying one product to supplying another. Chemical companies 
often extend into fields outside the industry, non-chemical firms fre-
quently enter the industry in one or a few product markets, and chemical 
products are often competitive-in-use with products in other fields. 
The industry definition used throughout this study is the chemical sec-
tion defined by the United Nations' SITC, Revised classification 
1 
system. 
6 
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The chemical industry in the United States is composed of several 
very large chemical companies which are diversified into many of the in-
dustry's component sectors, a multitude of smaller specialized com-
panies, and, for particular fields, non-chemical companies which have 
diversified. 2 The sub-sectors are especially indistinct in delineation; 
whatever the boundary, shifting subgroups of these giants, often ac-
companied by some relatively specialized smaller firms, create a pre-
dominantly oligopolistic industry structure for each subindustry. 
The interdependence of the firms in an oligopolistic structure 
tends to establish a policy of peaceful coexistence with recognition of 
spheres of influence. This is evidenced by the chemical industry's 
policy of market extension via joint ventures and purchase of estab-
lished small firms rather than new entry into other subindustries. The 
industry's oligopolistic structure reflects more than a non-competitive 
market extension policy. Many markets are too limited to support more 
than one firm. Continuous processing for the production of most chemi-
cal products implies large economies of scale. Further economies to a 
large scale accrue because of the massive research and innovative ef-
forts which are essential to the viability of a firm in the chemical in-
3 dustry. 
Kahn describes the pricing of the chemical industry's output as 
"orderly" with little competitive response to short-run fluctuations in 
demand. The technology which applies chemical science to industry yields 
output which is often both an intermediate and a finished product for 
the firm; and large firms market inputs among themselves often at dis-
count prices to maintain good relations. In addition to an oligopolistic 
market structure, the combination of relatively large proportions of 
fixed costs and the prevalence of joint products and/or w,;cable bv-· 
products presents pricing problems sufficient enough in themselves to 
encourage prices that are unresponsive to changes in demand. 
On the other hand, such oligopolistic structure and behavior is 
modified by technological non-price competition. The versatility of 
technology implies an omnipresent possibility of potential entry into 
exJ:3ting markets and of the development of new market opportunities. 
8 
In con~arison with U. S. firms, the foreign chemical producers are 
::iim:Llarly large in size and advanced in research capabilities, and are, 
therefore, a competitive factor for the chemical industry in the United 
States. Since World War II, the magnitude of foreign trade in chemicals 
began a long-term expansion and the chemical companies of the world de-
veloped an international outlook. 4 The internationalization of the 
chemical industry became particularly pronounced during the 1960s. 
American companies began to invest abroad on a large scale by establish-
ing foreign plants, engaging in joint ventures, or licensing products 
or processes to a foreign manufacturer. Total sales by U. S. plants 
abroad grew more rapidly in that decade than did U. S. exports; ad-
ditionally, about half of U. S. exports were through foreign affiliates. 
Foreign manufacturers also invested directly in the United States, es-
pecially in the field of dye manufacturing and ethical drugs. Backman 
estimates that in 1968, U. S. direct investment abroad approximated $6.0 
billion and foreign direct investment in U. S. plants equalled $2.5 
billion. 5 
The cause and effect relationship between monopoly power and tech-
nological progress is not clarified for the chemical industry. As Kahn 
notes: 
It is not possible to give our present system of organi-
zation a clean bill of health simply because it has been 
progressive; in modern science it is difficult not to 
progress, whatever the system of organization. The 
only meaningful bench mark against which to test achieve-
ments of the American industry is the potential inherent 
in chemical technology; but that potential is unknow-
able •. 
In fact, by the supreme test, the ability to meet 
rival producers in open competition, the chemical in-
dustry is by the admission of its own spokesman not an 
outstanding example of the superiority of American 
enterprise. They are among the leading advocates of 
high tariffs to protect themselves from the products 
of 'cheap foreign labor.' Yet in other American in-
dustries, where labor costs are an even higher propor-
tion of total costs than in the chemical, the disad-
vantage of high wage rates is more than offset by 
labor's high productivity. . • • [ I.]t is by no means 
clear that the chemical industry, with its typically 
high capital-labor ratios and far larger exports than 
imports, can offer such a defense for most of the high 
protection it enjoys.6 
Trade Barriers for Chemicals 
9 
Tariffs have a long history in the United States' chemical industry 
beginning with tariffs on gunpowder and indigo which were levied in 
1789. 7 Tariff duties were increased and tariff coverage of chemical 
products expanded during the 1800s; however, the organic chemical indus-
try remained at an embryonic level. World War I severed the U. S. 
source of coal-tar dyes (benzenoid organic chemicals) from Germany. The 
Emergency Tariff of 1916 provided increased duties for a 5-year period, 
after which rates were to be reduced annually. The industry grew 
rapidly but the end of the war threatened potential price-cutting by the 
German chemical cartel. In order to secure the development of the infant 
chemical industry in the U. S., of which coal-tar dyes were an important 
part, and because of the crucial role played by coal-tar dyes in the na-
tional defense, the consensus favored industry protection. Until a 
10 
permanent law could be enacted, Congress imposed a six-month embargo on 
imports of products produced domestically (the Dye and Chemical Control 
8 Act of 1921). 
Prior to 1922, the usual basis of valuation of an import good for 
customs duties was the selling price of the good in the exporting coun-
try; however, the post-war economies abroad were very unstable with cur-
rency depreciations and rapid price fluctuations. The situation made a 
system of valuation based on the more stable and easily determined U. S. 
price very attractive. The Tariff Act of 1922 (the Fordney-McCumber 
Tariff) embodied such an alternative system for coal-tar products only. 9 
This method of customs· valuation is referred to as the American Selling 
Price (ASP) system. 
The American Selling Price (ASP) method of valuation provides that 
imports of the ASP designated products which are competitive with U. S. 
production face tariffs levied on the value determined by the wholesale 
price of the comparable U. S. product and that imports of such products 
which are not competitive with U. S. products face tariffs levied on the 
United States value. 10 Thus, ASP has also been called the "flexible 
tariff" because the .amount of .duty levied varies with the price of the 
competitive U. S. product regardless of the constancy of the foreign 
price of the imported good. 
During the 1920s ASP was extended to various other products; the 
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of.1930 repealed these extensions, but retained 
the ASP system for benzenoid (coal-tar) products and the possibility of 
11 ASP designation for other goods. During the 1930s ASP was applied by 
proclamation- to four other types of imports: rubber-soled footwear and 
binoculars (1933), boiled baby clams packed in their own juices (1934), 
11 
and wool-knit gloves worth less than $1.75 a dozen (1936); the applica-
tion of ASP to binoculars was held invalid by the courts in 1935. The 
Reciprocal· Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and the subsequent Trade Acts 
provided that ASP could not be· extended to any good on which duty re-
duction had occurred. Because U. S. trade policy since 1934 has been to 
progressively lower tariff barriers, the possibility of extensions of 
ASP to additional products is limited. 12 
Of the four types of commodities subject to ASP only the imports of 
benzenoid chemicals are of significant magnitude. 13 In 1967, ASP valua-
tion was applied to $43.l million of benzenoid chemical imports that 
were competitive with U. S. production. Total imports of benzenoid 
chemicals eligible for ASP valuation that year were $82.6 million, which 
equalled 8.6 percent of the value of U. S. imports of chemicals and re-
lated products ($963million).· It should be noted that the ASP system 
of valuation for customs duties does not include all benzenoid chemicals. 
Three groups of benzenoid chemicals are not covered by the ASP provis-
ion: benzenoid crudes, which enter duty-free; benzenoid elastomers 
(synthetic rubbers), which account for 10 to 15 percent of total benze-
noid sales; and most benzenoid chemicals originating from natural animal 
14 
or vegetable products.· 
Benzenoid chemicals today differ from those of the 1920s in both 
source and form. No longer are benzenoids derived from cqal-tars and 
primarily composed of dye products. Dyes are less than 10 percent of 
U. S. benzenoid sales; and the benzenoids now are derived from petroleum 
and natural gas. Benzenoid chemicals include a great variety of products 
which are categorized into ten major product groups: intermediates (in-
eluding rubber-processing chemicals), dyes (including azoics), pigments, 
12 
medicinal chemicals, flavor and perfume materials, plastics and resins, 
plasticizers, surface-active agents, pesticides and agricultural chemi-
cals, and miscellaneous chemicals. 15 However, none of these benzenoid 
groups form a separate or distinct industry group. 
The U. S. tariffs at the three-digit level range from 26~5 percent 
on Synthetic organic dyestuffs, natural indigo and color lakes (SITC 
531) to 0.7 percent on Manufactured fertilizers (SITC 561). 16 The un-
weighted average of the three-digit tariff averages equals 8.1 percent. 
The largest U. S. import sector at the three-digit level is Organic 
chemicals (SITC 512) for which the tariff is 11.0 percent on $509 mil-
lion of f. o. b. imports in 1972. 
The average of the foreign tariffs faced by U. S. exports in each 
three-digit SITC group ranges from 13.9 percent on Plastic materials, 
regenerated cellulose and artificial resins (SITC 581) to 2.8 percent on 
Radioactive and associated materials (SITC 515). The largest export 
sector is Organic chemicals (SITC 512) with 1972 exports of $1103 mil-
lion and incurs foreign tariffs which average 12.5 percent. The un-
weighted average of the three-digit foreign tariff averages equal 9.2 
percent levied on U. S. exports. 
A tariff rate applied under the ASP system of valuation under-
states the true tariff in cases where the American selling price of the 
comparable domestic good exceeds the foreign price of the import. This 
is the tariff effect of the ASP system. 17 
Grubel and Johnson estimate a true tariff average for benzenoid 
intermediates (the only type of benzenoid for which they had price 
data). That is, they compute 
••. an average nominal tariff rate, which when applied 
to foreign prices would yield the same tariff revenue 
as does the current nominal .rate applied to American 
selling price. The relationsh:i,.p· of.nominal tariff 
(NT), true tariff (TT), foreign price (FP), and American 
selling price (ASP) is shown in the following equation: 
TT = NT x ASP 18 FP • 
Their re.sults show that the nominal tariff average which ranges, de-
13 
pending upon the averaging technique used, from 23.9 to 26.4 percent is 
19 
equivalent to a true tariff which lies between 40.9 and 53.2 percent. 
In addition to the tariff effect, ASP involves a nontariff effect 
resulting from the· complexities, uncertainties and delays of.its ad-
ministration-. A foreign- exporter cannot ascertain in advance whether 
the product will be· subject to ASP, L e., be determined to be competi-
tive, or what· the ASP will be.· Whereas· the Tariff Schedules of .the 
United States Annotated· listed in 1964 sixty-nine groups of chemicals 
eligible for ASP,· the· actui;il' number· of differentiated products imported 
equalled 2,943 items for each· of which· customs officials had to de-
20 termine the competitive status. It is interesting to consider the 
bureaucracy required to administer determinations of competitive status 
on the 750,000 commercial products that are potentially subject to 
ASP. 21 
The nontariff effects of the ASP system are well-described in the 
testimony of Ambassador WilliamM. Roth, Special Representative for the 
Kennedy Round· (1964-1967)· of trade negotiations· within the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): 
This broad· language [of the ASP statute] inevitably 
creates problems· in administration and in equity. It, in 
effect, assumes that there is necessarily a single price 
for each chemical and one which can be determined with cer-
tainty and accuracy by Customs officials. It implicitly 
assumes that list prices, where they exist, will be equal 
to prices at which goods are actually sold and, where they 
do not exist, that Customs will be readily able to obtain 
the necessary data. 
These assumptions are not realistic. They do not 
allow for the desirability of determining whether quoted 
price is a reasonable one --- a problem which may arise 
in the case, for example, where the· domestic article, 
often patented, is neither offered nor sold as an inter-
mediate product, but rather is made by a single or a 
few integrated producers who use the articles from it. 
In the latter case, the· price for the· intermediate may 
well be established· at a level which· deters any pros-
pective purchasers of a similar import .from importing. 
Yet this is, under the present statute, the proper basis 
for valuation. 
The 'willing to receive' provision of the· statute 
further means· that an importer· may bring chemicals to 
the United States· under the impression that there is 
no domestic production,· only to learn that an American 
manufacturer does produce them not commercially but en-
tirely for his own, internal use. If this manufacturer 
states to Customs· that· he 'would be willing to receive 
an offer' and then quotes his price·, even though no 
co~ercial transactions have actually occurred at that 
price, it also becomes· the basis for duty. 
This feature· of the statute permits situations 
where domestic firms have the potential for manipulating 
prices to deter and even· eliminate any import competition. 
This has, in fact, happened. As a result, in order to · 
anticipate these effects, importers often bring in very 
small samples, solely in order to establish the magnitude 
of the protective duty. · This practice is one of the ex-
planations why our trade statistics show that imports do, 
indeed, enter over fairly astronomical rates.· 
Still another difficulty with ASP concerns the al-
ternative valuation base which applies when a benzenoid 
chemical is found not to be competitive with· a domestic. 
product. In this situation the statute provides that a 
'United States value'·will be determined and.used as the 
basis for valuation·. · This essentially requires working 
back from· the quoted wholesale price of the import in 
the United States market,· deducting all necessary ex-
penses and markups incurred in its importation, to arrive 
at an equivalent· of an export value for the chemical. 
This, too, is time-consuming and often leads to contro-
versial results.· Certain shipments have been under con-
sideration for as much as 8 years while the matter was 
being litigated· through· the· courts·. 22 
Although nontariff barriers are not specifically the subject of 
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analysis for this study, the discussion of the nontariff barrier effects 
of ASP invites some mention of other such barriers to trade in chemi-
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cals. A survey of complaints concerning trade barriers faced by chem-
icals contains the greatest number of complaints involving quantitative 
limitations and licensing provisions. These complaints most frequently 
cite Japan for use of quotas on pharmaceutical products and unclassified 
chemicals. Pharmaceutical products are also the main product for which 
extremely rigid requirements serve as an effective embargo in the 
countries of Japan·, France and the United States or for which actual em-
bargoes on competitive imports· exist (Norway, Finland, Italy, and 
others). Six complaints against the U. S. and three complaints against 
Japan are registered regarding restrictive licensing practices. 
A large proportion of tl::ie over 100· complaints involving customs 
procedures pertain· to the U. S. ASP system of customs valuation. Japan, 
the U. S., and South American countries are each mentioned .in two or 
more complaints· regarding· excessive and· complex documentation require-
ments. And· many· countries· are cited for unreasonable restrictions on 
the importation of chemical and pharmaceutical samples. 
In reference to standards for chemical products, the most fre-
quently mentioned category is pharmaceuticals. Application of domestic 
standards for pharmaceuticqls (rather than acceptance of the exporting 
country's standards) by the United States, Japan, Canada and the EEC is 
a common complaint because of the delay involved in the repetition of 
testing; pharmaceutical imports into many countries involve stringent 
registration, labelling and clearance requirements which are cited as 
barriers. 
U. S. producers are the source of many complaints against Japan 
• ~ J 
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and the EEC and, to a lesser extent, the U. K. concerning their pro-
vision of gqvernmental export assistance. Complaints regarding "buy na-
tional" policies, especially for pharmaceuticals, cite the U. K., Japan, 
France, and other European countries. 
Other complaints of trade barriers to chemicals cite price con-
trols, particularly used for pharmaceuticals; border taxes, and re-
strictive business practices (including government sanctioned cartels) 
and various other practices. 
The United States' Participation in 
Trade Negotiations 
The reduction in the volume of international trade initiated by the 
high tariffs of· the u.· s.· Smoot-Hawley Tariff was further accentuated in 
24 1933 by the worldwide Depression.·· The 1934 Trade Agreements Act re-
versed the trend of U. S. protectionist policy. It granted the Presi...,. 
dent the power to reduce tariffs within limits. Any reductions; which 
were limited by statute· to· a maximum percentage, were to be matched by 
reciprocal reductions by· the other negotiating nation and were not to 
cause any serious injury to.U. S. industry. Tariff negotiations of this 
era were conducted on a.bilateral basis, primarily on narrowly defined 
products for which one nation was the principal supplier; the purpose of 
such narrow· definitions of negotiable items· was to prevent the extension 
of benefits· to any· other· countries. under the most-favored-nation (mfn) 
provision for which there was no reciprocity. 
In 1944 the BrettonWoods agreement established the International 
Monetary Fund· (IMF)· and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
25 Development (IBRD). During this period of international economic 
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cooperation, efforts also were being made both to achieve an inter-
national accord on trade liberalization and to establish an Internation-
al Trade Organization (ITO) for the administration of trade policy. 
After lengthy conferences, agreement was achieved in early 1948 on a 
final version of that Organization's charter; the charter was never 
ratified by the signatories and ITO did not come into existence. Mean-
while, parallel discussions did result in the agreement upon an inter-
national trade treaty, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
which was signed in October 1947 with the intention of its absorption 
into ITO. The next year the treaty's rules of trade policy and nego-
tiated tariff concessions became effective. Although the ITO was never 
established, GATT has survived to the present day as a loose type of or-
ganization. GATT now has over sixty member countries and is affiliated 
with the United Nations. In addition to its major activity of trade 
barrier negotiations, GATT has established a set of rules concerning 
trade relations, permissible deviations from the ideal of free trade, 
and a framework for the administration of such rules and the reconcilia-
tion of conflicts. 
The first tariff negotiating session of GATT occurred in 1947 in 
Geneva. It was a multilateral conference among twenty-three participat-
ing countries for mutual tariff reductions on an item-by-item basis. The 
negotiations were actually conducted on a bilateral basis between princi-
pal suppliers with the lists of proposed reductions circulated to the 
other parties. The first round of negotiations was followed by five more 
rounds which have been completed to date. 26 The first round of GATT 
achieved significant results. Subsequent negotiating sessions, until the 
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Kennedy Round, had lesser results, reflecting more limited objectives 
d 1 1 . . 1 . . f 'ff d . 27 an ess po itica incentive or tari re uctions. 
The United States' participation in the Kennedy Round of GATT was 
authorized by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (TEA), which granted the 
President new and broad authority to enter trade agreements with other 
nations. The legislation was unusually detailed because of the incor-
poration of several types of authority for negotiation, the inclusion 
of administrative details for trade agreements program, and the es-
tablishment of relief procedures for domestic economic injuries result-
28 ing from the trade agreements. Primarily, the TEA gave the President 
a five-year grant of authority to reduce by a maximum of 50 percent 
tariff rates exceeding 5 percent (with the exception of certain goods) 
and to eliminate duties on items with tariff rates below 5 percent. The 
major impetus to TEA's passage was the successful development of the 
European Common Market (EEC)j emphasized at that time by British appli-
cation for EEC membership. 
Although the contracting parties to GATT tentatively decided to 
hold a new round of negotiations in November 1962~ the Kennedy Round of-
ficially opened one and one-half years later, with the actual negotia-
tions beginning six months later. Before the actual negotiations con-
cerning the industrial sectors could begin, the basis for negotiation 
first had to be decided. The EEC desired the negotiations to be on the 
basis of "disparities" among national tariffs on specific items. 29 The 
u. S. and other major participants wanted the negotiations based on a 
linear approach, i. e., equal percentage reductions in all participants' 
tariffs. The issue was never explicitly settled and remained to haunt 
the actual negotiations as a potentially explosive issue. 
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Without a victory on the disparities issue, the EEC came to the in-
dustrial negotiations with a large list of exceptions to negotiable 
products. Efforts made by other participants to reduce this list were 
tempered to a degree by the fear of resurrecting the disparities issue. 
Certain groups of products were so troublesome that they posed a threat 
to all negotiations. For although the specific difficulties varied, in 
each case a major participant had made any worthwhile concessions con-
ditional upon obtaining a specified concession from one or more of its 
negotiating partners. In this context, the Director-General of GATT ad-
vanced the idea of separate sectoral negotiations for five major problem 
areas: steel, pulp and paper, aluminum, textiles, and chemicals. De-
spite some fears that special deals would result, it is generally be-
lieved that the approach was necessary and advantageous. 
In the case of chemicals, the U. S., because of its ASP system of 
valuation for certain.chemicals, was the center of attack by the EEC and 
U. K. The U. S. offer of a 50 percent reduction in chemical tariffs was 
rejected by the EEC and U. K.; for them, only an offer by the U. S. to 
abolish ASP would transform chemical products into negotiable items. 
Because the combination of ASP elimination and a 50 percent rate reduc-
tion exceeded the authority of the Trade Expansion Act, a deadlock ex-
isted which continued for the majority of the Kennedy Round. 
The European emphasis on ASP was essentially for tactical pur-
30 poses. Of the four ASP items only benzenoid chemicals were of any 
significance to Europe (primarily Germany), and that significance was of 
limited economic importance. In fact, in overall world trade terms, ASP 
is relatively insignificant, with the possible exception of dyes and 
intermediates. The tactical emphasis soon elevated European emotions and 
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ASP became a highly symbolic issue in Europe in late 1966, imbuing it 
with a bargaining value exceeding the value of benefits from its re-
moval. 
Rather than risk Congressional approval over the entire result of 
the chemical negotiations, the U. S. offered that a chemical settlement 
be made in two "packages": one which would utilize the negotiating au-
thority of the TEA, while retaining the ASP system, and a second ASP-
oriented package which would require Congressional approval to change 
the basis for customs valuation by eliminating ASP. During 1966 and 
early 1967, the two-package approach was resisted. Faced with a June 
30, 1967 expiration date for the U. S. negotiating authority granted by 
the TEA, much activity, including several nearly ruinous crises, oc-
curred in May and June. Both Europe and the U. S. had greater interest 
in obtaining some compromise concessions rather than permitting any dead-
locks to cause the failure of the Kennedy Round. On June 30th itself, 
the negotiated settlement was finalized with the chemical sector agree-
d . k 31 ment separate into two pac ages. 
The Kennedy Round concessions can be summarized as reductions 
averaging 43 percent by the United States on imports of $325 million in 
exchange for tariff reductions by the EEC, U. K., Japan and Switzerland 
32 
which average 26 percent on $890million of imports from the U. S. It 
also included reductions by other countries. The ASP package, was ne-
gotiated only among the major c~emical trading nations: the United 
States, the U. K., EEC, Japan and Switzerland. It recognized, and re-
quired reciprocity on, both the tariff and nontariff effects of ASP and, 
because it eliminated ASP, required Congressional approval in the United 
States. The concessions of the separate ASP agreement consist of: in 
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the case of the United States, the conversion of duties based on ASP to 
norm~! bases of valuation and an average reduction in tariffs of five 
percent; in the case of the EEC,· elimination of the discrimination 
against U. S. automobiles contained in the provisions of its road tax 
system and a 26 percent average reduction in tariffs; in the case of the 
United Kingdom, an average tariff reduction of 22 percent and a reduc-
tion of the preferential tariff margin on tobacco imports;. Switzerland 
agreed to modify its regulations.on canned fruit imports; and Japan 
agreed to make all its tariff concessions in the Kennedy Round package. 
Implementation of the ASP package was included in the Trade Ex-
pansion Act of 1968. The House Ways and Means Committee held extensive 
public hearings on the bill. 33 Much of the testimony was by industry 
and trade association spokesmen, including the Synthetic Organic Chemical 
Manufactures Association (SOCMA) representing 74 manufacturers of benze-
noid.chemicals who account for 80 percent of U. S. benzenoid production 
and the Manufacturing Chemists Association (MCA) representing a broader 
group of chemical firms. The overall industry response to the ASP 
package before Congress was negative. As Evans notes: 
[T]he United States chemical industry as a whole stood to 
gain from this conditional chemical package a much deeper 
reduction in the post-Kennedy Round tariffs impeding its 
exports than in the tariffs protecting its domestic mar-
kets. Furthermore, after these reductions, the resulting 
level of the chemical tariffs of the United States would 
remain substantially higher than those faced by its 
principal chemical exports. For aI.J. industry which, as 
indicated by its ne~t export position, is well able to meet 
foreign competition in· most products, this would have 
seemed to be an attractive exchange. But industries, 
like governments, are often prisoners of the positions 
they have taken in the past, and almost as soon as the 
results of the Kennedy Round became known, spokesmen for 
tl).e chemical industry as a whole declared their opposi-
tion to congressional approval of the ASP Agreement.34 
The two trade associations strongly objected to the elimination 
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of ASP; they argued that ASP is the best way to ensure an equalization 
of U. S. production costs with those of Europe and Japan and that such 
equalization is necessary for the survival of the U. S. benzenoid chemi-
1 . d 35 ca in ustry. SOCMA officials presented five specific arguments con-
cerning the U. S. industry's need of the ASP system: (1) the molecular 
structure of benzenoid chemical is such that a production process re-
sults in a series of benzenoid coproducts with differing demands, and, 
hence, the importation of a key income-producing coproduct may make the 
entire series unprofitable; (2) benzenoid prices vary among foreign 
countries and cannot be "counted on" when a tariff rate is decided; (3) 
some benzenoids (in fact, less than 7 percent of total U. S. benzenoid 
production) are made by "batch" processes which entail higher labor 
costs and place U. S. producers at a competitive disadvantage; (4) 
foreign producers face weaker antitrust laws than U. S. firms and, as a 
result, have more monopoly power in their domestic markets and often 
operate cartels; and (5) any reduction of protection would reduce re-
search in the field of benzenoid chemicals, particularly limiting ad-
vances in synthetic fibers and dyes. 
No decision was made on the legislation and the bill died in com-
mittee. The ASP package was inGluded again in the Trade Act of 1970 
submitted to Congress. The House Ways and Means Committee initially 
eliminated the ASP package. And, although it did finally reincorporate 
an ASP provision, its form was altered from the negotiated ASP package 
of the Kennedy Round. The provision in the legislation granted the 
President the authority to remove ASP if he is certain that the foreign 
countries' offers warrant it and gave Congress the power to veto any 
Presidential action within sixty days. 
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As previously mentioned, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (TEA) es-
tablished relief procedures for industries, firms or groups of workers 
significantly harmed by trade agreement concessions. These procedures 
specify that, following an.investigation and an affirmative finding by 
the Tariff Commission, relief for an industry may be in the form of in-
creased tariffs, import restrictions or marketing agreements; assistance 
to firms may be technical aid, financial help or tax benefits; whereas, 
groups of workers may receive compensation for their unemployment, job 
training, or relocation allowances. 
Between the fiscal years 1963 to 1975 during which .the provisions 
of the TEA were in effect, there were a total of twenty-nine industry· 
i i h fi d 263 k . i d 36 cases, s xty-e g t . rm cases an · · wor er cases invest gate . Over 
the 12-year period, the trend of industry cases per year was relatively 
stable, whereas the year 1971 marked a dramatic increase in firm and 
worker investigations. · Eighty~five percent of the 68 firm cases were 
filed after that year. Of the 263 worker cases, ninety-two percent were 
filed between 1971 and 1975. The affirmative and tied determinations 
represented 31 percent of the industry investigations, 41 percent of the 
firm cases, and 36 percent of the worker cases. The firms and workers 
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of the shoe industry constituted the majority of the cases. · Through-
out this time period, the chemical industry requested only one firm in-
vestigation and one investigation on behalf of .a group of workers; both 
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received negative determinations. 
The President's negotiation authority under TEA, which was the 
foundation of U. S. participation in the Kennedy Round of GATT, expired 
July 1, 1967.· The trade agreements legislation of major importance to 
succeed TEA was the Trade Act of 1974. 39 Among its many substantive 
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provisions, the Trade Act granted the President new authority for the 
five years beginning 1975 to enter into international trade agreements. 
The authorized tariff modifications permit both increases and decreases 
in duties. Under the Trade Act of 1974, the Executive may: 
•.. eliminate such duties which did not exceed 5 percent; 
reduce by up to 60 percent duties which exceeded 5 per-
cent; and proclaim increases in or imposition of duties 
up to the higher of either 50 percent above the Tariff 
Schedules of the United States (TSUS) column 2 rate or 
20 percent ad 4alorem (percentage points) above the TSUS 
column 1 rate. 0 
In addition, the Trade Act included provisions for relief in cases 
where domestic industries, firms or groups of workers are being sub-
stantially injured by import competition as a consequence of trade agree-
ment concessions. The legislation made significant changes in the ad-
ministrative procedures by removing firm and worker cases from the 
jurisdiction of the Tariff Commission; furthermore, it altered the cri-
. b f . d 41 teria to e met or in ustry cases. 
Summary 
This chapter sets the scene for the study. It begins with an out-
line of the structure and behavior of the chemical industry. The Stand-
ard International Trade Classification, Revised is the definition of the 
chemical industry used in this study. The industrial structure within 
both the United States and industrialized foreign countries is oligopo-
listic; however, the industry is international in scope. Competition, 
which can be intense, is predominantly of the non-price variety. 
The chapter also discusses trade barriers incurred by chemicals. 
Trade barriers for chemicals have a long history in the United States, 
having begun in the 18th century. In 1972, the ad valorem equivalents 
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of the U. S. tariffs on chemicals averaged 8.1 percent. The most con-
troversial aspect of U. S. trade barriers to chemical imports is the 
American Selling Price (ASP) method of valuation, often called the 
"flexible tariff." A tariff rate applied under ASP understates the true 
tariff in cases where the American selling price of a comparable domes-
tic good exceeds the price of the import. In view of the market power 
existent in oligopolistic market structures, the importance of the po-
tential for ASP's "flexible tariff" to become a complete barrier to 
trade is tempered by the limited applicability of ASP in terms of trade 
volume. In addition to this tariff effect, ASP incorporates the non-
tariff effects of uncertainty and complex administration. Other non-
tariff barriers applicable to chemical trade throughout the world are 
briefly summarized and most frequently cite the pharmaceutical group 
within the chemical industry. 
The chapter finishes with a review of U. S. participation in trade 
negotiations, primarily focusing upon the important role ASP played in 
the Kennedy Round of negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT). In general, tariffs have been reduced since the pas-
sage of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Beginning in the mid-1940s, 
GATT has been the organization for the negotiating sessions. The most 
recently completed session, the Kennedy Round (1964-1967), was particu-
larly successful in its final outcome. The session itself, however, was 
replete with problems, among which the chemical industry and the U. S. 
ASP system loomed large. The chemical industry was separated from the 
general negotiatiqns as a special problem sector and the chemical con-
cessions were made in two packages, the so-called Kennedy Round conces~ 
sions and the Supplemental Agreement on Chemicals. Only the former 
26 
package became effective. 
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which authorized U. S. participa-
tion in the Kennedy Round, also established relief procedures for in-
dustries, firms or groups of workers injured by import competition re-
sulting frotn trade concessions. This study's review of the investiga-
tions finds that the chemical industry has rarely requested assistance 
and has not received any assistance from these provisions. 
The most recent U. S. trade agreements legislation of major sig-
nificance is the Trade Act of 1974. It includes authorization for the 
President to enter into new trade agreements between 1975 and 1979 and 
to reduce most tariff duties by up to 60 percent. Therefore, this 
study, which considers the·effect of the elimination of the post-Kennedy 
Round tariff duties (the second scenario), overstates the maximum im-
pact of any results from the current round of GATT which is now com-
mencing. 
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31 The two separate agreements ·for the chemical sector are expli-
cated in Appendix A. 
32u. S. House, Hearings, pp. 502-503; the base year for this data 
is 1964. 
33The statements of the public witnesses at the Committee's hear-
ings conc~rning chemicals are in U.S. House, Hearings, pp. 4483-4810. 
A summary of the industry opposition expressed at the hearings and the 
legislative outcome is contained in Curtis and Vastine, pp. 122-126. 
34 Evans, p. 286. 
35The speciousness of their argument lies in the fact that trade 
is based primarily on cost differences; hence, the accomplishment of 
cost equalization, if possible under the flexible tariff of ASP, would 
eliminate all foreign trade. Kelly in Balassa and Associates, p. 291. 
36u. S. International Trade Commission, Annual Report 1975 (Wash-
ington, D. C., 1976), pp. 11-12. 
37Michael R. Edgmand and Tracy W. Murray, "Full Employment, Trade 
Expansion, and Adjustment Assistance," Southern Economic Journal, XXXVI 
(1970), pp. 404-424; U. S. International Trade Commission, Annual Re-
port 1975, pp. 11-12; and U. S. Tariff Commission, Annual Report of the 
United States Tariff Commission· (Washington, D. C., Years 1970 - 1974). 
38In 1964, Industrial- Biochemicals, Inc. of Edison, New Jersey, a 
manufacturer of sodium gluconate, filed a petition as a firm for an in-
vestigation which was negatively determined; and in 1974, the request 
for assistanc~ to the employees of GAF Corporation's plant in Linden, 
New Jersey (synthetic organic dyes and pigments) was denied. 
31 
39united States Code: Congressional 
Congress~-Second Session, 1974 (St. Paul, 
Public Law 93-618; 88 Stat 1978; referred 
proved January 3, 1975, pp. 2293-2294: 
and Administrative News, 93rd 
Minn., 1975), pp. 2290-2407. 
to as Trade Act of 1974, ap-
The purposes of this Act are, through trade agreements 
affording mutual benefits--
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(!) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
to foster the economic growth of and full employ-
ment in the United States and to strengthen 
economic relations between the United States and 
foreign countries through open and nondiscrimina-
tory world trade; 
to harmonize, reduce, and eliminate barriers to 
trade on a basis which assures substantially 
equivalent competitive opportunities for the com-
merce of the United States; 
to establish fairness and equity in international 
trading relations, including reform of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; 
to provide adequate procedures to safeguard Ameri-
can industry and labor against unfair or injurious 
import competition and to assist industries, firms, 
workers and communities to adjust to changes in 
international trade flows; 
to open up market opportunities for United States 
commerce in nonmarket economies; and, 
to provide fair and reasonable access to products 
of less developed countries in the United States 
market. 
United States International Trade Commission, Operation of the 
Trade Agreements Program, 26th Report, 1974 (USITC Publication 765), 
(Washington, D. C. , 1976). 
41 U. S. International Trade Commission, Annual Report 1975, p. 11. 
CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
Survey of Previous Studies 
The approach of this paper is based on the traditional static, 
partial-equilibrium model for tariff analysis. Several previous studies 
serve as the genesis for this. study' s application of the model. These 
studies are reviewed briefly in this section. 
Balassa, in collaboration with several other economists, examines 
the economic and political effects of alternative arrangements for trade 
policy among the industrialized nations of the world. 1 He first pre-
sents ·the economic and political setting for various trade arrangements 
and then analyzes the trade barriers existing in 1960. He then uses the 
traditional partial-equilibrium model to estimate the static effects of 
different forms of trade liberalization. 2 
The static effects analyzed are the direct (changes in imports, ex-
ports, and welfare), the indirect ("feedback" from nonindustrialized 
countries), and the discriminatory (trade diversion) effects. The analysis 
is based on 1960 (pre-Kennedy Round) data at the three-digit SITC level; 
however, the only results presented are aggregated into two groups--in-
dti.strial materials and manufactured goods. He uses Ball and Marwah' s 
import demand elasticities for the U. S. adjusted upwards, and then de-
rives elasticities for the rest of the industrialized world. 3 The esti-
mates of the direct effects of a 50 percent tariff cut are made under 
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two sets of alternative assumptions: one is that export prices are con-
stant in all countries so that the tariff changes are fully reflected in 
the import prices; the alternative assumes Europe's export prices rise 
by one-third the tariff reduction by the rest of the world, with all 
other countries' export prices remaining constant. Balassa estimates 
for Manufactured goods and Industrial materials that the direct effects 
under either alternative would be an expansion of U. S. exports to the 
other industrial countries in an amount of $1.666 billion. U. S. import 
expansion totals an estimated $1.655 billion for the first alternative 
and $1.898 billion for the second alternative. Thus, the direct effects 
on the U. S. trade balance are +$11 million and - $232 million for the 
two respective alternatives. The welfare gains from the direct effects 
of a 50 percent tariff reduction are $71 million under the first variant 
and $108 million under the second variant for the U. S. Balassa com-
pletes his book with a discussion of the possible consequences of trade 
liberalization on the broadening of markets and on capital flows. 
The study by MacPhee of trade restrictions in the steel industry 
quantifies both tariff and non-tariff barriers and then uses a partial 
equilibrium model to obtain estimates of their restrictive effects for 
h . 1 d' . 4 t e maJor stee -tra ing countries. He does not estimate welfare effects 
or the effects in the export market. Although the discussion and 
quantification of the nontariff barriers form the major part of .the 
book, the portions contributing to this study are the algebraic formula-
tions of the price and quantity effects of tariff removal and of the 
elasticity relationships. These are described below as they are used in 
the analytical framework. 
Kreinin has discussed the importance of this type of analysis. 
A cut_in our tar:i,ff rates may or may not r~sult in 
an equivalent decline in import prices. In all proba-
bility only part of _the reduction would be passed on to 
the_U. S. consumer, the remainder being reaped by 
foreign suppliers in the- form of higher export prices. 
The division of the total gain between the foreign pro-
ducer and the domestic· confiumer would-depend.on the 
relative elasticit.ies of import .demand and_ export 
supply. • • • 
Despite the importance of the problem .•• , it 
is usually overlooked in studies concerning the impact 
of our Trade Agreements Program. 5 - -
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The Baldwin and Mutti·paper examines the policy problems of adjust-
ment to trade liberalization for several import-competing industries in 
the United States.6· ·They discuss at length· the· various aspects of the 
costs of tariff removal. The empirical portion of their study measures 
the gains from· and costs of tariff removal by the _U. S. in five indus-
7 tries. Their model, the standard partial-equilibrium framework, is _used 
to estimate "the net direct gain or loss_ in welfare· from reducing the 
tariff which · is · defined as the present value of the shaded areas 
i. e. , th,e net_· consumer welfare gain determined by discounting the 
sum over some appropriate· time period and at some appropriate interest 
rate -- minus the· present value of the loss of productive output during 
the transitional period. 118 The result is a range of estimates of the net 
direct gain (loss) in each industry. The range of estimates is due to 
the lack of disaggre~ated· elasticity estimates at the time of their 
•• 
study; this void.causes· them to choose to use "a range to represent 
plausible elasticities· for our five industries. 119 It should.be noted 
that they assume the-price- change from tl:l,riff removal equals the full 
amount of the· tariff and that· they· consider only the United States im-
port market•·· Citing just· one· set· of their· findings, namely, that which 
assumes an· elasticity of· import demand equal to 2.0- and an elasticity of 
domestic supply equal to 0.09, Baldwin and Mutti estimate that the net 
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welfare effect equals $18.0·million for chemicals, defined as U. s. 
input-:output industry (27). This discounted figure is composed of 
$24. 678 million· of· benefits and· $6·. 678 million of costs from labor dis-
location, determined by· using a· five-year time hori~on for the bene-
fits, a nine-week labor unemployment duration, and a 10 percent dis-
count rate. 
The major contribution of the· Baldwin and Mutti paper to both the 
literature and· to· this· study is· the· methodology of estimating the cost 
of tariff removal. ·The cbst results· from the· transitional dislocation 
of the factors· of production· used in producing the domestic import-
competing commodities. These costs are estimated using labor as a proxy 
for all the factors of production. The methodology as it is used in 
this study is described in detail in the subsequent section on resource 
dislocation. 
Magee's paper· provides estimates of the welfare effects ,in the 
10 United States of restrictions on trade for broad product classes. He, 
too, utilizes the traditional framework for his analysis and assumes 
constant foreign pric~s· for· U. S.· importables. Following a general dis-
cussion of· free trade, government restrictions and the Burke-Hartke bill, 
he applies the· model to obtq.in-both short-run and long-run estimates of 
the gains from the removal· both of u.· s.· restrictions on its imports and 
of foreign restrictions OU' u·. s· .. exports. The welfare gains are treated 
as perpetual annual· flows· which· grow larger through time because long-run 
elasticities· generally· exceed those of the short-run. The annual flows 
are then discounted to obtain present values of the gains from trade 
liberalization. 
Magee also follows Baldwin and Mutti and explicitly recognizes the 
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cost flow from transitional resource dislocation. . Since his considera-
tion for a~alysis is that of long-run efficiency of a full-employment 
economy, he measures resource dislocation resulting from the long-run 
changes in domestic production. 
Magee· estimates'· assuming a 10 percent discount rate and a five-
year time· horizon,· that" the· U«' .s. ·welfare gain from the increase in di-
rectly competitive imp,orts intt>' the· U. s-. and· the increase in exports of 
manufactured goods·,. both· net· of labor dislocation costs, is $2. 6 bil-
lion. For total imports and total exports his estimate increases to 
$30.7 billion. 
The present study particularly·benefitted·fromMagee's analysis of 
the U. S. export market,·which is· commonly forgotten in similar studies, 
and by his distinction of the long-run and short-run estimates. 
Lastly, mention should be· made· of another study with similar ob-
jectives but completely different methodology. This study by Jondrow, 
Devine, Jacobson, Katz and O'Neill estimate.s the effects of removing 
U. S. restrictions on steel· imports, including the quota. 11 The authors 
estimate from an econometric model of the steel industry, using 1956 to 
1974 time series· data, the effects of free trade in terms of the change 
in domestic prices and production,· the change in employment,· the earn"".' 
ings losses of the displaced workers, and the net gain to society. The 
effects are estimated for two time periods: 1969-1973 and 1974-1978. 
The Static Model 
The economic impact of reducing· trade barriers· affects the United 
States economy· in a multitude of ways·.· · The static model for this study 
focuses on three major aspects of the total effect. They are the direct 
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effects in the chemical· import· markets, the chemical export markets, and 
the transitional resource adjustments. 
The Import Market 
The global' reduction of barriers· to chemical imports,· in general, 
will lower the· prices· of chemical imports into the United States. The 
lower prices of· iiµported chemicals will cause some shifting of pur-
chases from· domesticallymanufac1;:ured chemicals toward the now less ex--
pensive competitive· import.· Hence·, imports increase and domestic pro-
duction usually is· reduced. 12 
This generalized· statement assumes· that· each chemical· commodity 
that is imported into the· United States also is produced domestically. 
Such an assumption is· unlikely to be warranted for every individual. 
chemical import;· however, the relatively disaggregated level of the 
present study· still maintains· a substantial degree of aggregation and 
gives substance to such an assumption for each chemical category 
analyzed. It is also assumed that the imported and the domestically 
produced chemical commodity are perfect substitutes. 
Consider the elimination of a tariff barrier which· is stated in 
terms of au- advalorem· rate equivalent to its restrictiveness. The 
elimination of the· trade barrier will cause the u.· s.· price of the im-
port to fall. · Only in the case of a perfectly elastic supply of imports 
to the United States will the amount of the price fall be equal to the 
ab'Solute height· of· the.barrier and result in a new price equal to the 
;\._~·· 
"'.., . initial duty'-free·world·price. In the more general case, the .trade bar-
rier elimination· will result· in· a· higher· duty-free world price. 13 This 
increase in the duty-free world price received by the foreign suppliers 
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limits the price fall·in· the United States. Thus, the price of the im-
port in the United States will fall by only a fraction of the per-unit 
value of the .barrier removed·. 
This more general· case is illustrated by· the United States' import 
market in Figure l(a)·where Pis the original duty-free price, P' the 
initial U.· S·.· price· of the import and M the initial quantity· of .imports. 
With trade· barrier removal, the import price in the U. S. will fall to 
P . This fall is only a fraction, "s," of the absolute· amount of the 
0 
barrier, and equals (P' - P ) = sT = stP, where T is the per-unit value 
0 
of the tariff· and· t· is the· ad valorem tariff rate. 14 The percentage 
dP' 
change (negative) in the import price (P+T) for the United States equals: 
dP' st t~M 
-P+_T_ = ·1 +t = 11 - e: - te: 
M M M 
' (3.1) 
and the percentage increase in the original duty-.,.free price received by 
f 1 (dP) i's·.15 oreign supp iers p 
' (3.2) 
where nM is the price· elasticity of U. s. import demand and e:M is the 
price elasticity of the supply of U. s. imports. 
The consequences of .trade barrier changes in a static, partial 
equilibrium· analysis· are· illustrated by use of the domestic market as 
shown . in Figure 1 (b) •16 The reduction- of the· .U. S. price of the import 
from P' to·P· causes a movement· along· the· domestic demand curve and an 
0 . 
increase in consumption of the product from Qi' to Q2'. The new lower 
import price P is· the maximum price· at which domestic producers can 
. . 0 
S'ell their product and, thereby, reduces domestic production from Q1 to 
P' 
p 
0 
p 
P' 
p 
0 
p 
0 
0 
M 
(A) 
(B) 
Q ' 1 
Imports/U. T. 
s M,t 
SM 
DD 
Quantity/U.T. 
Figure 1. Graphic Analysis for Imported 
Connnodity (A) u.s. Import 
Market; (B) U.S. Domestic 
Market 
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_ :.Q2 • It is this production cutback·.that creates the transitional release 
of productive· resources· which is discussed in.alater section. With no 
quantitative restrictions on import~, the discrepancy between the quantity 
demanded and that supplied domestically il3. filled by imports. Thus, im-
ports increase· from· M; i. e·., QlQl ', to Q2Q2'. 
The elimination· of· trade· barriers has implications· also for the na-
tional welfare. Consumer surplus· is· increased, as illust.rated by the 
sum of the areas c·, n·, F·, and H'; however, parts of the gain are merely 
transfers to the consumer· sector from: other sectors of the economy. Area 
C is the loss· in· producer surplus as the domestic producers are forced to 
lower their price to match the now lower import price. Furthermore, in 
the case of· tariff· elimination· the government sector loses tariff reve-
nue in the· amount represented by the sum· of the areas F and G. 17 The 
welfare effect (WM) of trade barrier removal is shown D.+ H - G in the 
case of t~riffs. 
Quantification· of the magnitudes of· the effects is obtained from 
relationships utilizing· the· previously calculated percentage decline in 
the U. S. import price and· vario-qs elasticity estimate.s. The percentage 
change in imports (dM) is: 18 M 
M ; (3.3) 
dM 
-= 
19 
and the change in the duty-free value of imports (dVM) equals: 
.dP 
p 
+ dM + dP dM.] 
M P M. (3.4) 
And the change in· welfare (dWM) of the importing country from tariff 
1 . . i . 20 e iminat on is: 
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(3.5) 
The Export.Market 
The analysis for .the· United States export market is analagous to 
that for imports. The elimination of foreign trade barriers lowers the 
prices paid· by· the· rest-of-the-world for United States exports. Initially 
and temporarily the' price· fall. is from· P·' to P in Figure 2 (a). The 
lower foreign price is viewed as causing an increase in demand for U. S. 
exports and results in· an upward movement ~long the export.supply curve. 
Thus, as production is increased the price received by the exporter in 
the United Stat~s rises from P to P0 • 21 The price rise is a function of 
the price elasticit.ies of export supply and demand as well as t;he height 
of the eliminated tariff. 
In the domestic market,· the· price rise causes an incr:ease in do-
mestic production and a· decrease in the quantity demanded domestically. 
Assuming the amount by which· the quantity supplied exceeds the quantity 
demanded is exported, exports from the U. s. increase. The increase in 
the quantity of exports· (X:) is illustrated in Figure 2(b) by the change 
in exports from Qi Q1 ', at P·-.to_ Q2Q2 ' at ~o. The welfare effects for the 
United States are a loss of consumer surplus illustra~ed by the combina-
tion of areas E and F· and an offsetting gain in producer surplus repre-
sented by the sum of areas E, F, G, H and I. The net result is a wel-
fare gain for the United States .composed of G, H, and I. 
The percentage increase in the U. S. price of the exported good 
(dP) . 1 1 d is ca cu ate as: p 
(3. 6). 
P' 
p 
0 
p 
0 x Exports/U. T. 
(A) 
t--~~......,.~-.-~~~--..~~..__~~~- DX 
i--~~-+"--"""~-=-~-t."'"--+~~~.,...--D 
X,t 
0 
(B) 
Q ' 1 Quantity/U.T. 
Figure 2. Graphic Analysis for an Exported 
Commodity (A) U.S. Export 
Market; (B) U.S. Domestic 
Market 
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the magnitudes of the ensuing effects are estimated as• 
(3. 7) 
(3.8) 
for the change in the value of e~ports (dVX)' and for the welJare gain. 
(dWX) of .the United States: 
(3.9) 
where Ex and nx are, respectively, the price elasticities of U. S. ex-
22 port supply .·and U. S. export demand. 
Resource Adjustment . 
The elimination of tariffs causes a reduction in the output of the 
import'7competingsectors and aµ·increase in production by the exporting 
sectors. The changes in.production precipitate chaq.ges .in resource em-, 
ployment, given a fixed level of technology. This resource dislocation 
is a transitional phenomena whi·ch· exists only until the economy returns 
to a position-of.long"'.'run equilibrium;· however,· even the transitional 
unemployment of these factors· is a cost .. to society which offsets to some 
extent any welfare gains from trade liberalization.· Because of the .dif-
ficulties involved in assessing the cost of relocating capital equipment,. 
this study estimates the. social cost of .resource dislocation solely in 
terms of labor. 
When the import ... competi,ng· sectors· reduce.output, they eithe'I'. under-
utilize and/or release some of their labor resources. Until these 
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resources are once again fully-employed or reabsorbed by other parts of 
the economy, society loses potential output. The output expansion by 
the export sectors also involves a cost because people must change from 
jobs in other parts of .the economy into employment in the expanding 
sectors; however, these transitional costs of expansion are much less 
because the time of transition is shorter. The sum of the dislocation 
costs in both markets approximates the cost to society. 
The methodology for obtaining these estimates parallels that of 
23 Baldwin and Mutti as applied by them and also by Magee. Changes in 
output are assumed to yield only changes in the quantity of e~ployment, 
without changes in the intensity of'labor utilization. The change in 
employment is estimated by multiplying the predicted long-run change in 
output by a direct labor-output coefficient. 24 Algebraically, for the 
25 import markets: 
(3.10) 
where ~L is the change in jobs, Q the quantity of domestic output, P'Q 
the initial value of output, en* the long-run price elasticity of do-
~' L 
mestic supply~ P+T the percentage fall in the domestic price and P'Q 
the number of employees per value of output. Because the value of out-
put data include output for export, equation 3.10 is rewritten as: 
(3.11) 
where v8 is the value of domestic supply and VX is the value of U. S. 
exports. For the export markets, an analagous relationship exists: 
(3.12) 
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The total change in jobs in each type of market is then converted to an 
annual figure assuming there is a two-year period of labor adjustment to 
26 the change in output. 
This annual change in labor is· multiplied by the average duration 
of,unemployment· in years and by the annual average total cost of labor 
in the subgroups within the chemical industry. 27 This product is the 
cost of labor dislocation for each year of the two-year adjustment 
period. 
The cost of dislocation is estimated using two alternative as-
sumptions. 28 The first variant yields a minimum cost estimate for the 
dislocation given segregation of the import and export markets. It as-
sumes that the average duration of,unemployment for the import market 
is the average duration of unemployment for the economy as a whole, and 
therefore, by assumption, equals one-half the economy~s average duration 
for the export market. The second variant assumes the average durations 
for the import; and export markets are twice those of variant one. This 
recognizes the possible existence of small localized labor mar'Kets in 
which a plant closing substantially increases the average duration of un-
employment. Variant two would yield a maximum cost estimate. 
An important caveat is the possible overstatement of the transition 
costs resulting from the separate treatment of the import~competing and 
the export sectors. This would occur if the resources move easily from 
the import-competing sectors to the expanding export sectors. This 
would seem to be a likely occurrence within the sectors of the chemical 
industry. Hence, an alternative set of estimates of the transitional 
dislocation cost is made by netting out the production expansion due to 
increased exports from the output reduction in the import sector for 
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each chemical sector. If the net result is production expansion, it is 
treated as an export market as discussed above; otherwise it is treated 
as an import market. This integration of the import and export markets 
furnishes a set of lower-bound estimates of the cost under either variant. 
The Model Over Time 
The model presented in the preceding section is a framework for 
static analysis. This section incorporates an intertemporal treatment 
into the analysis.·· The estimates of the welfare effects and the dislo-
cation costs are the annual amounts of temporal flows which are of dif-
ferent durations. In order that the cost and welfare flows be commen-
surable, the flows must be discounted to derive their present values. 
Two discount rates, 5 percent and 10 percent, are used to compute 
alternative estimates of the present values of the gains from and costs 
of free trade. Baldwin and Mutti used 5 percent, 10 percent, and 15 
percent as a range of plausible rates; however, as they point out, this 
does not allow for growth of income and; hence, of demand and supply 
which Cquses their results to be biased downward. 29 Magee explicitly 
considers growth and shows that "the discount factor, incorporating 
both [the real] growth [rate, g, J and the rate of capitalization, 
r' . is i 1 1 
,,30 
approx mate y equa · to r - g. He believes a discount 
factor of 4 percent is most plausible but also computes estimates using 
discount rates of 7 and 10 percent. 
The relevant long-run time horizon chosen for the analysis is 
rather arbitrary. Baldwin and Mutti use a ten-year horizon but also 
present estimates for a five-year horizon "which might be more realis-
tic for politicians who face frequent elections. 1131 They reject 
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an infinite time horizon as unrealistic because of changes in taste and 
technology that occur over time. They assume labor adjustment occurs 
within one year. ·Magee assumes the. gains flow through perpetuity and 
labor ac;ljustment occiJrs over five years. 32 He also reports, however, 
the presentvalue of a five-year flow of benefits. This study uses a 
five-year time horizon for the long-run and assumes a two-year short-
run. 
The welfare gains from trade liberalization increase over time be-
cause long-run elasticities generally exceed those of the short-run. 33 
Thus, the welfare gains discussed above (Equations 3.5 and 3.9) are. 
calculated twice using the long-run and short-run elasticities. The 
short-run welfare effects are assumed to exist for the initial two years 
and the long-run effects are assumed for the remaining three years of 
t, 
the time horizon. This assumed stream of benefits is then discounted. 
The annual dislocation costs are derived from the production 
change to a new long-run equilibrium position. The time horizon for the 
labor adjustment flow is assumed to be two years. It is the present-
value of this two-year cost flow which is netted out of the discounted 
benefit stream. 
Summary 
This chapter begins with a review of the literature. The study by 
Balassa estimates· the static effects· of trade liberalization using 1960 
data. These effects on trade expansion. and social welfare are pre-
sented for two types of commodities (industrial materials and manu-
factured goods). · MacPhee quantifies the trade barriers in the steel in-
dustry .and then estimates the restrictive effects of those barriers. 
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In his study, he presents several elasticity relationships from which 
he estimates the price and quantity effects of tariff removal. The 
Baldwin and Mutti paper estimates the net welfare effects of tariff re-
moval for theU. S. import market· in five industries. The net welfare 
effect is composed of the net.consumer welfare gain and the loss from 
labor dislocation. Magee's paper follows Baldwin and Mutti's method,... 
ology but expands the analysis to include the effects in export markets. 
These previous works form the foundation for the analytical methodology 
used in this study. 
The major portion of the chapter is devoted to the development of 
the theoretical methodology for this study. The model presented in the. 
chapter consists of four components. The first two are static, partial 
equilibrium analyses of the U. S. import market and of the U. S. export 
market for a commodity (or commodity group). For the import market, 
elimination of a trade barrier will cause, in most cases, an increase 
in the duty-free world price and a decrease in the U. S. price of the 
import. The fall in the U. S. price of the import will be limited to 
only a fraction of the .per-unit value of the barrie~ removed. The 
analysis for the export.market is analagous to that for imports. The 
elimination of foreign tl;'ade barriers lowers the price paid by the 
rest-of-the-world for United States' exports. From the U. S. viewpoint, 
the.lower price abroad increases the demand for the exported commodity 
and increases the U. S. price of the commodity. The analyses derive the 
changes in prices, the changes in the quantity and. value of imports (ex-
ports), and·the changes in social welfare (composed.of the changes in 
producers'·· and consumers' surpluses and U. S. tariff revenue) which re-
sult fro~ tariff elimination. 
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The third portion of the model focuses upon the social costs which 
occur because of resource adjustments to changes in domestic production 
which result from trade liberalization. The estimates of these costs 
are restricted to the .labor resource and are subtracted from the esti-
mates of the social welfare effects. The estimates of the annual so-
cial cost of labor dislocation are the product of the changes in employ-
ment, the average duration of unemployment and the average total cost 
of labor. 
Lastly, the net welfare effects, i.e., the welfare gains less the 
resource dislocation costs, in the static model are treated as flows 
through time. Thus, it is necessary to select appropriate time horizons 
from which to derive the present values of the net social welfare ef-
fects. 
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12The domestic production effect depends on the relevant elastici-
ties. If the domestic supplyris pel;"fectly in,elastic, the lowel;' prices 
of imported chem~cals will increase imports to fulfill the increased 
quantity demanded without altering domestic production. 
13As viewed by the foreign suppliers, u. So demand for their 
product has increased, causing them to expand and move upward along 
their supply curve. 
14The remainder of the barrier is abs.orbed by foreign suppliers 
whose prices rise by (1-s)T. 
15The equations 3.1 and 3.2 are from MacPhee, p. 45. Although 
MacPhee did not present derivations of these equations in his text, the 
author's own derivations are presented in Appendix B. 
16 Although this analysis is conventional in the literature, a good 
presentation is made by Magee, pp. 658-661. 
17If the original tariff was fully protective, the government had 
no tariff revenue becaus.e. of the exclusion of imports. The model as-
sumes that some imports existed and, hence, some tariff revenue was 
collected prior to free trade; tariff elimination would by definition 
eliminate any tariff revenues. 
18Equation 3.3 is from MacPhee, p. 45. Although MacPhee did not 
present derivations of these equations in his text, the author's own 
derivations are presented in Appendix B. 
19Equation 3.4 is a rearrangement of MacPhee's equation (2.12), p. 
45. As with the preceding equations, a derivation appears in Appendix 
B. 
20 Equation 3.5 is based onthediscussion in Harry G. Johnson, "The 
Cost of Protection and the ScientificTa:i;.-iff," Journal of Political. 
Economy, 68 (1960), especially p. 332. Its derivation appears in Ap-
pendix B and it is used in the computation of the welfare effects re-
ported in Chapter V. 
In addition, for a selected set of assumptions, the components of 
the traditional welfare effect in the import market are calculated sepa-
rately to illustrate the distribution of the effect among the producers 
(p), consumers (c), and government (g) sectors. The equations for 
these separate calculations follow; their derivations appear in Appendix 
B. The change (loss) in prdducers' surplus is: 
dP' 
<vs - vx) [ 1 + dP' ED ]; dWM = 
-(P+T) (~)(P+T) 
,p (3. 5. a) 
the change (gain) in consumers' surplus is: 
dWM 
dP' [ 1 + dP' nD J = -(P+T) VD (~)(P+T) 
,c 
(3.5.b) 
the change (loss) in tariff revenue is: 
[ PdP dWM t = VM 
' 
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(3.5.c) 
21The foreign price abroad for our exports falls, in final analysis, 
from P' to P • 
0 
22The derivations of the equations for the export market, i. e., 
Equations (3.6), {3.7), (3.8) and (3.9) appear in Appendix B. In ad-
dition, for a selected set of assumptions, the components of the tra-
ditional welfare effect on the export market are calculated separately 
to illustrate the distribution of the effect among the producers' (p) 
and consumers' (c) sectors. The equations for these separate calcula-
tions follow; their derivations appear in Appendix B. 
The change (loss) in consumers' surplus is: 
and the change (gain) in producers' surplus is: 
dWX 
,p = 
dP V 
p s 
[ 1 (dP) 1 +·~ p 
(3.9.a) 
(3.9.b) 
23Baldwin and Mutti, and Magee. This approach is criticized by 
Jondrow, et al. 
24As Baldwin and Mutti, and Magee note, this coefficient is an 
average value, but is used as if it were also a marginal value. This 
assumes that the coefficient is a constant. 
25 d * dP'Baldwin and Mutti, p. 12. As noted by Baldwin an Mutti, 
e:n"P+T must be ::: l; if not, tiL > L. 
26 
The two-year period of adjustment is chosen because of evidence 
in the study by Jondrow, et al. for the steel industry. It found that 
the labor adjustment to an output change was nearly complete in one 
year and .. is complete within six quarters. Baldwin and Mutti assume a 
one~year period; Magee assumes a five-year period of adjustment. 
27Both Baldwin and Mutti's andMagee's analysis makes use of the 
average wage of labor. If one were interested in the private cost of 
the dislocation, the lost wages of labor should be adjusted for unem-
ployment benefits which are paid to the unemployed. However, the con-
cern of this study is with the social cost of the transitional dislo-
cation. As theory tells us, employees are paid according to their 
worth. It .must be noted that most employees receive from their em-
ployers more than just their wage; fringe benefits are significant in 
amount. Thus, the worth of the employee is his total cost to the em-
ployer, i.e., his wage plus the value of his fringe benefits. 
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In the export market, the average duration is assumed to equal 
one-half that of the import market on the.supposition that it is easier 
to move into an expanding industry than to make the transition to a.new 
job from a contracting industry. This assumption is similar to one by 
Magee, pp. 682-683. 
28 Baldwin and Mutti, p. 14. 
29Ibid., p. 11. 
30 Magee, p. 684. 
31 Baldwin and Mutti, p. 11. 
32 Magee, pp. 660, 680. 
33rn terms of Figures 1 (b) and 2 (b) , the domes ti.c supply and demand 
curves would become more elastic, rotating at.the points of intersection 
with the original import supply (export demand) curves at.the initial 
price levels. Thus the deadweight welfare triangles become larger over 
time (assuming the domestic price change is the same in the long~run and 
the short-run, which would be the case if the long-run elasticities of 
demand and supply both increase by the same proportion). 
CHAPTER IV 
THE DATA 
Introduction 
The model described in the preceding chapter forms the basis for 
the empirical analysis of this study. Given the necessary data, the 
model is readily transfqrmed into quantitative estimates. 1 One of the 
greatest challenges in doing research in international trade is pre-
sented by the collection of· the data. The desired data.· do not always 
exist. The various sources of available data use several different 
methods of classification; .hence, early in the.research effort these 
classificationschedules must be reconciled. Also, the available data. 
are at different levels of aggregation. This difficulty is intensified 
because the integrity of data coverage diminishes as the level of dis-
aggregation increases. As a result.of these and other problems, ex-
tensive adjustments to the existing data are necessary. It is the pur-
pose of this chapter·ta·elaborate on the collection of the basic data 
and their modificati.ons.for this study. 
Classification Schedules 
The classificationsystemused inthis study is·the Standard·In-
ternational Trade Classification, Revised (SITC). It .is presented in 
Table I disaggregated to the four-digit level. Unfortunately, the 
multiplicity of data sources for this study are not all arranged 
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TABLE I 
STANDARD INTERNATIONAL TRADE ~LASSIFICATION~ REVISED* 
SECTION 5. CHEMICALS 
Division 51.. Chemical Elements and Compounds 
512 Organic chemicals 
55 
512.1 Hydrocarbons and their halogenated, sulfonated, nitrated 
or nitrosated derivatives 
512.2 Alcohols, phenols, phenol-alcohols, glycerine 
512.3 Ethers, epoxides, acetals 
512.4 Aldehyde-, ketone- and quinone-function compounds 
512.5 Acids and their halogenated, sulphonated, nitrated or 
512.6 
512.7 
512.8 
512.9 
nitrosated derivatives 
Inorganic esters, their salts and derivatives 
Nitrogen-function compounds 
Organo-inorganic and heterocyclic compounds 
Other organic chemicals 
513 Inorganic chemicals: Elements, oxides and halogen salts 
513.1 Oxygen, nitrogen, hydrogen, rare gases 
513.2 Chemical elements n.e.s. 
513.3 Inorganic acids and oxygen compounds of non-metals or 
metalloids 
513.4 
513.5 
513.6 
Halogen and sulphur compounds of non-metals or of 
metalloids 
Metallic oxides, of kinds principally used in paints 
Other inorganic bases and metallic oxides 
514 Other inorganic chemicals 
514.1 Metallic salts and peroxysalts of inorganic acids 
514.2 Other metallic salts and peroxysalts of inorganic 
acids (I) 
514.3 Other metallic salts and peroxysalts of inorganic 
acids (II) 
514.9 Inorganic chemical products, n.e.s. 
515 Radioactive and associated materials 
515.1 Radioactive chemical elements and isotopes and their 
515.2 
515.3 
Division 52. 
compounds and mixtures 
Stable isotopes and their compounds 
Compounds and mixtures, n.e.s. of thorium, of uranium, 
of rare earth metals, of yttrium or of scandium 
Mineral Tar and Crude Chemicals from Coal, Petroleum and 
Natural Gas 
521 Mineral tar and crude chemicals from coal,, petroleum, and 
natural gas . 
*SOURCE: "Standard International Trade Classification, Revised," United 
Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statis~ 
tical Papers, Series M, No. 34, New York, 1961. 
521.1 
521.3 
521.4 
TABLE I (Continued) 
Mineral tar 
Ammoniacal gas liquors and spent oxide produced in 
coal gas purification 
Oil and other products of the distillation of coal 
and tar 
Division 53. Dyeing, Tanning and Colouring Materials 
531 Synthetic organic dyestuffs, natural indigo and colour lakes 
531.0 Synthetic organic dyestuffs, natural indigo and 
colour lakes 
532 Dyeing 
532.1 
532.3 
532.4 
532.5 
and tanning extracts, and synthetic tanning 
Dyeing extracts (vegetable and animal) 
Synthetic tanning materials 
Tanning extracts of vegetable origin 
Tannie acids (tannins) and derivatives 
materials 
533 Pigments, paints, varnishes and related materials 
533.1 Colouring materials, n.e.s. 
533.2 Printing inks 
533.3 Prepared paints, enamels, lacquers, varnishes, 
artists' colours, siccatives (paint driers) and 
mastics 
Division 54. Medicinal and Pharmaceutical Products 
541 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 
541.1 Vitamins and provitamins 
541.3 Penicillin, streptomycin, tyrocidine and other 
antibiotics 
541.4 
541.5 
541.6 
541.7 
541.9 
Division 55. 
Opium aklaloids, cocaine, caffein, quinine and other 
vegetable alkaloids, their salts and other derivatives 
Hormones 
Glycosides; glands and their extracts; sera, vaccines 
Medicaments 
Pharmaceutical goods 
Essential Oils and Perfume Materials; Toilet, 
Polishing and Cleansing Preparations 
551 Essential oils, perfume and flavour materials 
551.1 Essential oils and resinoids 
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551.2 Synthetic perfume and flavour materials and concentrates, 
and enfleurage greases and mixtures of alcohol and 
essential oils 
553 Perfumery and cosmetics, dentifrices and other .. toilet 
preparations (except soaps) 
554 
-TABL~ I (~ontinqed) 
553.0 Perfumery and cosmetics, dentifrices and other toilet 
preparations (except soaps) 
Soaps, 
554.1 
554.2 
554.3 
cleansing and polishing preparations 
Soaps 
Surface-acting agents and washing preparations 
Polishes, pastes, powder and similar preparations 
for polishing and preserving leather, wood, metal, 
glass and other materials 
Division 56. Fertilizers, Manufactured 
561 Fertilizers, manufactured 
561.1 Nitrogenous fertilizers and nitrogenous fertilizer 
materials (other than natural), n.e.s. 
561.2 Phosphatic fertilizers and phosphatic fertilizer 
materials (other than natural)(including super-
phosphates and basic dephosphorization slag) 
561~3 Potassic fertilizers and potassic fertilizer 
materials (other than crude natural potassic salts) 
561.9 Fertilizers, n.e.s. 
Division 57. Explosives and Pyrotechnic Products 
571 Explosives and pyrotechnic products 
571.1 Propellent powders and other prepared explosives 
571.2 Fuses, primers and detonators 
571.3 Pyrotechnical articles 
571.4 Hunting and sporting anununition 
Division 58. Plastic Materials, Regenerated Cellulose and 
Artificial Resins 
57 
581 Plastic materials, regenerated cellulose and artificial resins 
581.1 Products of condensation, polycondensation and 
polyaddition (e.g., phenoplasts, amoniplasts, alkyds, 
polyallyl esters and other unsaturated polyesters, 
silicones) 
581.2 Products of polymerization and copolymerization 
(e.g., polyethylene, polysterene, polyvinyl, etc. 
derivatives, coumaroneindene resins) 
581.3 Regenerated cellulose, chemical derivatives of 
cellulose and vulcanized fibre 
581.9 Other artificial resins and plastic materials 
Division 59. Chemical Materials and Products, N.E.S. 
TABLE I (Continued) 
599 Chemical materials and products, n,e.s. 
599.2 Insecticides, fungicides, disinfectants (including 
sheep and cattle dressing) and similar preparations 
599.5 Starches, inulin, gluten; albuminoidal substances; 
glues 
599.6 Wood and resin-based chemical products 
599.7 Organic chemical products, n.e.s. 
599.9 Chemical products and preparations, n.e.s. 
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according to the SITC system. A partial list of the many existing 
classification systems includes the International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC), the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature (BTN), the 
Standard Industrial Classification of the United States (SIC), the Tar-
iff Schedule of the United States of America (TSUSA), and Schedule A, 
Statistical Classification of Commodities Imported into the. United 
States. These classification systems are not completely amenable to 
cross-classification. 
The BTN schedule is the basis for the tariff schedules of the 
world excluding the United States and Canada, each of which has its own 
classification schedule for tariffs. The BTN schedule corresponds 
exactly with the SITC schedule which was revised in 1961 to effect this 
correspondence at the five-digit SITC level. This correspondence is 
published by the United.Nations. 2 
The United States arranges its tariff schedule according to its 
own unique classification system, the TSUSA. It does not correspond 
directly to the SITC; however, the best possible concordance has been. 
established and published by the U.S. Bureau of Census. 3 
The U. S. import statistics are reported in.terms of Schedule A. 
Schedule A rearranges and summarizes the approximately 
10,000 commodity classifications of the Tariff Schedules of 
the ,United States.Annotated (TSUSA) into approximately 2,400 
7-digit Schedule A Classifications within the.framework of 
the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), Re-
vised. At the l...;., 2-, and 3-digit levels, the number-
ing system of Schedule A is identical with that of·. the SITC. 
The commodity coverage is not always identical, but it is . 
believed.that for most statistical purposes the coiverage 
at the 1-, 2-, and 3-digit levels can be considered es..;. 
sentially comparable with that of the SITC. 4 
5 The cross"".'classificat:j.on is from the U. S. Bureau of Census • 
. . 
,'I,.· 
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Linking the two remaining classification systems discussed in this 
study to the SITC classification is tenuous because of the different 
orientations. Whereas the SITC, BTN, TSUSA, and Schedule A are arrange-
ments according to conunodity use, the ISIC and SIC are production-based 
systems focusing on industrial origin. 
The United Nations has published a cross-classification of SITC 
items to ISIC groups; 6 however, it is not a complete concordance. For-
tunately, the ISIC classified data source used in this study also indi-
cates the SITC item corresponding to the ISIC category. 
The concordance between the SIC and SITC systems which is used in 
this study is one compiled by the author. It is derived from a variety 
of sources at the level of aggregation necessary for use with the Census 
7 
of Manufactures data. 
Import and Export Data 
The import and export data are from OECD statistics for the year 
1972. 8 The data are reported and collected on the three-, and four-
digit SITC levels in terms of value of imports and exports. For the 
SITC subgroups which also report quantity of imports or exports, these 
data are collected likewise. It should be noted that the OECD data for 
the EEC include intra-EEC trade, but the intra-EEC trade statistics are 
also reported. For this study, the intra-EEC trade is subtracted from 
the OECD total. Hence, the EEC data of this study exclude intra-EEC 
trade. 
The value of exports data are on an f. o. b. basis. The import 
figures are c. i. f. values for all countries except the United States 
and Canada. The latter two nations report f. o. b. statistics. In 
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order to maintain consistency in calculating the sundry price elastici-
ties, the u. s. and Canadian f. o. b. import data must be converted to 
a c. i. f. equivalent. 
The conversion of f. o. b. value of imports to c. i. f. values is 
made using information published by the u. S. Bureau of Census. 9 The 
series, which began in 1974, reports value of u. s. imports on three 
bases, i. e., customs value, f. a. s. value, and c. i. f. value, and is 
categorized according to the u. s. Schedule A commodity code. The 1974 
u. S. import data are first regrouped from the Schedule A items into 
the SITC classification system. These data on both the f. a. s. and 
c. i. f. values of u. S. imports permit the calculation for each three-
digit SITC group of a figure which is the percent of the f. a. s. value 
by which the c. i. f. value exceeds the f. a. s. value. These percent-
age figures are used to transform the reported 1972 f. o. b. import data 
of the United States into c. i. f. values. The same conversion factors, 
based on the U. S. data, are also applied to the Canadian value of im-
ports data. 
This conversion assumes the f. a. s. value is identical with the 
f. o. b. value which is not the case. Since no data on both the 
f. o. b. and c. i. f. values are available, the conversion and corres-
ponding assumption appear to be the best possible and preferable to no 
adjustment at all. The conversion also assumes the f. a. s. - c. i. f. 
differential remained the same from 1972 to 1974. Again the 1974 corn-
rnencernent of the data series necessitates the assumption. 
62 
Production Data 
For the United States 
The production data for the United States is Value of Shipments 
data obtained from the 1972 Census of Manufactures. These data, pub-
lished according to the SIC classification, are reclassified into the 
SITC classification used in this study according to a concordance es-
tablished by the author. 
Radioactive and associated materials (SITC 515) is an anomaly be-
cause the Census of Manufactures includes only radioactive isotopes 
shipped from non-AEC plants. Thus, it omits the AEC which is the major 
source of U. s. nuclear material production. To correct for this de-
ficiency, reference was made to the AEC's Financial Sunnnary for 1972 
which reported production of nuclear materials; this figure is in-
10 
corporated in the u. s. production data. 
For the Rest-of-the-World 
Production data for other countries in the study present a greater 
problem. No truly satisfactory source of disaggregated chemical pro-
duction data could be found, as individual countries are reluctant to 
reveal information about their chemical production. 11 This data void 
necessitated an indirect approach to obtain the estimates of chemical 
production for the foreign countries of this study. 
Values of gross output by country are reported in terms of the 
ISIC industrial classification system in the United Nation's Growth of 
12 World Industry, Volume I. The data are quite aggregated; for each of 
the countries in this study, the volume reports the value of gross out-
put for the chemical industry (ISIC's 351 and 352 combined). 13 These 
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data are in terms of the national currency. Therefore it is necessary 
to convert them into the equivalent u. S. dollar values using the 1972 
conversion rates of the OECD. 14 As subsequently described, these 
values of gross chemical output for each nation are used to obtain the 
required disaggregated value of production data. 
The initial disaggregated production data, with the exception of 
SITC 541 (Medicinal and pharmaceutical products), are obtained from the 
United Nation's Growth of World Industry, Volume II. 15 These data are 
quantity of output figures by country for selected individual ISIC num-
bers. The volume also reports the SITC number corresponding to each 
selected ISIC number. This permits the regrouping of these data into 
the SITC classification of this study. 16 For each country, including 
the United States, these re-grouped data are then aggregated to the 
three-digit SITC level and are also totalled for the nation's chemical 
industry. From these figures, a percent of total chemical production 
accounted for by each three-digit SITC is computed. 
Several important things must be noted concerning the production 
data from GWI, II. First, for several countries omissions of the se-
lected ISIC's are prevalent serving to vitiate the data. The United 
States, Japan and the EEC contain few omissions; their data are used as 
reported, subject to the adjustments described below. The United King-
<lorn, Canada, and the "other" countries have massive data omissions and 
are deemed unuseable. 
Secondly, The Growth of World Industry, Volume .!.!. reports only se-
lected ISIC items and, thus, provides incomplete coverage of the in-
dustry. Finally, the data are quantity figures rather than in terms 
of value of production. 
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In the case of Japan and the EEC, the three-digit SITC percentage 
of chemical production figures are adjusted to compensate for the in-
complete coverage and to convert quantity data into value data. This 
procedure asstmles that these countries have similar production propor-
tions of selected to non-selected ISIC items within each SITC group and 
that the price level ratios of one three-digit SITC to another are com-
parable. An initial adjustment coefficient is created; it is the ratio 
of the u. S. Value of Shipments percent to the U. S. Growth of World In-
dustry, Volume II percent for each three-digit SITC. Each adjustment 
coefficient is multiplied by the corresponding percentage production 
figure for each three-digit SITC group to obtain a partially-adjusted 
percentage figure. That is, 
Vs . Vs S S U S S . 
_ _..x_x_x.._,_1_ = ( 1 xxx,U •• I xxx, •• ) xxx, 1 
Vs . Vs S S U S S . x,1 x,U. • x, • • x,1 
where Vs . is the value of shipments (Vs) for the xxx SITC category 
xxx,1 
for country i and S . is the quantity of output with the same sub-
xxx, 1 
scripts. 
In several cases, none of the selected ISIC items belong to a par-
ticular three-digit SITC group. 17 Bence, that SITC group has zero quan-
tities produced by all countries. It is necessary in these cases to 
assume for the partially-adjusted figure the same percentage as the 
United States' Value of Shipments percentage figure. 
A final adjustment is required because the resulting partially-
adjusted percentages plus the adjusted percentage of SITC 541 (discussed 
in the succeeding paragraph) no longer sum to 100. The final adjusted 
percentage figures sum to 100 percent and are obtained by multiplying 
each partially adjusted percentage figure by the ratio of 100 percent 
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minus the SITC 541 percent·· to the total of the partially adjusted per~ 
cents (excluding SITC 541). 
The exceptional category in the production data is SITC 541, Me-
dicinal and Pharmaceutical Products, which is nearly identical to ISIC 
3522. 18 The United Nations' GWI,1,, in addition to reporting the value 
of gross output of the chemical industry (ISIC 351 and 352) for each of 
the countries of this study, also reports value of output for various 
industry subparts for some of the countries of this study. The one sub-
part for which data are available for all the countries of this<study 
is ISIC 3522. Thus, the percent of the total value of chemical output 
accounted for by SITC 541 is computed directly using ISIC 3522 as its 
proxy. This figure is then adjusted by the ratio of the u. S. Value of 
Shipments percent for SITC 541 to the u. s. gross output percent for 
ISIC 3522. The result is a final adjusted percent of total chemical 
output for SITC 541 for each of the foreign countries of this study. 
As noted before, the data of the United Kingdom, Canada, and the 
"other" countries are replete with omissions. Thus, the best recourse 
for these countries seems to be the assumption of an average distribu-
tion of production. For each three-digit SITC excluding SITC 541 a 
percent-of-production figure is obtained by taking the average of the 
EEC's and Japan's adjusted percentages and the Value of Shipments' per-
centage for the u. s. As discussed above, for SITC 541 the percentage 
figure is obtained directly from the Growth of World Industry, Volume 
I. As in the case of Japan and the EEC, adjustment is necessary for 
the result to sum to 100 percent. 
Finally, the adjusted percentages are multiplied by the respective 
1 1 f h . 1 19 nationa va ues o gross c emica output. This yields the value of 
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production estimates for each three-digit SITC for each foreign country 
of the study. 
To summarize, the production data of this study for each three-
digi t SITC group by country are: (1) for the United States, the Value 
of Shipments from the Census of Manufactures and the AEC's nuclear ma-
terials production, (2) for the EEC and for Japan, their respective ad-
justed percentage figures at the three-digit level times the national 
value of gross chemical output, and (3) for the United Kingdom, Canada, 
and the "other" countries, an adjusted average percentage figure times 
the country's gross chemical output. 
Domestic Consumption Estimates 
Given the value of imports, exports, and domestic production for 
each country of this study for each three-digit SITC category, esti-
mates of the value of domestic consumption are computed. These magni-
tudes equal the sum of production and imports less exports. 
Tariff Data 
The computations of this study on the effects of tariff removal 
are performed twice using two sets of tariff data. One set is comprised 
of post-Kennedy Round ad valorem equivalent tariff rates which assume 
approval of the separate ASP package eliminating the ASP system. The 
second tariff set contains post-Kennedy Round rates without implementa-
tion of the ASP supplemental agreement. 
Tariffs Resulting from the Approval of Both Concession Packages 
The former set of tariff rates are based on the GATT Tariff 
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20 Study. The data of the GATT study include average ad valorem tariff 
(or ad valorem equivalent) m. f. n. rates of duty for each BTN heading 
for eleven countries. Two tariff averages are presented for each BTN. 
One is a simple arithmetic average of each national tariff line within 
the BTN. The other average is a weighted average of the tariff lines 
with the country's own imports at each tariff line as the weights. 
Despite the many ways of calculating an average tariff, none is 
without bias. 21 The ideal would be a weighted average with the weights 
being the national imports that would occur under free trade. These 
weights are not known with certainty and cannot be estimated ~ ~· 
The simple unweighted average gives equal importance to all tariff 
lines "under the assumption that the 1 law of large numbers' will lend 
meaning to the result.1122 But the importance of different items varies 
considerably; and an item of little trade significance, under either 
protected or free trade situations, may be given undue weight. 
The weighted-by-own•imports tariff average is biased downward. A 
high duty which is highly restrictive would be given little importance 
in the average because of the "weight" of very few imports. At the ex-
treme, a prohibitive tariff would have a zero weight. 
A preferable and feasible tariff average is a tariff average 
weighted by world imports. Such an average does give recognition to 
the varying importance of different items in world trade but avoids the 
distortions created by·· the existing national tariff structures. 
Unfortunately, the GATT study does not report weighted-by-world-
imports tariff averages for each BTN. 23 Thus, for the present study 
the simple arithmetic averages are used rather than the more highly 
distorted alternative. These simple averages are regrouped according 
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to the SITC-BTN concordance. Since each four-digit SITC contains 
several BTN headings, a tariff average is computed for each SITC by 
weighting each BTN simple tariff average by the value of its world im-
ports. The result is a simple-weighted tariff average for each four-
digit SITC for each of the eleven countries of this paper. 
In the u. s. import market, the effects of tariff removal are es-
timated by using these simple-weighted tariff averages for each four-
digit SITC for the u. S. on the worksheets. For the three-digit cate-
gories, the u. s. four-digit tariffs are averaged using the four-digit 
world import data reported in the GATT study as weights. 
In the export market, it is necessary to first compute "the tar-
iff" faced by u. s. exports in each category. The simple-weighted tar-
iff averages for each of the ten nations of the rest-of-the-world of 
this study are grouped by the four-digit SITC. By using the national 
value of consumption for the chemical industry (SITC 5) as a proportion 
of these ten countries' total consumption as the weights, the weighted 
average of the national tariffs (t) gives a "rest-of-the-world" tariff 
average for each four-digit SITC (t*). 24 
These foreign tariff averages represent the average tariff barriers 
faced by United States' exports in each four-digit SITC groupo They 
are levied on the c. i. f. value of the recipient nation's imports 
(U. S. exports). Because the export data is reported in terms of the 
f. o. b. value, an adjustment to convert each c. i. f. foreign tariff 
average (t~() to a f. o. b. equivalent tariff (t~d~). The conversion is 
25 
accomplished as follows: 
t~'(* = [ 1 + c. i. f. value - f. o. b. value] t* 
f. o. b. value 
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As in the import market, the three-digit tariff averages are computed 
as the weighted-by-world-imports average of the four-digit tariff 
averages. 
Tariffs Resulting from Approval of the Kennedy Round Concessions Only 
The Supplemental Agreement on Chemicals was negotiated among the 
u. s., EEC, u. K. and Switzerland; however, it was never ratified be-
cause of the failure of the u. s. Congress to approve the proposal. 
The American Selling Price system of valuation remains the practice 
for certain benzenoid chemical imports into the United States and the 
additional tariff reductions by the European parties on their imports 
have never transpired. 
The second set of tariff data used in this study are post-Kennedy 
rates without implementation of the ASP supplemental agreement. Because 
of shortcomings in the available data, the rates should be regarded as 
approximate tariff averages. 
The proposed additional duty concessions by Switzerland are on 
non-chemical goods, primarily jams and jellies, and are, thus, outside 
the scope of this sectoral study. The chemical tariff rates of the 
u. K. and the EEC that resulted from the primary Kennedy Round agree-
ment, i. e.,. those in effect without the further concessions conditional 
upon u. S. removal of the ASP system, are garnered from GATT's Legal 
26 Instruments. These tariff schedules report ad valorem rates by BTN 
b . 27 su items. This study first computes a simple unweighted average of 
28 these subitem tariff rates for each BTN. From these BTN tariff 
averages the same procedure is followed as described in the preceding 
section which assumed approval of the Supplemental Agreement. 
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The tariff averages for the United States are extrapolated from 
the corresponding tariff averages of the first scenario (ratification 
of the Supplemental Agreement) using data from a u. S. Tariff Commission 
29 
study. That study, "Major Industrial Product Sectorsg Tariffs and 
Other Trade Barriers," contains post-Kennedy Round ad valorem tariff 
rates (or tariff equivalents) for the United States for several chemical 
30 
sectors. It also notes the tariff averages for these sectors which 
would exist using the rates in the "ASP package." Because these sectors 
contain, in most cases, several three-digit SITC categories, a ratio of 
the non-ratification to the ratification averages is computed for each 
31 
sector. This ratio is then multiplied times the corresponding three-
and four-digit SITC tariff rates for the first scenario. Their products 
are the estimated u. S. tariff averages for the second scenario, which 
assumes that the Supplemental Agreement was never ratified. 
Price Elasticities 
u. s. Import Demand 
The basic data on United States' short-run price elasticities of 
import demand are obtained from the research efforts of others. The 
other required price elasticities are derived from relationships between 
the various elasticities and import or export shares discussed below. 
Because the purpose of this study is a disaggregated sectoral 
analysis, price elasticity estimates disaggregated to the four-digit 
SITC level are desirable; they are also nonexistent. Although many im-
port demand elasticity 'estimates have been made for broad sectors of the 
economy, e. g., manufacturing as a whole, few studies have focused on 
individual d . . . d . 1 d. 32 commo ities or in ustria or commo ity groups. The price 
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elasticities of u. S. import demand used in this study are estimates for 
the three-digit SITC sectors within the chemical industry derived from 
papers by Kreinin and by Richardson. 33 Each three~digit level price 
elasticity also is applied to the four-digit subgroups. 
Kreinin estimates, from time series data, import demand.price 
elasticities disaggregated by commodity groups. The literature has dis-
cussed at length the downward bias inherent in elasticity estimates ob-
. d b d . 1 1 . f . . d 34 taine y or inary east-squares ana ysis o ti.me series ata. The 
existence of this bias suggests that the elasticity estimates should be 
adjusted upwards. 
In addition, studies indicate tariff elasticities exceed price 
1 . . . 35 e asticities. 
[Their] results point to the conclusion that a reduction 
in tariffs is likely to have a larger effect on imports 
than an equivalent change in import prices ~- a phenomenon 
which requires explanation. Aside from the downward bias 
in least-squares estimates of price elasticities, a pos-
sible explanation is that importers regard tariff changes 
as permanent and reallocate their purchases accordingly 
while changes in import prices are often considered 
transitory. Also, a ratchet effect may be operative in 
the second case. Once purchases are accommodated to a 
lower import price, habit formation or simply the acquired 
knowledge of foreign goods would limit the shift back to 
domestic commodities if import prices rose again. On the 
other hand, we have few instances when tariffs were raised 
in the postwar period.36 
Balassa and Kreinin continue "[t]hese results suggest that, for pur~ 
pose of estimating the possible effects of tariff reductions on United 
States' imports, the elasticities calculated ••• need to be adjusted 
37 
upwards. In this study such an adjustment is accomplished by the ad-
dition of three standard errors to the least-squares estimates by 
K . . 38 reinin. 
The remaining three-digit SITC sectors for which Kreinin presents 
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no estimates of the elasticity of import demand are assumed to have the 
elasticity of the chemical industry as an aggregate. This estimate re-
sults from the analysis by Richardson. 
Richardson attempts to meet Orcutt's critique of the usual method 
to estimate elasticities; he uses a structural model, which incorporates 
both suppy and demand variables, to estimate the price responsiveness 
of import demand. No information is available which indicates the sue-
cess of the different methodology employed by Richardson to avoid the 
inherent downward bias of the traditional approach. 
This unevaluated new methodology and the additional problem of tar-
iff elasticities exceeding price elasticities indicate that perhaps an 
upward adjustment, but of a smaller magnitude than three standard errors, 
would be appropriate. Thus, this study for SITC's 515, 521, 561, and 
599 uses an adjusted import demand elasticity figure equal to Richard-
son's structural estimate plus one standard error. 
U. s. Domestic Market and Export Supply 
39 It can be shown that: 
(4.1) 
where nM ( <:0) is the price elasticity of import demand, no ( < 0) is 
the domestic demand price elasticity, t:0 ( > 0) the domestic supply price 
elasticity, and o, s, and M are the (initial) quantities of demand, 
supply and imports, respectively. In an analagous way, one derives the 
relationship for the price elasticity of supply of exports ( t: ) as a 
x 
function of export shares and the domestic price elasticities of supply 
and demand, i. e. 
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(4. 2) 
The relationships formulated in Equations 4.1 and 4a2 cannot be 
used exactly as they were derived because the relationships assume that 
a connnodity is either imported, in which case M = D - s, or exported 
(X = S - D), but not both. As a result of the coexistence of both im-
ports and exports within each three-digit SITC group, an adjustment to 
each equation must be made. 
In the import markets the proper supply figure is not the nation's 
gross output. It is rather the output that is consumed within that 
40 
country. That isll the "S" in Equation 4.1 should be "S-X." Ana .. 
lagously, in the export market, the coexistence of imports requires 
that "D" be replaced with "D~M. 1141 Thus, the equations used in the 
computations of this study areg 
(4.3) 
and 
(4.4) 
It is assumed that the re,lationship between the domestic demand 
and supply price elasticities isg 42 
(4. 5) 
Substituting this assumption into Equation 4.3 produces the following 
relationship for the calculation of the price elasticity of domestic 
supplyg 
(4. 6) 
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The estimates of the domestic supply elasticities for the U. s. and the 
assumption of Equation 4.·5 yields the domestic demand price elasticities 
for each three-digit SITc. 43 
The data on export shares and the estimates of the u. S. domestic 
demand and supply price elasticities are used in Equation 4.4. The re-
sults are estimates of the elasticity of the supply of u. S. exports to 
the rest-of-the-world. 
Foreign Elasticities 
For the individual countries of the rest-of-the-world, the same 
relationships apply; however, even less data are available than for the 
United States. Because of the lack of disaggregated price elasticity 
estimates, it is assumed that the domestic elasticities of supply and 
of demand are identical for all countries. 44 
The countries considered in this study are the most developed and 
highly industrialized countries in the world. Furthermore, these 
countries have technologically and structurally similar chemical in-
dustries. The technological gap between the u. s. and its European and 
Japanese competitors which existed after World War II has been elimi-
d d h . h 1 . 11 . . 45 nate an t ese countries are now tee no ogica y competitive. The 
meager empirical evidence available for international comparisons of 
national industrial structures suggests that the u. S. and u. K. have 
46 the least concentrated structures. These similarities in combination 
with the internationality of many chemical companies give foundation to 
the assumption of identical domestic price elasticities. 
For each three-digit SITC the domestic price elasticities of the 
United States are used in Equations 4.3 and 4.4. These elasticities in 
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combination, as indicated by Equation 4.3, with each country's import 
shares yield estimates for each country's import demand elasticity on 
a three-digit SITC level of disaggregation. Similarly, using export 
shares and Equation 4.4, disaggregated estimates are derived for the 
47 foreign countries' price elasticities of export supply. 
World Elasticities 
For the world as a whole, the price elasticities of import demand 
and export supply are weighted averages of the individual country 
elasticities. Specifically, the elasticity of export supply from the 
48 
rest-of-the-world equals: 
n-UoS. 
E 
i = 1 
49 And the elasticity of world import demand equals: 
n 
= ~ 
i = 1 
!,G s. Import Supply and Export Demand 
( 4. 7) 
(4. 8) 
The effect of trade barrier elimination in the import market depends 
on the price elasticities of U. s. import demand (EM) and of the rest-· 
of-the=world's supply of imports to the United States (sX,W-u.s.>· Mac-
Phee has demonstrated that the latter elasticity depends on the rest-of-
the-world's elasticity of export supply and the share of world exports. 
that the United States imports: 50 
= s -U S (~i -U , S. ) X,W • , M • 
-·u. s. 
(4.9) 
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Lastly, to complete the u. s. export market, one must have the 
price elasticity of demand for United States' exports. It is, as Mac• 
Phee shows, a function of export shares, the elasticity of the supply of 
exports from the rest-of-the-world and of the elasticity of world import 
51 demand. That is, f'x: is calculated as: 
= 
(4.10) 
Long-Run Price Elasticities 
The lack of long-run price elasticity estimates necessitates the 
use of an assumed relationship to their short-run counterparts. Fallow-
ing Magee, it is assumed here that the long-run domestic elasticities 
equal three times those of the short-run. 52 Substitution of these long-
run domestic price elasticities into Equations 4.3 and 4.4 yields the 
long-run import demand and export supply elasticities needed for the 
calculation of the long-run welfare effects. 
Effects in u. s. Import and Export Markets 
The computations to estimate the effect of trade barrier removal in 
the import and export markets of the United States are those indicated 
by the model of the preceding chapter. In the import market, the United 
States' f. o. b. value of imports is used because it is upon that value 
the u. s. levies the tarift. 53 
For the effect of the removal of foreign tariffs on the u ... s. ex-
port markett the foreign tariffs cannot be used directly with the given 
f. o. b. value of u. S, exports. As previously discussed, the average 
foreign tariff must be converted to an f. o. b. equivalent tariff. 
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Labor Data 
The data are constructed at the three-digit SITC level of aggrega-
tion to estimate the effects of trade liberalization on the labor mar-
ket. The figure used in this study for the economy's average duration 
of unemployment is the 1972 annual average duration for the nondurable 
goods manufacturing sector (which includes chemicals) reported in §.!!!-
1 dE . 54 E oyment an arnings. 
The remaining labor data are reported on the basis of SIC codes 
and must be rearranged into the SITC system of classification; this is 
accomplished using an updated version of the concordance presented by 
55 Hufbauer. The total number of employees for each SIC group are re-
56 ported in the 1972 Census of Manufactures -- General Summary. These 
are regrouped and totalled for each SITC sector. 
The latest available data on the total cost of labor is for 1971 as 
57 
reported in the Annual Survey of Manufactures. These data are ad-
justed to 1972 estimates. The adjustment factor used for each SIC code 
is the corresponding ratio of the average annual earnings for production 
workers for 1972 to a comparable 1971 figure. The 1972 data are ob-
tained by conversion of average weekly earnings reported in Employment 
and Earnings into annual figures. The 1971 statistics are the annual 
payroll per production employee data of the Annual Survey of Manufac-
tures. The 1972 estimates thus obtained are then regrouped according to 
the SITC classification system. The 1972 average total labor cost per 
employee for each three-digit SITC classification is the average of its 
corresponding SIC data weighted by the number of employees in each SIC 
group. In the case of Radioactive and associated materials (SITC 515} 
the total labor cost per employee for the chemical industry as a 
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whole is used. 
Summary 
This chapter discusses in detail the data used in the study, in-
cluding their sources, rearrangements, and many adjustments. The vari-
ous sources of available data use several different methods of classi-
fication. The data are all transformed to the SITC, Revised classifica-
tion system, using the published cross-classifications or a concordance 
compiled by the author between the SITC system and the BTN, TSUSA, 
Schedule A, ISIC or SIC systems. 
The types of data are import-export data, production and consump-
tion data, two sets of tariff data, estimates of price elasticities 
(both u. s. and foreign), and labor data. The import and export data 
are OECD statistics for the year 1972 which is the first year the Ken-
nedy Round concessions became fully effective. The value of exports 
data are on an f. o. b. basis. The import figures are c. i. f. values 
for all countries except the United States and Canada which report 
f. o. b. imports. In order to maintain consistency in calculating the 
sundry price elasticities, the u. S. and Canadian f. o. b. import data 
must be converted to a c. i. f. equivalent. 
The production data for the United States are Value of Shipments 
data obtained from the 1972 Census of Manufactures. Production of 
Radioactive and associated materials is partially from the AEC's Fi-
nancial Summary for 1972. The paucity of production data for the rest-
of-the-world serves as an obstacle for this study. The basic data are 
from the United Nations' Growth of the World Industry which is classi-
fied according to the ISIC system and is incomplete in coverage. To 
APPENDIXES 
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short-run price elasticity of import demand for the u. S. existing in 
the literature. In the analysis it is necessary to make certain as-
sumptions. Hence, it is assumed that the domestic price elasticity of 
demand is equal to one-half the domestic supply elasticity, that the 
domestic elasticities are identical for all the countries in the study, 
and that the long-run domestic elasticities are equal to three times 
their short-run counterparts. 
These data permit the estimation of the trade effects in the U. s. 
import and export markets and the social welfare effects. The estima-
tion methods are discussed in the preceding chapter. 
The labor data include the number of employees, as reported in the 
1972 Census of Manufacturers -- General Summary; and the average dura-
tion of unemployment for nondurable manufactured goods, reported in Em-
ployment and Earnings. The basic data for the total cost of labor de-
rive from the Annual Survey of Manufactures. These data, for 1971, are 
adjusted to 1972 estimates. These data are used to compute the social 
costs of labor dislocation. As discussed in the preceding chapter, 
these costs are deducted from the social welfare gains to estimate the 
net social welfare effects. 
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least~squares time series estimates and the understatement of tariff 
elasticities by price elasticities of import demand. 
39This section of the study extracts from a discussion of the 
elasticity relationships in Craig R. MacPhee, Restrictions on Inter-
national Trade in Steel (Lexington, Mass., 1974), pp. 58-67; in particu-
lar, Equation 4.1 appears on pp. 58-59 without derivation. This 
author's derivation of that equation is: 
dM 
M 
~="dP= 
p 
dM ..J: = ~ d(D-S) 
M0 dP dP 0 D-S 
= ~.dD-dS 
~ dP D-S · 
P dD P dS 
= dP":0:S - dP 0 D-S 
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40This can be shown as follows. Since the domestic demand is com-
puted as D = S + M - X and Equation 4.1 assumes that M = D - S·k, where 
s~'( is the relevant production figure, substitution yields M = 
S + M - X - S*. This reduces to S* = S - X. 
An alternative approach to the problem of the simultaneous exist-
ence of imports and exports is suggested by Joe Stone, currently a gra-
duate student at Michigan State University. He assumes that each good 
within a category can be classified as either an importable or an ex-
portable and that the domestic demand and supply price elasticities are 
identical for both types of goods. The equation he suggests as ap-
propriate is~ 
If ED =EX' this relationship is identical to the alternative used in 
the present study. If they are not equal, his relationship differs but 
is not problem-free. First, even a highly disaggregated conunodity 
group contains items that are both imported and exported and the data 
does not permit classification of a good as either an importable or ex-
portable as Stone assumes is possible. Hence, there is no way statis-
tically to compare the alternative approaches. Furthermore, there is 
no reason to believe that the domestic supply and demand price elas-
ticities are necessarily identical for both types of goods. And as a 
practical problem, nD' ED and Ex are all unknowns to be estimated 
from nM• Assumptions additional to that made in the present study, 
i. e., n =-~ED are necessary to obtain values for the three un-
knowns. 9oe Stone, "The Static Effects of Trade Liberalization~ An 
Estimate for Large Traders" (Unpublished paper, Michigan State Univer-
sity$ 1976). 
41Since X = S - D*, substitution for S in D = S + M - X yields 
D~'<: = D - M. 
42This assumption was made by Stephen P. Magee, "The Welfare Ef-
fects of Restrictions on u. S. Trade," Brookings Paper on Economic 
Activity$ No. 3 (1972), p. 665. 
43s 1 1 . . . h 1 . . . evera a ternative assumptions concerning t e e asticities were 
tried and judged to be unacceptable. First, Richardson's estimates of 
the domestic demand elasticity for the aggregated conunodity "chemicals" 
were used in combination with the disaggregated import demand elas-
ticities. The inunediate disadvantage for this study is the level of 
aggregation; however, disaggregated estimates do not exist. Magnitudes 
of the domestic supply elasticities were derived from Equation 4.1. 
These estimates all carried a negative sign, whether using Richardson's 
preferred structural estimates (both the coefficient itself and the 
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lower bound of the confidence interval) or the lower bound of his less 
preferred simple least-squares estimate. A consistently negatively-
signed domestic supply elasticity seemed implausible. 
Secondly, a set of domestic demand elasticities were estimated from the 
relationship 4.1 using Baldwin and Mutti's assumption that the domestic 
supply elasticity ranged somewhere between zero and one. In order to 
obtain a negative domestic demand elasticity for SITC 512 9 the domestic 
supply elasticity had to be equal to or less than Oo09. Choosing a do-
mestic supply elasticity less than 0.09 ~priori seemed even more ar-
bitrary than the assumed relationship. Robert E. Baldwin and John H. 
Mutti, "Policy Problems in the Adjustment Process (U. s. ), (Unpublished 
paper). 
44 Such an assumption has been made in other studiesg 
60 and Bela Balassa, Trade Liberalization among Industrial 
(New York, 1967) 9 p. 49. 
MacPhee, p. 
Countries 
45 Jules Backman, The Economics of the Chemical Industry (Washing-
ton, D. c., 1970), p. 243. 
46Joe S. Bain, International Differences in Industrial Structure 
(New Haven, Conn., 1966), pp. 67-122. For specific chemical sub-
industries, the data are particularly limited and inconclusive; how-
ever, unlike the u.,s., European and Japanese governments tend to 
participate in private markets and to permit cartels which together 
cause true market concentration to be understated. 
47The preceding computations are shown, for the United States, in 
Worksheet I and, for the foreign countries, in Worksheet II. 
48 MacPhee, p. 64. MacPhee includes the derivation which follows 
in his text~ 
49 
= (dX /X )(P /dP) 
x x 
N N 
~ 
i=l 
since 2:: 
i=l 
x. = x ]. w 
MacPhee, p. 62, derives Equation 4.6 in his text as follows: 
~. (dM /M )(P/dP) 
'W w w 
N 
2.: (dM/M)(P /dP) 
i=l 
since M 
w 
N 
E 
i=l 
M. ]. [sic J 
= 
N 
.,·-r 
Li· 
i=l 
N 
E 
i=l 
(dM~/M.)(P/dP)(M./M ) i i i w 
i 
(M. /M ) • 
i w n 
These world estimates are computed on Worksheet II. 
5oTh . d . d . . e equation an its erivation appear in MacPhee, p. 64. 
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MacPhee calls s the price elasticity 
U. s. ( s.). Hi~ derivation is: of the supply of exports to the 
i 
Ei. = (dX ./M.)(P/dP) 
w-i i 
= (dX ./X .)(P/dP)(X ./M.) 
w-i w-i w-i i 
= E . (X ./M.). 
w-i w-i i 
51 MacPhee, p. 67. His derivation of the Equation 4.8, which uses 
absolute values of the elasticities: 
n . = (dX./X.)(P/dP) 
xi i i 
= (P/dP)d(X -X .)/(X -X .) since X = X. + X . 
w w-i w w-i w i w-i 
= (dX /dP)[P/(X -X . ) ] + (dX ./dP)[P/(X -X .) J 
w w w-i w-i w w-i 
= (dX /X )(P/dP) X /(X -X .) + (dX ./X ./X ") 
w w w w w-i w-i w-i w-i 
(P/dP)X ./(X -X .) 
w-i w w-i 
= nx (X /X.) + s . (X . /X.). 
w i w-i w-i i 
See Worksheet III. 
52 Magee, pp. 665i> 675. 
53Th · · 11 h . h ASP k h d b is is genera y t e case, assuming t e pac age a een 
removed as in the first set of worksheets. In the second set of com-
putations, ASP remains in existence. Thus, the actual ad valorem tar-
iff equivalent rate in the case of benezoid chemicals is levied on the 
value determined by the selling price of an equivalent American product 
rather than the f. o. b. import value. Howeveri> the ad valorem tariff 
rates used in the computations are rates already adjusted to compen-
sate for ASP and are tariff equivalents if the tariffs were levied on 
f. o. b. values (not ad valorem percents computed from duty collected 
as a percent of dutiable value). 
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S4United States, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earn-
ings, Vol. 19, No. 7, January, 1973. 
SS Hufbauer, "Hypotheses and Tests of Trade Patterns." His con-
cordance is between the three-digit SITC and the four-digit SIC codes 
based on the 1967 SIC. The concordance must be updated to correspond 
to the revised 1972 SIC classifications. 
S6United States, Bureau of the Census, 1972 Census of Manufactures 
Subject Series General Surrnnary (Washington, D. c., 197S). 
S7United States, Bureau of the Census, Annual Survey of Manu-
factures: 1970-1971 (Washington, D. c., 1973). 
CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical results obtained from applying 
the data described in the preceding chapter to the theoretical model 
presented in Chapter III. The first section discusses the elasticity 
estimates which are derived. The second section recounts the price ef-
fects as well as the long-. and short-run effects on trade quantities and 
values. The third section presents the impact of trade liberalization 
on the labor market. The fourth section relates the estimated impact on 
the social welfare of the United States citizenry. The fifth section 
compares the results from disaggregated data to those obtained from data 
at an aggregate level. The final section summarizes the findings pre-
sented in the chapter. 
Elasticity Estimates 
The elasticity data are restricted to the three-digit SITC level of 
disaggregation. The estimates of the elasticities of u. s. import de-
mand used in this study are taken from the research efforts of others. 
They range from -0.97 for Essential oils, perfume and flavor materials; 
Perfumery and cosmetics, dentifrices and other toilet preparations (ex-
cept soaps); Soaps, cleansing and polishing preparations; and Explosive 
and pyrotechnic products, i. e., _,SITC 's 551, 553, . 554 and 571 · 
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respectively, to -3.03 for SITC's 531, 532, and 533 which combined form 
SITC Divisions 53, Dyeing, tanning and coloring materials. The SITC 
sectors for which it is necessary to assume the import demand elasticity 
of the chemical industry in aggregate have an assumed elasticity of 
-2.15; these sectors are Radioactive and associated materials; Mineral 
tar and crude chemicals from coal, petroleumf and natural gas; Manu-
factured fertilizers; and Chemical materials and products not elsewhere 
classified; i. e., SITC's 515, 521, 561 and 599. 
The other elasticities for the United States are derived, as dis-
cussed previously, from these data on the U. s. elasticity of import 
demand. The set of elasticities at the three-digit SITC level for the 
United States are presented in Table II. Overall the results appear to 
be reasonable. Two SITC groups contain estimates which are suspect be-
cause they are extreme; the estimates are the import supply and export 
demand elasticities for the Synthetic organic dyestuffs, natural indigo, 
and color lakes group (SITC 531), which equal 56.763 and -333.345 re-
spectively, and for the Dyeing and tanning extracts and synthetic tan-
ning group (SITC 532), which respectively equal 16.955 and -91.498. 1 
Disregarding these two sectors at this point, the range of esti-
mates of the elasticity of the supply of imports into the u. So is from 
1.114 for SITC 512, Organic chemicals, to 4.172 for SITC 561, Manu-
factured fertilizers. In the export market, the estimated elasticities 
for the u. S. supply of exports range from 0.165 (SITC 554: Soaps, 
cleansing and polishing preparations) to 1.687 (SITC 513: Inorganic 
chemicals -- elements, oxides, and halogen salts). For the elasticity 
of demand for U. s. exports the variation extends from -1.250 (SITC 554: 
Soaps, cleansing and polishing preparations) to -11.475 (SITC 561: 
Manufactured fertilizers). 
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TABLE II 
ESTIMATED ELASTICITIES FOR THE U.S. 
Import Market Domestic Market Export Market 
SITC 1M EM no ED nx EX 
512 -1.14 1.114 -0.032 0.064 -2.083 0.618 
513 -1.14 1.468 -0.071 0.142 -5.433 1. 687 
514 -1.14 2.736 -0.016 0.033 -4.814 0.665 
515 -2.15 3.632 -0.178 0.355 -5. 4 71 1. 573 
521 -2.15 3.061 -0.004 0.008 -2.349 0.626 
531 -3.03 56.763 -0.160 0.320 -333.345 6.137 
532 -3.03 16. 9 55 -2.068 4.137 -91.498 7.202 
533 -3.03 1.871 -0.004 0.007 -1. 909 o. 521 
541 -1.09 2.107 -0.008 0.016 -2.458 0.376 
551 -0.97 1. 311 -0.015 0.030 -4.491 1.233 
553 -0.97 1.183 -0.002 0.004 -3.386 0.606 
554 -0. 97 2.014 -0.001 0.002 -1. 250 0.165 
561 =2.15 4.172 -0. 072 0.144 -11.475 1.840 
571 -0.07 1.309 -0.029 0.057 -3.688 0.808 
581 -1. 57 3.013 -0.026 0.052 -2.702 0.477 
599 -2.15 1. 906 -0.033 0.065 -2.006 0.636 
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The import demand and export supply elasticities for each of the 
foreign countries considered in this study are calculated in order to 
enable completion of the set of necessary u. s. elasticities. These 
calculations, as previously noted, assume that the other countries' do-
mestic elasticities are identical with the u. s. domestic elasticities; 
the resultant foreign elasticity estimates are presented in Table III. 
As a point of interest, the average chemical import demand elasti-
city for Japan is compared with estimates from two other studies. The 
average chemical import demand elasticity is the average of this study's 
elasticities for each three-digit SITC group weighted by the value of 
Japan's imports for each group. The resultant weighted average import 
demand elasticity for SITC 5 for Japan equals 2.138. Kreinin estimates 
the import demand elasticity for the combined categories of SITC 5 and 
2 7 as 2.0 for Japan. His technique is to estimate elasticities for the 
Do S. using regression analysis and to derive the foreign estimates from 
the relationship based on import shares and assuming identical domestic 
elasticities. In another study, using regression analysis of OECD index 
data for Japan, Kreinin obtained an estimated relative price elasticity 
of import demand for SITC 5 of 1.17 with a standard error of 0.52. 3 
The estimate plus three standard errors, as used in this paper, thus 
would equal 2.73. 
The comparison of this study's weighted average to Kreinin's esti-
mates is reassuring by its revelation that the estimates are within the 
same ballpark; however, the comparison is of limited usefulness due to 
the fact that this study's basic elasticity data are Kreinin's disag-
gregated estimates for the U. S. and carry the same flaws as his inde-
pendent estimates for Japanese chemical imports. 
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TABLE III 
ESTIMATED FOREIGN ELASTICITIES 
Japan Canada U.K. EEC Other World a 
512 TJM . -0.895 -0.212 -0.270 -0.150 -0.040 -0.403 
' l. 
sx . 0.339 0.686 b.301 0.137 0.072 0.200 
'l. 
513 nM . 
' l. 
-0.956 -0.135 -0.614 -1. 649 -0.147 -0.846 
c 
~X,i 
o. 772 0.166 1. 279 0.863 0.379 o. 727 
514 nM . 
' l. 
-3.147 -0.161 -0.601 -1.253 -0.086 -0.706 
sx . o. 713 0.232 0.352 0.459 0.191 0.430 
'l. 
515 nM . 
'l. -2.222 -0.178 -0.807 -1. 742 -1.149 -1. 680 
sx . 70.299 0.355 0.931 3. 716 2.604 2.436 
'l. 
521 nM . 
' l. 
-5.764 -0.102 -0.314 -0. 710 -0.247 -0.737 
sx . 4.224 0.858 0.570 0.700 0.564 0.825 
'l. 
531 nM . 
'l. -19.915 -4.554 -10.347 -27.589 -1.239 -11.645 
sx . 27.551 2038.880 5.406 8.701 0.730 6.482 
'l. 
532 nM . -3.315 -4.252 -2.068 -5.760 -2.068 -3.749 
' l. 
sx . 23.292 72.392 4.137 6.023 4.137 6.051 
' l. 
533 nM . -0.463 -0.053 -0.165 -0.083 -0.020 -0.238 
'l. 
sx . 0.221 0.299 0.056 0.031 0.026 0.056 
'l. 
541 nM . =0.360 -0.135 -0. 277 =0.335 -0.031 -0.315 
,1 
sx . 1.103 0.345 0.081 0.156 0.032 0.148 
'l. 
551 nM . =0.531 -0.399 -0.361 -0.474 -0.129 -0.543 
,1 
sx . 4. 292 4.485 0.345 0.329 0.104 0.384 
'l. 
553 nM . -0.573 -0.108 -0.231 -0.708 -0.031 -0.350 
' l. 
sx . 0.684 0.646 0.078 0.117 0.061 0.129 
'l. 
554 nM . -0.314 -0.039 -0.230 -0.4 72 -0.018 -0. 213 
'l. 
sx . 0.237 0.939 0.055 0.135 0.025 0.100 
'l. 
561 nM . -2.444 -0. 072 -1.817 -4.189 -0.426 -2.186 
'l. 
sx . 2. 549 0.144 8.354 1.606 0.665 1. 267 
,1 
aThe world elasticities are n and s • M,W X,W-U.S. 
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TABLE III (Continued) 
Japan Canada U.K. EEC Other World 
571 nM . 
'J_ -2.749 -0.180 -0. 794 -0.663 -0.042 -0. 581 
e:x . 1.654 0.326 0.166 0.333 0.073 o. 293 
' J_ 
581 nM . 
' J_ -2.186 -0.117 -0.218 -0.352 -0.042 -0.363 
e:x i 0.407 0.687 0.208 0.141 0.085 0.201 
' 
599 nM . 
'J_ -0.191 -0.102 -0.151 -0.332 -0.033 -0.382 
e:x . 0.373 0.389 0.132 0.196 0.065 0.176 
'J_ 
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Price and Trade Effects of Tariff Elimination 
Introduction 
The price and trade effects of the removal of the post-Kennedy 
Round tariff rates are estimated under two alternative scenarios. The 
first assumes that the Supplemental Agreement on Chemicals was approved 
by the U. S. Congress and ratified by the participating nations. The 
tariff data are from a single source which lends to them a semblance of 
comparability, uniformity and reliability. The second scenario derives 
from the reality that the u. S. Congress never approved the supplemental 
ASP chemical package. 
It should be noted that the estimated price and trade effects of 
tariff elimination presented in this section exceed the effects which 
may result from U. S. participation in the current round of GATT. The 
President's negotiating authority in the GATT session now beginning is 
granted by the Trade Act of 1974 and is limited in most cases to maximum 
reductions of 60 percent from the existing tariff duties. 
For each of the two scenarios the import and export markets are 
analyzed separately. The effects in the import markets occur as a re-
sult of the removal of u. S. tariff barriers to imports. The effects 
estimated in this study are the percentage decrease in the U. S. price 
of the imported connnodity, the percentage increase in the duty-free 
price received by the foreign supplier, the percentage change in the 
quantity of imports, and the change in the value of imports. The latter 
two trade effects are estimated for both the short-run and the long-run 
(which is denoted by*). The price effects are the same in either case 
given the assumed relationship between the short- and long-run elastici-
ties. 
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The analysis of the U, S, export markets considers the removal of 
tariffs by the foreign countries of the study. As discussed previously, 
the foreign tariffs are averaged to yield a single measure of their re-
strictive height. The estimated effects which occur are the percentage 
change in the u. S. price of the commodity exported by the U. S, and the 
short-run and long-run trade effects, i. e.~ the percentage change in 
quantity and the change in the value of exports. 
Initially the presentation of the empirical results is restricted 
to the relatively aggregated three-digit SITC level. It is hoped that 
this limitation, by reducing the volume of estimates, facilitates the 
discussion of the results. The restriction is later removed and the 
disaggregated results are presented in their entirety. 
An Overview 
T h_~ _ _}:_i_r s L§..s ea a_E.~.2.l._!.l!!_p_ l etne~ ion o f .J?...<?.!:.~~-~£.1!!1. ed y 
Round_~2Jl£~~~on Packages 
The Import Markets. The first scenario assumes the approval and 
final ratification of the Supplemental Agreement on Chemicals; thus, the 
tariff rates are those resulting from implementation of both Kennedy 
Round concession packages. The estimated price and trade effects of 
tariff elimination in the U. S. import markets are shown in Table IV at 
the three-digit SITC level for the first scenario. The post-Kennedy 
Round weighted average U. S. tariffs for the three-digit SITC groups 
range from 0.7 percent for Manufactured fertilizers (SITC 561) to 23.7 
percent for Synthetic organic dyestuffs, natural indigo and color lakes 
(SITC 531). 
The estimated percentage decline in the U. S. price of the imported 
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TABLE IV 
SURVEY OF PRICE AND TRADE EFFECTS OF U.S. TARI FF REMOVAL 
ON THE, U.S. IMPORT MARKET: FIFST SCENARIO 
dP 1 dP dM dVM dV ~'( 
-
M t P+T p M 
SITC (/o) (%) (%) (%) (million $) (million $) 
512 10.6 -5.0 5.1 5.7 56.447 117. 428 
513 4.3 -2.4 1.8 2.7 15.833 34.967 
514 5.8 -3.9 1.6 4.5 4,833 11. 994 
515 2.9 -1.8 1.1 3.9 5,552 14.235 
521 2.8 -1.6 1.1 3.5 0.369 0.932 
531 23.7 -18.4 1. 0 55.7 59.484 176.375 
532 4.1 -3.4 0.6 10.2 1.064 3.074 
533 9.8 -3.6 5.8 10.9 2.754 6.418 
541 9.3 -5.8 3.0 6.3 14.137 33. 4 72 
551 5.0 -2.8 2.1 2.7 3.529 7.534 
553 8.2 -4.3 3.5 4.2 2.117 4.462 
554 7.8 -5.0 2.4 4.9 1.043 2.453 
561 0.7 -0.5 0.2 1.0 2.785 7.427 
571 9.0 -4.9 3.6 4.8 1.805 3.900 
581 10.9 -6.7 3.5 10.5 25.374 63.761 
599 7.3 -3.3 3.7 7.1 15.444 36.001 
Total for SITC 5 212.570 524.433 
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goods is lowest for Manufactured fertilizers (SITC 561), having an es-
timated decrease of 0.5 percent. The greatest percentage decline is 
18.4 percent for Synthetic organic dyestuffs, natural indigo and color 
lakes (SITC 531). As might be expected, these price declines corres-
pond in magnitude to the height of the tariff removed. The percentage 
increases in the duty-free prices range from 0.2 percent to 5.8 percent 
for SITC 561, Manufactured fertilizers, and SITC 533, Pigments, paints, 
varnishes and related materials, respectively. 
These duty-free price increases relative to the corresponding tar-
iffs which are eliminated show substantial variation. For Pigments, 
paints, varnishes and related materials (SITC 533) the duty-free price 
increases by more than half the extinquished tariff, i. e., (dP/P) / t 
= 0.59, whereas for Synthetic organic dyestuffs, natural indigo, and 
color lakes (SITC 531) the duty-free price increases by only .04 of the 
tariff. The unweighted average of the ratios of the percent increase 
in the duty-free price to the percent decrease in tariff is 0.36. That 
indicates that, on the average, just over one-third of the tariff re-
duction goes to the foreign supplier in the form of increased prices. 4 
The percentage increase in the quantity of imports is largest for 
Synthetic organic dyestuffs, natural indigo, and color lakes (SITC 531) 
being estimated to equal 55.7 percent. The next largest increase in 
the quantity of imports is 10.9 percent; three groups, SITC's 532, 533, 
and 581 (Dyeing and tanning extracts, and synthetic tanning materials, 
Pigments, paints, varnishes and related materials; and Plastic ma-
terials, regenerated cellulose and artificial resins, respectively) all 
have percentage quantity increases between 10 and 11 percent. Manu-
factured fertilizers (SITC 561) displays the smallest percentage 
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increase in the quantity of imports, equal to 1.0 percent, which re-
fleets, in part, the fact that its post-Kennedy Round average tariff 
rate is the least of all the groups within the chemical industry. 
The effects on the quantity of imports, shown in Table IV, are es-
timated percentage changes for the short-run. Because of the algebra 
of the calculations, the assumption that the long-run elasticities §Ire 
three times those of the short-run yields long-run percentage increases 
in the quantity of imports whi~h equal three times those qf the short-
run. The long-run increases are not displayed in the Table. 
Finally, for the import markets, the estimated increases in the 
value of imports ranges from $0.369 million for Mineral tar and crude 
chemicals from coal, petroleum and natural gas (SITC 521) to $59.484 
million for Synthetic organic dyestuffs, natural indigo, and color 
lakes (SITC 531). Organic chemicals (SITC 512) also indicate a sub-
stantial increase in the value of imports; the estimated short-run in-
crease is $56.447 million for this group. The long-term increases in 
the value of imports are somewhat less than three times their short-run 
5 
counterparts. These long-run estimates, indicated by an*, are shown 
in the far right-hand column of Table IV. 
The Export Markets. This study also estimates the effects in the 
United States' export markets of the elimination of tariffs by the 10 
foreign countries of the study. The following portion of the discussion 
continues the first scenario which assumes approval of the Supplemental 
Agreement. The empirical results are displayed in Table V. The aver-
ages of the foreign tariffs faced by the u. s. exports range from a 
high of 10.9 percent for Perfumery and cosmetics, dentifrices and other 
SITC 
512 
513 
514 
515 
521 
531 
532 
533 
541 
551 
553 
554 
561 
571 
581 
599 
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TABLE V 
SURVEY OF PRICE AND TRADE EFFECTS OF FQRJ;:IGN" TARIFF REMOVAL 
ON THE U.S. ,,EXPORT MARKET: FIRST SCENARIO 
dP dX 
dVX dV ·k t•·k•k p x x 
(lo) (lo) (lo) (million $) (million 
8.9 6.7 4.2 123.267 222.132 
6.4 4.8 8.1 34.830 79.325 
7.0 6.1 4.1 15. 890 29. ll9 
2.1 1. 6 2.6 7.690 17.272 
3.3 2.6 1.6 1. 296 2.322 
9.9 9.7 59.6 39. 962 109.568 
4.4 4.1 29.3 1. 251 3.456 
7.9 6.1 3.2 9.489 16. 277 
8.8 7.5 2.8 49.780 78. 272 
6.9 5.3 6.6 7.334 15.657 
10.9 9.1 5.5 6.326 11. 352 
10.l 8.8 1.5 9.744 12.798 
1. 5 1. 2 2.4 10.830 25.326 
10.1 8.1 6.6 4.265 8.261 
10.7 9.0 4.3 93.887 160.576 
6.7 5.0 3.2 46.506 83.898 
$) 
Total for SITC 5 462.347 875.611 
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toilet preparations (except soaps), SITC 553, to a low of 1.5 percent 
for Manufactured fertilizers, SITC 561. This latter group, SITC 561, 
also has the lowest U. s. tariff as discussed in the earlier section on 
the import markets. 
The elimination of these foreign tariffs increases the demand ex-
perienced by U. S. exporters resulting in price increases. The per-
centage increases in U. S. export prices for all the three-digit groups 
average 6.0 percent. The sector displaying the smallest estimated price 
increase, equal to a 1.2 percent increase, is Manufactured fertilizers 
(SITC 561). Four groups have price increases exceeding 8.5 percent. 
They are Synthetic organic dyestuffs, natural indigo and color lakes 
(SITC 5Bl) with a 9.7 estimated price increase; Perfumery and cosmetics, 
dentifrices and other toilet preparations (except soaps) (SITC 553) 
with 9.1 percent; Soaps, cleansing and polishing preparations (SITC 554) 
with 8.8 percent; and Plastic materials, regenerated cellulose and 
artificial resins (SITC 581) with 9.0 percent. These price increases 
average more than twice the average increase in the duty-free price for 
U. S. imports. 
Two sectors show extremely large percentage increases in the quan-
tity of exports. The 59.6 percent increase for Synthetic organic dye-
stuffs, natural indigo and color lakes (SITC 531) and the 29.3 percent 
increase for Dyeing and tanning extracts, and synthetic tanning ma-
terials (SITC 532) reflect the extreme estimates of the elasticity of 
export demand derived for these two sectors. Excluding these two sec-
tors, the percentage increases in the quantity of exports range from 
1.5 percent for Soaps, cleansing and polishing preparations (SITC 554) 
to 8.1 percent for Inorganic chemicals--elements, oxides and halogen 
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salts (SITC 513). 
The estimated impact in dollar magnitudes of foreign tariff elimi-
nation reveals considerable variation. The smallest increases in ex-
ports for the short-run are for the groups Mineral tar and crude chemi-
cals from coal, petroleum and natural gas (SITC 521) and Dyeing and tan-
ning extracts and synthetic tanning materials (SITC 532), which have in-
creases of $1.296 million and $1.251 million respectively. By far the 
largest short-run increase is estimated to be in the exports of U. s. 
Organic chemicals (SITC 512) where the increase is calculated to be 
$123.267 million. 
The long-run effects allow for complete adjustment assuming no 
other changes. The long-run increases in exports are estimated to ex-
tend from $2.322 million for Mineral tar and crude chemicals from coal, 
petroleum and natural gas (SITC 521) to $222.132 million for Organic 
chemicals (SITC 512)~ 
The Second Scenario: Implementation of 
Only the First Kennedy Round Package 
The second Scenario uses the tariff rates resultant from the Ken-
nedy Round concessions alone, without the approval and final ratifica-
tion of the additional concessions contained in the Supplemental Agree-
ment on Chemicals. As under the first scenario, the effects of tariff 
elimination in both the import and export markets are considered 
separately. 
The Import Markets. For the import markets, the estimated effects 
of tariff elimination for the second scenario are shown in Table VI for 
the three-digit SITC groups. The u. S. tariff data are extrapolated 
SITC 
512 
513 
514 
515 
521 
531 
532 
533 
541 
551 
553 
554 
561 
571 
581 
599 
Total 
TABLE VI 
SURVEY 'OF PRICE AND TRADE EFFECTS OF U.S. TARIFF REMOVAL ON 
THE U.S. IMPORT MARKET: SECOND SCENARIO 
dP• dP dM 
dVM dV "J( t P+T p M M 
(%) (to) (/o) (%) (million $) (million 
11. 0 - 5. 2 5.3 5.9 58. 59 5 121. 835 
4.5 -2.5 1.9 2.8 16.545 36.408 
6.0 -4.1 1. 7 4.6 4.995 12.322 
3.0 -1.8 1.1 4.0 5.664 14.569 
2.8 -1.6 1.1 3.5 0.369 0.932 
26.5 -20.l 1.1 60.9 65.108 193.038 
4.6 -3.8 0.7 11.4 1.193 3.442 
11.0 -4.0 6.5 12.2 3.097 7.226 
9.3 -5.8 3.0 6.3 14.137 33. 472 
5.4 -3.0 2.2 2.9 3.752 8.058 
8.8 -4.6 3.8 4.5 2. 285 4.805 
8.4 -5.4 2.6 5.2 1.115 2.615 
0.7 -0.5 0.2 1.0 2. 785 7.427 
9.3 -5.l 3.8 4.9 1.871 4.013 
10.9 -6.7 3.5 10.5 25.374 63.761 
7.5 -3.4 3.8 7.3 15.883 37.040 
for SITC 5 222.768 550.963 
104 
$) 
105 
estimates as discussed in Chapter IV. The range of the tariffs is 
wider than under the first scenario extending from a low of 0.7 percent 
(as in the first scenario) for Manufactured fertilizers (SITC 561) to a 
high of 26.5 percent for Synthetic organic dyestuffs, natural indigo 
and color lakes (SITC 531). These same categories also are the extreme 
points of the range of estimated percentage changes in the u. S. price 
of imports; they are decreases of 0.5 percent and 20.1 percent re-
spectively. 
The percentage increases in the duty-free prices range from 0.2 
percent for Manufactured fertilizers (SITC 561) to 6.5 percent for Pig-
ments, paints, varnishes and related materials (SITC 533). These 
figures compare to 0.2 percent and 5.8 percent under the first scenario. 
The combination of an extremely large estimate of the import sup-
ply elasticity for Synthetic organic dyestuffs, natural indigo, and 
color lakes (SITC 531) and its high tariff causes the estimated per-
centage increase in the quantity of imports for SITC 531 to be extremely 
large, equaling 60.9 percent. The second largest estimate is the 12.2 
percent increase in imported quantities of Pigments, paints, varnishes 
and related materials (SITC 533). The smallest increase,_ 1.0 percent, 
is estimated for Manufactured fertilizers (SITC 561). 6 
The percentage quantity increases in imports are transformed into 
dollar magnitudes for both the short-run and long-run. The smallest 
estimated increase in the value of imports is $0.369 million in the 
short-run and $0.932 million in the long-run for Mineral tar and crude 
chemicals from coal, petroleum and natural gas (SITC 521). Synthetic 
organic dyestuffs, natural indigo, and color lakes (SITC 531) displays 
the largest estimated increases; they ~qual $65:108 million arid $193.038 
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million for the short-run and long-run, respectively. 
The Export Markets. The results for the u. S. export market under 
the second scenario are displayed in Table VII. The foreign tariffs, 
i. e., the averages of the foreign tariffs faced by U. S. exports within 
each group, range from 13.9 percent for Plastic materials, regenerated 
cellulose and artificial resins (SITC 581) to 2.8 percent for Radio-
active and associated materials (SITC 515). For comparison, the same 
two SITC groups have, respectively, tariff rates of 10.7 percent and 2.1 
percent under the first scenario which assumes approval of the separate 
agreement on chemicals. The non-ratification of the separate agreement 
results in higher tariff rates for all the chemical groups as can be 
seen by comparing the rates of Table VII to those of Table V which as-
sumes ratification. The category with the highest tariff rate (10.9 
percent) under the first scenario, Perfumery and cosmetics, dentifrices 
and other toilet preparations (except soaps) (SITC 553) has a tariff 
average of 13.4 percent, which is the second highest, under the second 
scenario. Manufactured fertilizers (SITC 561) has an average foreign 
tariff equal to 3.7 percent. 
Because of the higher initial tariff rates, ceteris paribus 9 the 
estimated impact of tariff removal is greater for the second scenario, 
considered here, than for the first. The predicted increases in the 
u. s. prices of U~ S. exports extend from the smallest increase, 2.2 
percent, for Radioactive and associated materials (SITC 515) to 11.6 
percent for Plastic materials, reg~nerated cellulose and artificial 
resins (SITC 581) which is the largest predicted price increase. The 
mean of the SITC three-digit group price increases is 7.6 percent for 
SITC 
512 
513 
514 
515 
521 
531 
532 
533 
541 
551 
553 
554 
561 
571 
581 
599 
Total 
TABLE VII 
SURVEY.OF PRICE AND TRADE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN TARIFF REMOVAL 
ON THE· U.S. ;EXPORT MARKET: ·:SECOND SCENARIO 
dP dX 
dVX dV ~'( t')'\'')'\' p x x 
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(%) (%) (%) (million $) (million $) 
12.5 9.4 5.8 173.212 313.209 
8.2 6.1 10.3 44.892 102. 600 
8.9 7.7 5.1 20.192 36.992 
2.8 2.2 3.4 10.217 22.815 
4.2 3.3 2.1 1.670 2.990 
11.1 10.9 66.7 45.188 124.005 
5.8 5.3 38.6 1.662 4.600 
10.8 8.3 4.3 12.966 22.360 
ll. 3 9.7 3.6 64.645 102.031 
8.7 6.7 8.3 9.313 19.919 
13.4 11.1 6.8 7.812 14.143 
12.6 ll.O 1.8 12.147 15.880 
3.7 3.2 5.8 27.413 63.139 
ll.3 9.1 7.3 4. 779 9.238 
13.9 11.6 5.5 123.528 208.990 
8.0 6.0 3.8 55.788 100.610 
for SITC 5 615.424 ll63.521 
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the present alternative, as opposed to 6.0 percent for the first 
scenario. 
The extremely high (in absolute quantities) elasticities of U. s. 
export demand for sectors SITC 531 and 532 (Synthetic organic dyestuffs, 
natural indigo, and color lakes and Dyeing and tanning extracts, and 
synthetic tanning materials, respectively) cause the trade effects also 
to be extremely high. The short-run percentage increase in the quantity 
of u. s. exports for Synthetic organic dyestuffs, natural indigo and 
color lakes is estimated to be 66.7 percent. The corresponding increase 
in the value of exports is $45.188 million. For the long-run, the in-
crease in the value of exports is predicted to be $124.005 million. 
In the case of Dyeing and tanning extracts, and synthetic tanning 
materials (SITC 532) the elimination of an average foreign tariff equal 
to 5.8 percent causes a 38.6 percent increase in the quantity of U. S. 
exports. In dollar terms, the estimated increase in the value of ex-
ports is $1.662 million in the short-run and $4.600 million in the long-
run. 
Disregarding these two sectors, the greatest percentage increase 
in the quantity of exports is 10.3 percent for Inorganic chemicals --
elements, oxides and halogen salts (SITC 513). Soaps, cleansing and 
polishing preparations (SITC 554) has the smallest increase in the 
quantity of exports, equal to 1.8 percent. These are the estimates for 
the short-run. The results for the long-run adjustment equal three 
times the short-run percentages. 
The short-run increases in exports vary from $1.670 million for 
Mineral tar and crude chemicals from coal, petroleum, and natural gas, 
(SITC 521) to $173.212 million for Organic chemicals (SITC 512). 
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Effects Aggregated for the Chemical Industry 
The preceding section of the chapter has presented an overview of 
the price and trade effects of tariff elimination. For the purposes of 
such a survey, the results were aggregated into the 16 SITC groups con-
tained in the chemical industry. The trade effects can be further ag-
gregated for the chemical industry as a whole. The industry totals are 
shown in Table VII for both scenarios. Because the first scenario as-
sumes both Kennedy Round packages became effective whereas the second 
scenario is based only on the tariff concessions of the Kennedy Round 
package without approval of the ASP package, the differences between 
the results under both scenarios indicate the impact of Congressional 
approval of the Supplemental Agreement; these results are also shown in 
Table VIII. 
In all three)cases, i. e., elimination of either set of tariffs or 
approval of the ASP package, the increase in Do S. chemical exports ex-
ceeds the increase in u. s. chemical imports. The excess of exports 
over imports is especially pronounced in the case of the impact of the 
Supplemental Agreement because of the large concessions by the rest-of-
the-world relative to the U. So concessions. 
The Effects in Their Entirety 
Introduction 
This section presents the entire set of price and trade effects. 
These estimates are summarized in the preceding section at the three-
digit level of aggregation. 
The results of tariff elimination for the first scenario are 
SITC 5 (U.S.) 
First Scenario 
Second Scenario 
Impact of 
Supplemental 
Agreement 
TABLE VIII 
VALUE OF TRADE EFFECTS FROM TARIFF ELIMINATION FOR THE U.S. CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 
(SITC 5) 
(Million $) 
v M,f.o.b. vx dVM dVX dVM* 
(1972) (1972) (to) (%) (to) 
2014.588 4133.649 
. , ... .... 212.570 462.347 524.433 
(10. 6%) ( 11. 2%) (26.0%) 
. :it>~,:; 222.768 615.424 550. 963 •. .. ... ..... 
(11. 0%) ( 14. 9%) (27. 3%) 
...... , .... . ... , 10.198 153.077 26.530 
(O. 5/o) (3. 7%) (1. 3%) 
. . •· Not Applicable • 
dV * x 
(%) 
875.611 
(21.2/o) 
1163. 521 
(28.1%) 
287.910 
( 7. 0%) 
t--' 
t--' 
0 
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estimated from tariffs effective following the ratification of both 
concession packages negotiated for chemicals in the Kennedy Round. 
These tariffs, for each four-digit SITC group, are displayed in Figure 
3 for easy visual comparison of the U. s. and foreign tariff averages. 
The u. S. tariffs are listed in T~ble IX and the foreign tariffs are 
listed in Table X. 
The tariffs used in the second scenario are those resulting solely 
from the Kennedy Round concessions package without implementation of the 
ASP package. The tariffs are graphically illustrated in Figure 4, 
which shows that, in general, the foreign tariffs exceed u. S. tariffs 
for this scenario. In contrast, in the first scenario U. S. and foreign 
tariffs are relatively more comparable. 
-------The First Scenario 
The entire set of estimated results are computed at the four-digit 
SITC level. The results of the first scenario, which are discussed 
here, derive from tariff rates which assume that the Supplemental Agree-
ment on Chemicals was ratified. The effects estimated for the u. S. 
import market are shown in Table IX. Table X displays the estimated 
price and trade effects of foreign tariff removal in the export market. 
The estimates at the four-digit level are described in terms of a range 
within each three-digit sector. The effects in the export market are 
compared to those in the U. S. import market for each three-digit group 
because it seems reasonable that tariff elimination by the u. S. would 
only occur within the context of multilateral agreement to free trade. 
The import market for Organic chemicals (SITC 512) exhibits U. S. 
tariff averages which range from 5.2 percent to 14.4 percent for Other 
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TABLE IX 
ESTIMATED PRICE AND TRADE EFFECTS OF U.S. TARIFF REMOVAL ON 
THE U.S. IMPORT MARKET: FIRST SCENARIO 
dP 1 dP dM 
dVM dVM~~ t P+T p M 
SITC (%) (%) (%) (%) (million $) (million 
10.6 -5.0 5.1 5.7 56.447 117.428 
5121 6.5 -3.l 3.2 3.5 
5122 13.9 -6.4 6.6 7.3 
5123 13.8 -6.4 6.5 7.3 
5124 11.9 -5.5 5.7 6.3 
5125 8.9 -4.2 4.3 4.8 
5126 13. 6 -6.3 6.4 7.2 
5127 14.4 -6.6 6.8 7. 5 
5128 10.2 -4.8 4.9 5.5 
5129 5.2 -2.5 2.6 2.9 
4.3 -2.4 1.8 2.7 15.833 34.967 
5131 5.0 -2.7 2.1 3.1 
5132 4.2 -2.3 1.8 2.6 1. 495 3.274 
5133 4.8 -2.6 2.0 3.0 0.857 1.893 
5134 4.4 -2.4 1.9 2. 7 
5135 7 .4 -4.0 3.1 4.6 4.208 9.298 
5136 3.2 -1.8 1.4 2.0 8.360 18.251 
5.8 -3.9 1. 6 4.5 4.833 11. 994 
5141 6.3 -4.2 1.8 4.8 
5142 5.7 -3.9 1. 6 4.4 
5143 5.8 -3.9 1. 6 4.4 
5149 5.5 -3.7 1. 5 4.3 
2.9 -1.8 1.1 3.9 5.552 14.235 
5151 o.o -0.0 o.o o.o 
5152 5.0 -3.0 1.8 6.5 
5153 9.6 -5. 7 3.4 12.2 
2.8 -1. 6 1.1 3.5 0.369 0.932 
5211 o.o -0.0 o.o o.o o.ooo o.ooo 
5213 4.5 -2.6 1.8 5.5 
5214 3.0 -1. 7 1. 2 3.7 0.343 0.863 
23.7 -18.4 1.0 55.7 59.484 176.375 
5310 
4.1 -3.4 0.6 10.2 1.064 3.074 
5321 8.0 -6.4 1.1 19.3 
---Necessary data not available. 
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TABLE IX (Continued) 
dP I dP dM 
dVM dV ~~ t P+T p M M 
SITC (%) (%) (/o) (to) (million $) (million $) 
5323 8.2 -6.5 1.2 19.7 
5324 2.1 -1.8 0.3 5.3 0.489 1.415 
5325 6.2 -5.0 0.9 15.1 
533 9.8 -3.6 5.8 10.9 2. 7 54 6.418 
5331 6.6 -2.5 4.0 7 .4 o. 711 1.647 
5332 4.3 -1.6 2.6 4.9 0.227 0.527 
5333 11. 7 -4.3 6.9 13.0 1.420 3.317 
541 9.3 -5.8 3.0 6.3 14.137 33. 472 
5411 6.2 -3.9 2.0 ,4.3 1.819 4.317 
5413 8.5 -5.3 2.7 5.8 2.609 6.200 
5414 9.8 -6.1 3.1 6.6 2.032 4.823 
5415 8.2 -5.1 2.6 5.6 2.739 6. 511 
5416 2.6 -1.7 0.9 1.8 0.306 0.715 
5417 11. 0 -6.8 3.5 7.4 1.625 3.855 
5419 11.2 -6.9 3.6 7.5 0.189 0.448 
551 5.0 -2.8 2.1 2.7 3.529 7.534 
5511 2.2 -1.2 0.9 1.2 1.034 2.219 
5512 9.5 -5.2 3.8 5.0 2.129 4.588 
553 8.2 -4.3 3.5 4.2 2.117 4.462 
5530 
554 7.8 -5.0 2.4 4.9 1.043 2.453 
5541 5.8 -3.8 1.8 3.6 0.178 0.417 
5542 8.0 -5.1 2.5 5.0 0.709 1.663 
5543 8.5 -5.4 2.6 5.3 0.120 0.282 
561 0.7 -0. 5 0.2 1.0 2. 785 7.427 
5611 1.8 -1.2 0.6 2.5 1. 798 4.702 
5612 o.o -0 •. 0 o.o o.o o.ooo o.ooo 
5613 OaO -0.0 o.o o.o o.ooo o.ooo 
5619 1.3 -0.9 0.4 1.8 1.027 2.709 
571 9.0 -4.9 3.6 4.8 1.805 3.900 
5711 6.5 -3.6 ~.7 3.5 0.262 0.562 
5712 3.5 -2.0 1.5 .1.9 0.050 0.107 
5713 14.4 -7e6 5.7 7.4 1.208 2.605 
5714 9.8 -5.3 3.9 5.2 0.603 1.304 
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TABLE IX (Continued) 
dp·1 clP dM 
dVM dV ,'( t P+T p M M 
SITC (%) ('70) (%) (%) (million $) (million $) 
581 10.9 -6.7 3.5 10.5 25.374 63.761 
5811 11.4 -7.0 3.6 10.9 
5812 11.0 -6.7 3.5 10.6 
5813 10.1 -6.2 3.2 9.8 1. 615 4.067 
5819 7.9 -4.9 2.6 7.7 0.166 0.416 
599 7.3 -3.3 3.7 7.1 15.444 36.001 
5992 5.6 -2.6 2.9 5.5 2.182 5.067 
5995 6.2 -2.8 3.2 6.0 7.490 17.367 
5996 5.6 -2.6 2.9 5.5 o. 259 0.603 
5997 10.3 -4.6 5.2 9.9 1. 016 2. 371 
5999 7 .4 -3.4 3.8 7.2 2. 798 6.508 
512 
513 
514 
515 
521 
531 
TABLE X 
ESTIMATED PRICE AND TRADE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN TARIFF REMOVAL 
ON THE U.S. EXPORT MARKET: FIRST SCENARIO 
dP dX 
dVX dV * t** p x x 
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SITC (/o) (%) (%) (million $) (million $) 
8.9 6.7 4.2 123.267 222.132 
5121 7.3 5.5 3.4 
5122 9.3 7.0 4.3 
5123 11. 2 8.4 5.2 
5124 9.4 7.1 4.4 
5125 8.9 6.7 4. 2 
5126 9.5 7.2 4.4 
5127 10.1 7.6 4. 7 
5128 8.7 6.6 4.1 
5129 8.5 6.4 4.0 
6.4 4.8 8.1 34.830 79. 325 
5131 5.4 4.1 6.9 0.642 1.459 
5132 4.1 3.1 5.2 3.630 8.230 
5133 6.3 4.7 8.0 2. 586 5.900 
5134 6.0 4.5 . 7. 6 0.304 0.693 
5135 7.3 5.5 9.2 2.324 5.291 
5136 7.1 5.3 9.0 25.167 59. 363 
7.0 6.1 4.1 15.890 29.119 
5141 6.1 5.3 3.5 
5142 7.8 6.8 4.5 
5143 6.2 4.7 3.1 
5149 7.0 6.1 4.1 
2.1 1.6 2.6 7 .690 17.272 
5151 0.6 0.5 0.7 1.354 2.937 
5152 6.4 4.9 7.7 2.473 5.551 
5153 4.8 3.7 5.8 4.834 10.819 
3.3 2.6 1.6 1. 296 2.322 
5211 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.001 0.002 
5213 4.1 3.2 2.0 0.001 0.002 
5214 3.5 2.7 1.7 1.362 2.432 
9.9 9.7 59,6 39. 962 109.568 
5310 
·---Necessary data not available. 
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TABLE X (Continued) 
dP dX dVX dV -1( t** p x x 
SITC (%) (i.) . (%) (million $) (million $) 
532 4.4 4.1 29.3 1.251 3.456 
5321 2.8 2.6 18.7 0.244 0.673 
5323 6.4 5.9 4·2.5;, 0.906 2. 507 
5324 3.9 3.6 26~0 
5325 5.9 5.4 39.2 
533 7.9 6.1 3.2 9. 489 16. 277 
5331 7.7 6.0 3.1 1.485 2.536 
5332 8.7 6.7 3.5 1.07 5 1.844 
5333 7.9 6.1 3.2 6.993 11. 995 
541 8.8 7.5 2.8 49.780 78. 272 
5411 7.3 6.3 2.4 0.879 1.386 
5413 8.3 7.1 2.7 13. 633 21. 528 
5414 6.6 5.7 2.1 o. 277 0.354 
5415 7. 4 6.4 2.4 2.872 4.510 
5416 5.1 4.4 1. 7 3.538 5.574 
5417 10.4 8.9 3.3 22.680 35. 715 
5419 8.9 7.6 2.9 4.300 6.942 
551 6.9 5.3 6.6 7.334 15.657 
5511 6.6 5.1 6.3 4. 295 9.148 
5·512 7.5 5.8 7.1 3.093 6.583 
553 10.9 9.1 5.5 6.326 11. 352 
5530 
554 10.1 8.8 1.5 9.744 12.798 
5541 10.6 9.3 1. 5 0.809 1.051 
5542 10.4 9.1 1. 5 8.248 10.763 
5543 8.1 7.1 1.2 o. 774 1.011 
561 1.5 1.2 2.4 10.830 25.326 
5611 1. 7 1.5 2.7 1.978 4.536 
5612 2.2 1.9 3.5 2.868 6.610 
5613 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.409 0.954 
5619 3. 3.:.'. 2.8 5.2 12.543 29.005 
571 10.l 8.1 6.6 4.265 8.261 
5711 7.9 6.4 5.2 0.750 1.446 
5712 10.2 8.2 6.6 0.736 1.421 
5713 8.3 6.7 5.4 0.760 1.462 
5714 11. l 8.9 7.2 1.811 3.508 
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TABLE X (Continued) 
dP dX dV dV * t** p x x x 
SITC (%) (/o) (%) (million $) (million $) 
581 10.7 9.0 4.3 93.887 160.576 
58ll 10.6 8.9 4.2 28.538 47.904 
5812 ll.2 9.4 4.5 49.901 84.223 
5813 8.6 7.2 3.4 10.641 17.788 
5819 7.3 6.1 2.9 3.486 5.822 
599 6.7 5.0 3.2 46.506 83.898 
5992 6.4 4.8 3.0 7.679 13.753 
5995 9.3 6.9 4.4 3.962 7.174 
5996 3.9 2.9 1.9 3.094 5.586 
5997 7.6 5.7 3.6 16.974 30.563 
5999 6.1 4.6 2.9 13.990 25.109 
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organic chemicals (5129) and Nitrogen-function compounds (5127), re-
spectively. Elimination of these tariffs by the u. S. would cause the 
u. S. price of the imported goods to fall by 2.5 percent for Other or-
ganic chemicals (5129) and 6.6 percent for Nitrogen-function compounds 
(5127); furthermore, it would result in increases of the duty-free price 
received by the foreign suppliers which equal 2.6 percent and 6.8 per-
cent, respectively. 
U. S. exports of Organic chemicals (SITC 512) face average foreign 
tariffs which range from 7.3 percent for Hydrocarbons and their halo-
genated, sulfonated, nitrated or nitrosated derivatives (5121) to 11.2 
percent for Ethers, epoxides, acetals (5123). This is less variation 
than for the import side of this sector. 
For comparison with the immediately preceding discussion of the im-
port market, exports of Other organic chemicals (5129), the imports of 
which have the lowest U. S. tariff within the group, face an average 
foreign tariff of 8.5 percent. The foreign tariffs average 10.1 percent 
on U. s. exports of Nitrogen-function compounds (5127). The elimination 
of these foreign tariffs would increase the u. S. price of the export 
corrnnodity by 6.4 percent in the case of Other organic chemicals (5129) 
and by 7.6 percent for Nitrogen-function compounds (5127). 
The quantity of imports into the U. S. for these same two subgroups 
would increase by 2.9 percent for Other organic chemicals (5129) and by 
7.5 percent for Nitrogen-function compounds (5127) as a result of tariff 
elimination. The exports of the U. s. would experience a quantity in-
crease equal to 4.0 percent and 4.7 percent, respectively. 
The tariff average of 4.3 percent of imports of Inorganic chemi-
cals: Elements, oxides and halogen salts, SITC 513, conceals U. s. 
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tariffs which vary from 3.2 percent for Other inorganic bases and me-
tallic oxides (5136) to 7.4 percent for Metallic oxides, of kinds 
principally used in paints (5135). The highest tariff (5135's) is ex-
treme, however; the second highest tariff is 4.8 percent for Inorganic 
acids and oxygen compounds of non-metals or metalloids (5133). The cor-
responding effects resulting from tariff elimination are, for Metallic 
oxides, of kinds principally used in paints (5135), an import price de-
crease of 4.0 percent, a duty-free price rise of 3.1 percent, and a 4.6 
percent increase in the quantity of imports. For Other inorganic bases 
and metallic oxides (5136) these effects are estimated to be, re-
spectively, a 1.8 percent decrease, a 1.4 percent duty-free price in-
crease, and a 2.0 percent increase in imports. 
The foreign tariffs levied on U. S. exports of Inorganic chemicals: 
Elements, oxides, and halogen salts (SITC 513) range from 4.1 percent 
on Chemical elements n. e. s. (5132) to 7.3 percent on Metallic oxides 
of kinds principally used in paints (5135). The elimination of foreign 
tariffs on u. S. exports of Other inorganic bases and metallic oxides 
(5136), which average 7.1 percent, would increase the u. s. price by 
5.3 percent and increase exports, in terms of quantity, by 9.0 percent. 
The elimination of tariffs on exports of Metallic oxides, of kinds 
principally used in paints (5135) results in an 5.5 percent increase in 
the u. s. price and a 9.2 percent quantity increase in exports. The 
estimated changes in the value of trade in Metallic oxides, of kinds 
principally used in paints (5135) are, for the short-run, increased im-
ports of $4.208 million and increased exports of $2.324 million. It is 
estimated that trade liberalization would increase, for Other inorganic 
bases and metallic oxides (5136), imports by $8.360 million and exports 
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by $25.167 million.· 
The variation of tariffs levied on U. s. imports within the sector 
Other inorganic chemicals (SITC 514) extends from 5.5 percent for Inor-
ganic chemical: products, n. e. s. (5149) to 6.3 percent for Metallic 
salts and peroxysalts of inorganic acids (5141). The corresponding de-
clines in the u. S. prices of the imports as a result of tariff elimi-
nation are 3.7 percent and 4.2 percent. In comparison, Do s. exports 
of Inorganic chemical pro<lucts, n. e. s. (5149) incur foreign tariffs 
which average 7.0 percent. The elimination of such tariffs would drive 
up the U. S. price an estimated 6.1 percent as a result of increased 
foreign demand. These data are, coincidently, the averages of Other 
inorganic chemicals (SITC 514) as a whole and represent neither the 
upper or lower extreme. 
A wide range of u. s. tariffs exists for Radioactive and associated 
materials (SITC 515). For Radioactive chemical elements and isotopes 
and their compounds and mixtures (5151) the tariff is nil; whereas the 
tariff average is 9.6 percent for Compounds and mixtures, n. e. s. of 
thorium, of uranium, of rare earth metals, of yttrium or of scandium 
(5153). The removal of this 9.6 percent tariff is estimated to result 
in a 5.7 percent decline in the price of imported Compounds and mix-
tures, n. e. s. of thorium, of uranium, of rare earth metals, of 
yttrium, or of sandium (5153), and a 12.2 percent increase in the 
quantity of imports. Foreign suppliers would experience a 3.4 percent 
increase in the price they receive. 
In the export sector, foreign tariffs range from 0.6 percent for 
Radioactive chemical elements and isotopes and their compounds and mix-
tures (5151) to 6.4 percent for Stable isotopes and their compounds 
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(5152). The remaining subgroup within the Radioactive and associated 
materials (SITC 515) group, Compounds and mixtures, n. e. s. of thorium, 
of uranium, of rare earth metals, of yttrium, or of scandium (5153), 
faces an average 4.8 percent tariff abroad. Its elimination would in-
crease the u. S. price 3.7 percent and increase exports, in terms of 
quantity, 5.8 percent. 
The tariff on Mineral tar (5211) is nil. The highest tariff 
average within Mineral tar and crude chemicals from coal, petroleum, and 
natural gas (SITC 521) is 4. 5 percent on Ammoniacal gas liquors and 
spent oxide produced in coal gas purification (5213), the elimination 
of which results in a 2.6 percent decline in the U. S. price of the im-
port and a 5.5 percent increase in the quantity of imports. The in-
creased value of imports approximates $26 thousand. 
The foreign tariffs on the subgroups within Mineral tar and crude 
chamicals from coal, petroleum, and natural gas (SITC 521) are 0.4 per-
cent on Mineral tar (5211), 4.1 percent on Ammoniacal gas liquors and 
spent oxide produced in coal gas purification (5213), and 3.5 percent 
on Oil and other products of the distillation of coal and tar (5214). 
Free trade would increase the U. S. price of Ammoniacal gas liquors and 
spent oxide produced in coal gas purification (5213) 3.2 percent and in-
crease exports 2.0 percent. The short-term increase in exports is 
valued at $1 thousand. 
The division of Dyeing, Tanning and Coloring Materials (SITC 53) 
consists of three three-digit groups. One three-digit group, Synthetic 
organic dyestuffs, natural indigo and color lakes (SITC 531) is not sub-
divided at the four-digit level and is described in the previous section 
only. Dyeing and tanning extracts, and synthetic tanning materials 
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(SITC 532) consists of four four-digit subgroups with tariffs ranging 
from 2.1 percent to 8.2 percent. The subgroup Tanning extracts of 
vegetable origin (5324), which has the lowest U. s. tariff within its 
group, displays a price decline of 1.8 percent for the import price 
paid by the u. S. consumer, whereas the duty-free price increase is 0.3 
percent. These price changes would result in an increase in the quan-
tity of imports of 5.3 percent in the short-run. The value increases in 
imports of Tanning extracts of vegetable origin (5324) are estimated as 
$0.489 million in the short-run and $1.415 million in the long-run 
which are increases of 5.6 percent and 16.2 percent, respectiveiy. The 
most highly tariffed subgroup,. Synthetic tannir:ig materials ( 532.:,3), indi-
cates a 6.5 percent decrease in the U. S. import price and a 1.2 percent 
increase in the duty-free price. The quantity of imports would in-
crease by 19.7 percent following the elimination of U. S. tariffs. 
The foreign tariffs within Dyeing and tanning extracts, and syn-
thetic tanning materials (SITC 532) range from 2.8 percent to 6.4 per-
cent for Dyeing extracts (vegetable and animal)(5321) and Synthetic tan-
ning materials (5323), respectively. The greatest tariff being on Sy-
thetic tanning materials (5323) coincides with the situation for the 
U. s. The removal of the foreign tariff on Synthetic tanning materials 
(5323) would result in a 5.9 percent increase in the U. S. price and a 
42.5 percent increase in the quantity of exports by the U. S. 
The tariff range for the four-digit subgroups of Pigments, paints, 
varnishes and related materials (SITC 533) extended from 4.3 percent for 
Printing inks (5332) to 11.7 percent for Prepared paints, enamels, lac-
quers, varnishes, artists' colors, siccatives (paint driers) and 
mastics (5333). Their elimination results in respective import price 
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declines of 1.6 percent and 4.3 percent. The quantity of imports would 
increase 4.9 percent and 13.0 percent, respectively. For Prepared 
paints, enamels, lacquers, varnishes, artists' colors, siccatives and 
mastics (5333) the increase in the value of impdrts is $1.420 million, 
in the short-run and $3.317 million in the long~run. 
The foreign tariffs for this group are 7.7 percent for Coloring 
materials, n. e. s. (5331), 8.7 percent for Printing inks (5332) and 
7.9 percent for Prepared paints, enamels, lacquers, varnishes, artists' 
colors, siccatives and mastics (5333). For comparison with the u. s. 
import market results, tariff elimination abroad for Printing inks 
(5332) would increase the U. S. price of the exported cormnodities 6.7 
percent. Multilateral tariff elimination would create short-run esti-
mated increases in the value of U, S. imports of $0.227 million and in 
the value of exports of $1.075 million. 
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products (SITC 541) consists of seven 
four-digit subgroups. Glycosides, glands and their extracts, sera, and 
vaccines (5416) has the lowest tariff, 2.6 percent, the elimination of 
which would result in a price decline for the u. s. consumer of 1.7 per-
cent. The foreign suppliers would reap a duty-free increase of 0.9 per-
cent and the quantity of imports would increase 1.8 p.ercent. These ef-
fects combine to increase the duty-free value of imports by $0.306 mil-
lion in the short-run and $0.715 million in the long-run. In comparison, 
the most heavily tariffed subgroup, Pharmaceutical goods (5419), whose 
tariff given ratification of the Supplemental Agreement is 11.2 percent, 
shows an estimated increase in the value of imports of $0.189 million 
in the short-run and $0.448 million in the long run. This is the result 
of a 3.6 percent increase in the duty-free price and a 7.5 percent 
126 
increase in the quantity of imports. The U. S. consumer would experi-
ence a price decrease of 6.9 percent. 
The tariffs faced by u. S. exports of Medicinal and pharmaceutical 
products (SITC 541) to the rest-of-the-world extend from 5.1 percent 
for Glycosides, glands and their extracts, sera, and vaccines (5416) to 
10.4 percent for Medicaments (5417). Removal of this latter tariff 
would cause an increase in the u. s. price of Medicaments (5417) esti-
mated to equal 8.9 percent. Furthermore, exports would increase by 3.3 
percent in terms of quantity and in terms of value by $22.680 million. 
The least heavily tariffed subgroup, exports of Glycosides, glands 
and their extracts, sera, and vaccines (5416), is also the least tar-
iffed by the u. S. on the import market side, and the two markets are 
readily compared. Elimination of foreign tariffs would create an up-
ward force on U. S. prices of Glycosides, glands and their extracts, 
sera, and vaccines (5416) of 4.4 percent. The short-run effects on 
trade would be to increase exports by 1.7 percent of their initial 
quantity and to increase the value of exports by $3.538 million. 
u. S. imports of Essential oils and resinoids (5511) have a 2.2 
percent tariff and Synthetic perfume and flavor materials and concen-
trates, and enfleurage greases and mixtures of alcohol and essential 
oils (5512) have a 9.5 percent tariff, which average, when weighted by 
world imports, the 5.0 percent U. S. tariff for the composite three-
digit group. The corresponding u. s. prices decrease, as a result of 
free entry into the u. s., by 1.2 percent and 5.2 percent. The duty-
free value of imports increases respectively, in the short-run, by 
$1.034 million and $2.129 million. 
The export markets incur foreign tariffs on Essential oils and 
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resinoids (5511) and on Synthetic perfume and flavor materials and con-
centrates, and enf leurage greases and mixtures of alcohol and essential 
oils (5512) which equal 6.6 percent and 7.5 percent, respectively. The 
respective U. S. prices in the case of foreign tariff removal increase 
by 5.1 percent and 5.8 percent. The value of exports increase in the 
short-run by $4.295 million and $3.093 million. In the long-run, the 
increased export values are $9.148 million for Essential oils and res-
inoids (5511) and $6.583 million for Synthetic perfume and flavor ma-
terials and concentrates, and enf leurage greases and mixtures of alcohol 
and essential oils (5512), whereas the comparable import increases are, 
respectively, $2.219 million and $4.588 million. 
The tariff range for Soaps, cleansing and polishing preparations 
(SITC 554) extends from 5.8 percent for Soaps (5541) to 8.5 percent for 
Polishes, pastes, powder and similar preparations for polishing and pre-
serving leather, wood, metal, glass and other materials (5543). 7 
Surface-acting agents and washing preparati9ns (5542) has a tariff 
average of 8.0 percent. The elimination of these tariffs would yield 
estimated declines of the U. S. prices equal to 3.8 percent for Soaps 
(5541) and 5.4 percent for Polishes, pastes, powder and similar prepara-
tions for polishing, and preserving leather, wood, metal, glass and 
other materials (5543). Correspondingly, the duty-free prices would 
tend to increase by 1.8 percent and 2.6 percent and imports would in-
crease by 3.6 percent and 5.3 percent. The dollar magnitudes of imports 
would increase in the short-run by $0.178 million and by $0.120 million, 
respectively. 
The foreign tariffs levied on U. s. exports average 10.6 percent 
for Soaps (5541), 10.4 percent for Surface-acting agents and washing 
preparations (5542), and 8.1 percent for Polishes, pastes, powder and 
similar preparations for polishing and preserving leather, wood, glass 
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and other materials (5543). Their elimination would tend to drive up 
the U. S. prices by 9.3 percent in the case of Soaps (5541) and 7.1 
percent in Polishes, pastes, powder, and similar preparations for po-
lishing and preserving leather, wood, metal, glass and other materials 
(5543). The corresponding export quantities would increase by per-
centages equal to 1.5 and 1.2 and short-run export values would rise by 
$0.809 million and $0.774 million, respectively. 
Both Phosphatic fertilizers and phosphatic fertilizer materials 
(other than natural) (5612) and Potassic fertilizers and potassic fer-
tilizer materials (5613) carry no tariffs when imported into the United 
States. The u. S. does levy tariffs which average 1.3 percent on Fer-
tilizers, n. e. s. (5619) and 1.8 percent on Nitrogenous fertilizers and 
nitrogeneous fertilizer materials (other than natural), n. e. s. 
(5611). This study estimates that the elimination of the tariff on 
Nitrogenous fertilizers and nitrogenous fertilizer materials (other than 
natural), n. e. s. (5611) would result in a 1.2 percent decrease in the 
price paid by the U. s. consumer, while foreign suppliers would gain a 
0.6 percent increase in the price they receive. As a result of the 
price effect, the quantity of imports is estimated to increase by 2.5 
percent. The predicted value magnitudes are a $1.798 million increase 
in the short-run and a $4.702 million long-run increase in the duty-
free value of imports of Nitrogenous fertilizers and nitrogenous ferti-
lizer materials (other than natural), n. e. s. (5611). 
The foreign tariffs range from 0.4 percent on Potassic fertilizers 
and potassic fertilizer materials (other than crude natural potassic 
salts) (5613) to 3.3 percent on Fertilizers, n. e. s. (5619). Compared 
to the u. S. import market for the Nitrogenous fertilizers and 
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nitrogenous fertilizer materials (other than natural), n. e. s. subgroup 
( 5611), elim;nation of· its 1. 7 percent tariff would tend to increase 
U. S. prices by 1.5 percent and u. s. exports by 2.7 percent of the 
initial quantity. The value of the increment in exports is estimated 
to be $1.978 million in the short-run. 
Elimination of tariffs on Explosives and pyrotechnic products 
(SITC 571) causes price declines for U. S. imports of such conrrnodities 
which range from 2.0 percent for Fuses, primers and detonators (5712), 
upon which the average tariff is 3.5 percent, to 7.6 percent for Pyro-
technical articles (5713), upon which the average tariff is 14.4 per-
cent. The value of imports in the short-run for these subgroups would 
increase by $0.050 million, or 3.4 percent, and $1.208 million (13.5 
percent), respectively. 
The categories which are the extremes for the U. S. import market 
are not the extremes for the export market, which displays foreign tar-
iffs from a low of 7.9 percent for Propellent powders and other pre-
pared explosives (5711) to a high of 11.1 percent for Hunting and 
sporting anrrnunition (5714). For comparison with the discussion of U. S. 
imports, the effects of eliminating the 8.3 percent foreign tariff on 
Pyrotechnical articles (5713) are discussed here. The estimated price 
effect is an increase of 6.7 percent in the price of conrrnodities in the 
U. S. The value of exports would increase by $0.760 million in the 
short-run which is less than the predicted increase in value of imports 
for Pyrotechnical articles (5713). 
The tariff variation for imports of Plastic materials, regenerated 
cellulose and artificial resins (SITC 581) extends from a low for Other 
artificial resins and plastic materials (5819) of 7.9 percent to a high 
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for Products of condensation, polycondensation and polyaddition (5811) 
of 11.4 percent. The corresponding effects on the U. s. price of the 
imports are predicted to be decreases of 4.9 percent and 7.0 percent. 
In both subcategories, the foreign suppliers would receive slightly 
less than one-third of the tariff eliminated as price increases. The 
quantity of imports of Products of condensation 1 polycondensation and 
polyaddition (5811) would increase about 10.9 percent. The increase in 
imports of Other artificial resins and plastic materials (5819) is es-
timated as 7.7 percent in terms of quantity and as $0.166 million for 
the short-run change in value. 
The tariff for U. S. exports of Plastic materials, regenerated 
cellulose and artificial resins (SITC 581) vary from 7.3 percent to 
11.2 percent. The lowest tariff is on Other artificial resins and 
plastic materials (5819), whereas the highest tariff is on Products of 
polymerization and copolymerization (5812). Products of condensation, 
polycondensation and polyaddition (5811) have the second highest aver-
age foreign tariff, equal to 10.6 percent. Foreign tariff elimination 
would increase the U. S. prices of this subgroup (5811) by 8.9 percent 
and the quantity of exports would increase by 4.2 percent. The short-
run effect for this category on the value of trade would be an increase 
in exports equal to $28.538 million. 8 
The Chemical materials and products not elsewhere classified group 
(SITC 599) exhibits tariffs on U. S. imports which range from 5.6 per-
cent for Insecticides, fungicides, disinfectants (including sheep and 
cattle dressing) and similar preparations ( 5992) and for Wood and 
resin-based chemical products (5996) to 10.3 percent for Organic chemi-
cal products, n. e. s. (5997). For imports of Insecticides, fungicides, 
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disinfectants and similar preparations (5992) and of Wood and resin-
based chemical products (5996), the estimated price declines are 2.6 
percent and the estimated increases in the quantity of imports equal 
5.5 percent. In terms of the value of imports, the short-run increases 
equal $2.182 million for Insecticides, fugicides, disinfectants and 
similar preparations (5992) and $0.259 million for Wood and resin-based 
chemical products (5996). 
The largest u. s. import price decline within SITC 599, 4.6 per-
cent, is predicted for Organic chemical products, n. e. s. (5997). 
Furthermore, tariff elimination within this subgroup results in the 
duty-free price increasing 5.2 percent and the quantity of imports in-
creasing 9.9 percent. These increases combine and produce a short-run 
increase of $1.016 million in the duty-free value of imports of Organic 
chemical products, n. e. s. (5997). 
Exports within this catch-all category (SITC 599) incur average 
tariffs abroad which vary from 3.9 percent for Wood and resin-based 
chemical products (5996) to 9.3 percent for Starches, inulin, gluten; 
albuminoidal substances; glues (5995). The exports of the subgroup Or-
ganic chemical products, n. e. s. (5997) face foreign tariffs which 
average 7.6 percent which is above the average for its three-digit 
group. Free trade for these exports would drive up the U. S. price an 
estimated 5.7 percent, while the quantity of exports increases by 3.6 
percent. The value of exports would increase $16.974 million in the 
short-run. 
The Second Scenario and a Comparison of the Two Scenarios 
The analysis of the second scenario estimates the impact of the 
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elimination of the tariffs existing after the Kennedy Round reductions 
but without implementation of the Supplemental Agreement on chemicals. 
The results of the analysis under the assumption of non-ratification 
are presented in their entirety in Table XI for the import market and 
in Table XII for the export market. 
The tariffs of the second scenario either equal or exceed those of 
the first scenario, and, therefore, the estimated effects accordingly 
either equal or exceed those discussed in the preceding section. Rather 
than extracting for this text the highlights of these estimated effects 
which are displayed in the tables, it seems of greater interest to fol-
low a discussion of the tariffs of the second scenario with a comparison 
of the estimated effects under the two scenarios. This would give some 
measure of the impact on the u. S. of the failure of Congress to approve 
the Supplemental Agreement on chemicals. The estimates of the value of 
trade effects resulting from ratification of the Supplemental Agreement 
are shown in Table XIII. These estimates are the differences between 
the estimates of the second scenario and those of the first scenario. 9 
Organic chemicals, SITC group 512 9 displays U. S. tariffs which 
range from 5.4 percent for Other organic chemicals (5129) to 14.9 per-
cent for Nitrogen-function compounds (5127), assuming non-ratification 
of the ASP package. On average, these tariffs are 0.4 of a percentage 
point above those of the first scenario. The price effects in the im-
port market as well as the increment in the quantity of imports differ, 
on average, by 0.2 of a percentage point between the two scenarios. 
Comparison of the results for the value of increased imports from tar-
iff elimination under both scenarios reveals that ratification of the 
Supplemental Agreement would have increased U. S. imports of Organic 
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TABLE XI 
ESTIMATED PRICE AND TRADE EFFECTS OF U, S, TARIFF REMOVAL ON 
THE U.S. IMPORT MARKET: SECOND SCENARIO 
dP' dp dM 
dVM dV * t P+T p M M 
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SITC (%) (%) (%) (%) (million $) (million $) 
11.0 -5.2 5.3 5.9 58. 595 121. 835 
5121 6.7 -3.2 3.3 3.7 
5122 14.4 -6.6 6.8 7.6 
5123 14.3 -6.6 6.8 7.5 
5124 12.3 -5.7 5.9 6.5 
5125 9.2 -4.4 4.4 5.0 
5126 14.1 -6.5 6.7 7.4 
5127 14.9 -6.9 7.0 7.8 
5128 10.6 -5.0 5.1 5.7 
5129 5.4 -2.6 2.7 3.0 
4.5 -2.5 1.9 2.8 16.545 36.408 
5131 5.2 -2.8 2.2 3.2 
5132 4.4 -2.4 1.9 2.8 1.598 3.516 
5133 5.0 -2.7 2.1 3.1 0.891 1.963 
5134 4.5 -2.5 1.9 2.8 
5135 7.7 -4.2 3.2 4. 7 4. 320 9.525 
5136 3.3 -1.8 1.4 2.1 8.607 18.993 
6.0 -4.1 1.7 4.6 4.995 12.322 
5141 6.5 -4.4 1.8 5.0 
5142 5.9 -4.0 1. 7 4.6 
5143 6.0 -4.1 1. 7 4.6 
5149 5.7 -3.9 1.6 4.4 
3.0 -1.8 1.1 4.0 5.664 14.569 
5151 o.o -0.0 o.o o.o 
5152 5.2 -3.2 1.9 6.8 
5153 9.9 -5.9 3.5 12.6 
2.8 -1.6 1.1 3.5 0.369 0.932 
5211 o.o -0.0 o.o o.o o.ooo o.ooo 
5213 4.5 -2.6 1.8 5.5 
5214 3.0 -1. 7 1. 2 3.7 0.343 0.863 
26.5 -20.l 1.1 60.9 65.108 193.038 
5310 
---Necessary data not available. 
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TABLE XI (Continued) 
dP"' dP dM dVM dV * t P+T p M M 
SITC (%) (%) (%) (%) (million $) (mi 11 ion $) 
532 ~4.6 -3.8 0.7 11.4 1.193 3.442 
5321 9.0 -7.1 1.3 21.5 
5323 9.2 -7.2 1.3 21.9 
5324 2.3 -1.9 0.3 5.8 0.533 1. 546 
5325 6.9 -5.5 1.0 16.8 
533 11.0 -4.0 6.5 12.2 3.097 7.226 
5331 7 .4 -2.7 4.4 8.3 0.794 1.848 
5332 4.8 -1.8 2.9 5.4 0.252 0.583 
5333 13.l -4.8 7.7 14.4 1. 584 3.702 
541 9.3 -5.8 3.01 6.3 14.137 33.472 
5411 6.2 -3.9 2.0 4.3 1.819 4.317 
5413 8.5 -5.3 2.7 5.8 2.609 6.200 
5414 9.8 -6.1 3.1 6.6 2.032 4.823 
5415 8.2 -5.1 2.6 5.6 2.739 6. 511 
5416 2.6 -1.7 0.9 1.8 0.306 o. 715 
5417 11.0 -6.8 3.5 7 .4 1.625 3.855 
5419 11.2 -6.9 3.6 7.5 0.189 0.448 
551 5.4 -3.0 2.2 2.9 3. 7 52 8. 058 
5511 2.4 -1.4 1.0 1.3 1.133 2.419 
5512 10.3 -5.6 4.1 5.4 2.303 4.966 
553 8.8 -4.6 3.8 4.5 2.285 4.805 
5530 
554 8.4 -5.4 2.6 5.2 1.115 2.615 
5541 6.3 -4.1 2.0 4.0 0.198 0.464 
5542 8.6 -5.5 2.6 5.3 o. 748 1. 760 
5543 9.2 -5.8 2.8 5.7 0.129 0.304 
561 0.7 -0.5 0.2 1.0 2.785 7.427 
5611 1.8 -1.2 0.6 2.5 1. 798 4.702 
5612 o.o -0.0 o.o o.o o.ooo o.ooo 
5613 o.o -0.0 o.o o.o o.ooo o.ooo 
5619 1.3 -0.9 0.4 1.8 1.027 2.709 
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TABLE XI (Continued) 
dP' dP dM 
dVM dV * t P+T p M M 
SITC (%) (%) (to) {to) (million $) (million $) 
571 9.3 -5.1 3.8 4.9 1.871 4.013 
5711 6.7 -3.7 2.7 3.6 0.267 0.575 
5712 3.6 -2.0 1. 5 2.0 0.052 0.112 
5713 14.8 -7.8 5.8 7.6 1.236 2.673 
5714 10.1 -5.5 4.1 5.3 0.624 1.339 
581 10.9 -6.7 3.5 10.5 25.374 63.761 
5811 11.4 -7.0 3.6 10.9 
5812 11.0 -6.7 3.5 10.6 
5813 10.1 -6.2 3.2 9.8 1. 615 4.067 
5819 7.9 -4.9 2.6 7.7 0.166 0.416 
599 7.5 -3.4 3.8 7.3 15.883 37.040 
5992 5.8 -2.7 3.0 5.7 2.261 5.254 
5995 6.4 -2.9 3.3 6.3 7.822 18.203 
5996 5.7 -2.6 2.9 5.6 0.263 0.612 
5997 10.6 -4.7 5.4 10.2 1.051 2.450 
5999 7.6 -3.4 3!9 7. 4 2.876 6.693 
512 
513 
514 
515 
521 
531 
TABLE XII 
ESTIMATED PRICE AND TRADE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN TARIFF REMOVAL 
ON THE U.S. EXPORT MARKET: SECOND SCENARIO 
dP dX 
dVX dV * t*7' p x x 
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SITC (%) (%) (%) (million $) (million $·) 
12.5 9.4 5.8 173.212 313. 209 
5121 11.1 8.3 5.1 
5122 12.8 9.6 5.9 
5123 15.4 11.5 7.1 
5124 13.3 9.9 6.2 
5125 12.7 9.5 5.9 
5126 13. 7 10.2 6.3 
5127 13.6 10.2 6.3 
5128 11.9 8.9 5.5 
5129 10.9 8.2 5.1 
8.2 6.1 10.3 44.892 102.600 
5131 6.6 4.9 8.4 0.782 1. 781 
5132 5.8 4.4 7. 4 5.170 11. 767 
5133 8.9 6.7 11. 2 3.683 8.425 
5134 8.1 6.1 10.2 0.414 0.945 
5135 9.4 7.0 11.8 3.008 6.878 
5136 8.8 6.6 11.1 32.392 74.037 
8.9 7.7 5.1 20.192 36.992 
5141 8.2 7.1 4. 7 
5142 9.7 8.4 5.6 
5143 8.3 7.2 4.8 
5149 8.8 7.6 5.1 
2.8 2.2 3.4 10.217 22.815 
5151 0.9 0.7 1.1 2.028 4.524 
5152 8.7 6.6 10.4 3.381 7.622 
5153 6.3 4.8 7.6 6.360 14.293 
4.2 3.3 2.1 1.670 2.990 
5211 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.002 0.004 
5213 5.7 4.4 2.8 0.001 0.003 
5214 4.5 3.5 2.2 1. 777 3.171 
11.1 10.9 66.7 45.188 124.005 
5310 
---Necessary data not available 
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TABLE XII (Continued} 
dP dX 
dVX dV * t** p x x 
SITC (%} (%} (%} (million $} (million $} 
532 5.8 5.3 38.6 1.662 4.600 
5321 3.9 3.6 26.0 0.341 0.943 
5323 8.6 7.9 57 .1 1.236 3.428 
5324 4.9 4.5 32.6 
5325 8.1 7.5 53.8 
533 10.8 8.3 4.3 12.966 22.360 
5331 11.1 8.5 4.4 2.132 3.670 
5332 11. 5 8.8 4.6 1. 423 2.455 
5333 10.6 8.1 4.2 9.377 16.114 
541 11.3 9.7 3.6 64.645 102.031 
5411 10.0 8.6 3.2 1.199 1.889 
5413 11.0 9.4 3.5 18. 053 28. 504 
5414 9.5 8.1 3.1 0.328 0.521 
5415 10.1 8.6 3.3 3.906 6.207 
5416 7 .4 6.4 2.4 5.132 8. 059 
5417 12.6 10.7 4.0 27.461 43.524 
5419 11. 5 9.8 3.7 5.674 9.000 
551 8.7 6.7 8.3 9.313 19.919 
5511 8.0 6.2 7.6 5.230 11.144 
5512 9.7 7.5 9.2 4.040 8.635 
553 13.4 11.1 6.8 7.812 14.143 
5530 
554 12.6 11. 0 1.8 12.147 15.880 
5541 13.4 11. 7 1.9 1.022 1.335 
5542 12.8 11.1 1.8 10.067 13.136 
5543 10.6 9.3 1. 5 1.010 1.312 
561 3.7 3.2 5.8 27.413 63.139 
5611 7.7 6.6 12.1 9.097 21.134 
5612 3.0 2.6 4. 7 3.894 8. 954 
5613 1. 2 1.0 1.9 1.323 3.063 
5619 5.3 4.5 8.3 20. 285 46.996 
571 11.3 9.1 7.3 4. 779 9.238 
5711 10.4 8.4 6.8 0.992 1.919 
5712 14.4 11. 5 9.3 1. 049 2.044 
5713 11.2 9.0 7.3 1.034 2.004 
5714 11.1 8.9 7.2 1.811 3.508 
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TABLE XII (Continued) 
dP dX dVX dV * t** p x x 
SITC (io) (io) (%) (million $) (million $) 
581 13.9 11.6 5.5 123.528 208.990 
5811 14.3 11.9 5.7 38.700 65. 720 
5812 14.4 12.0 5.7 64.070 108.557 
5813 10.9 9.1 4.3 13.532 22.732 
5819 9.3 7.8 3.7 4.478 7.507 
599 8.0 6.0 3.8 55.788 100.610 
5992 8.3 6.2 3.9 9.995 17.998 
5995 10.1 7.5 4.8 4.322 7 .847 
5996 5.1 3.8 2.4 4.010 7 .185 
5997 10.2 7.6 4.8 22. 795 41.239 
5999 6.9 5.2 3.3 15.890 28.618 
SITC 
512 
5121 
5122 
5123 
5124 
5125 
5126 
5127 
5128 
5129 
513 
5131 
5132 
5133 
5134 
5135 
5136 
514 
5141 
5142 
5143 
5149 
515 
5151 
5152 
5153 
521 
52ll 
5213 
5214 
531 
5310 
532 
5321 
5323 
5324 
5325 
TABLE XIII 
ESTIMATED VALUE OF TRADE EFFECTS OF 
THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT 
dVM dV * M dVX 
(million $) (million $) (million $) 
2.148 4.407 49.945 
o. 712 1.441 10.062 
0.140 
0.103 0.242 1. 540 
0.034 0.070 .1. 097 
0.110 
0.112 0.227 0.684 
0.247 0.742 7.225 
0.162 0.328 4.302 
0.112 0.334 2.527 
0.674 
0.908 
1.526 
o.ooo o.ooo 0.374 
o.ooo o.ooo 0.001 
o.ooo 
o.ooo 0.000 0.415 
5.624 16.663 5.226 
0.129 0.368 0.411 
0.097 
0.330 
0.044 0.131 
--- Necessary data not available. 
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dV -1( 
x 
(million $) 
91. 077 
23.275 
0.322 
3.537 
2. 525 
0.252 
1.587 
14.674 
7.873 
5.543 
1. 587 
2.071 
3.474 
0.668 
0.002 
0.001 
0.739 
14.437 
1.144 
0.270 
0.921 
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TABLE XIII (Continued) 
dVM dV * dV dV * M x x 
SITC (million $) (million $) (million $) (million $) 
533 0.343 0.808 3.477 6.083 
5331 0.083 0.201 0.647 1.134 
5332 0.025 0.056 0.348 0.611 
5333 0.164 0.385 2.384 4.119 
541 o.ooo 0.000 14.865 23.759 
54ll o.ooo o.ooo 0.320 0.503 
5413 o.ooo o.ooo 4.420 6.976 
5414 o.ooo o.ooo 0.051 0.167 
5415 o.ooo 0.000 1.034 1.697 
5416 o.ooo 0.000 1. 594 2.485 
5417 o.ooo o.ooo 4. 781 7.809 
5419 o.ooo o.ooo 1. 374 2.058 
551 0.223 0.524 1.979 4.262 
55ll 0.099 0.200 Oo935 1.996 
5512 0.174 0.378 0.947 2. 052 
553 0.168 0.343 1.486 2. 791 
5530 
554 0.072 0.162 2.403 3.082 
5541 0.020 0.047 0.213 0.284 
5542 0.039 0.097 1.819 2.373 
5543 0.009 0.022 0.236 0.301 
561 o.ooo o.ooo 16. 583 37.813 
5611 0.000 o.ooo 7 .119 16.598 
5612 o.ooo o.ooo 1.026 2.344 
5613 0 QOO ···.. · -<{}~:Ott' ·" ~, ···o.914 - 2.109 •.. - --~- .... ,_.o.:_.,, .• ,_--.::;~~- -.... ,_ -·~- ... - , .
5619 ·''' ~.,,o~ooo · · · o.ooo 7.742 17.991 
571 0.066 0.113 o. 514 0.977 
5711 0.005 0.013 0.242 0.473 
5712 0.002 0.005 0.313 0.623 
5713 0.028 0.068 0.274 0.542 
5714 0.021 0.035 0.000 0.000 
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TABLE XIII (Continued) 
dVM dV * M dVX dV * x 
SITC (million $). (million $) (million $) (million $) 
581 o.ooo o.ooo 29.641 48.414 
58ll 10.262 17.816 
5812 14.169 24.334 
5813 o.ooo o.ooo 2.891 4.944 
5819 o.ooo o.ooo 0.992 1.685 
599 0.439 1.039 9.282 16. 712 
5992 0.079 0.187 2.316 4.245 
5995 0.332 0.836 0.360 0.673 
5996 0.004 0.009 0.916 1.599 
5997 0.035 0.079 5.821 10.676 
5999 0.078 0 .185 1.900 3.509 
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chemicals (SITC 512) by $2.148 million in the short-run and $4.407 mil-
10 lion in the long-run. 
For the export market, tariffs range from 10.9 percent for Other 
organic chemicals (5129) to 15.4 percent for Ethers, epoxides, acetals 
(5123). These subgroups had in the first scenario average foreign tar-
iffs equal to 8.5 percent and 11.2 percent, respectively. The increase 
in the u. s. prices of the exported commodities as a result of tariff 
elimination is 8.2 percent for Other organic chemicals (5129) and is 
11.5 percent for Ethers, epoxides, acetals (5123). This latter price 
increase compares to an 8.4 percent increase under the first scenario. 
For the group Organic chemicals in aggregate (SITC 512), the results of 
this study indicate that ratification of the Supplemental Agreement 
would have increased, in the short-run, u. s. exports by $49.945 mil-
l . 11 ion. 
The u. s. import market for Inorganic chemicals: elements, oxides 
and halogen salts (SITC 513) without the Supplemental Agreement having 
been implemented contains tariffs which range from 3.3 percent to 7.7 
percent for Other inorganic bases and metallic oxides (5136) and metal-
lie oxides, of kinds principally used in paints (5135), respectively. 
The group's average tariff exceeds that of the first scenario by 0.2 
percentage points. The price and import trade effects are greater by 
O.l of a percentage point on average. 
Using Metallic oxides, of kinds principally used in paints (5135) 
as an example, the elimination of tariffs on U. S. imports which result 
from the Kennedy Round without implementation of the separate ASP package 
would increase U. s. imports in the short-run by $4.320 million. Elimi-
nation of tariffs in effect with implementation of the ASP package would 
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increase U. S. imports by $4.208 million. Thus, ratification of the 
ASP package would have increased U. S. imports by $0.112 million. In 
the export market for Metallic oxides, of kinds principally used in 
paints (5135), the results indicate that ratification would increase 
exports by $0.684 million. 
The foreign tariffs of the second scenario range from 5.8 percent 
for Chemical elements, n. e. s. to 9.4 percent for Metallic oxides, of 
kinds principally used in paints (5135). The comparable tariffs for the 
first scenario are 4.1 percent to 7.3 percent. On average for the 
group Inorganic chemicals~ elements, oxides and halogen salts (SITC 
513), the tariffs of the second scenario exceed those assuming ratifica-
tion by 1.8 percentage points. 
The range of U. S. tariffs on imports of Other inorganic chemicals 
(SITC 514) extends from 5.7 percent on Inorganic chemical products, 
n. e. s. (5149) to 6.5 percent on Metallic salts and peroxysalts of in-
organic acids (5141), each of which are 0.2 of a percentage point above 
the extremities of the alternative assumption. The price decreases in 
the u. S. price of the imports are estimated to be 3.9 percent for In-
organic chemical products, n. e. s. (5149) and 4.4 percent for Metallic 
salts and peroxysalts of inorganic acids (5141), whereas the duty-free 
prices are predicted to increase by 1.6 percent and 1.8 percent, re-
spectively. Under the alternative assumption these duty-free price in-
creases are 1.5 percent and 1.8 percent, respectively. The percentage 
change in the quantity of imports averages for Other inorganic chemicals 
(SITC 514) O.l of a percentage point greater in the second scenario. 
Comparison of the predicted changes for the short-run in the value of 
imports from tariff elimination indicates that ratification of the ASP 
package would increase imports into the U. S. by $0.162 million for 
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Other inorganic chemicals (SITC 514). This same comparison applied to 
the export market shows that ratification of the ASP package would in-
crease exports of Other inorganic chemicals (SITC 514) from the u. s. 
by $4.302 million. 
Exports of Other inorganic chemicals (SITC 514) under the second 
scenario face foreign tariffs which range from an average of 8.2 percent 
for Metallic salts and peroxysalts of inorganic acids (5141) to 9.7 
percent for Other metallic salts and peroxysalts of inorganic acids (I) 
(5142). Had the Supplemental Agreement become effective, these re-
spective foreign tariff averages would be 6.1 percent and 7.8 percent. 
Removal of the 8.2 percent tariff on Metallic salts and peroxysalts of 
inorganic acids (5141) would increase both the U. s. price of that sub-
group's products by 7.1 percent and the quantity of exports by 4.7 per-
cent. These effects correspond, .respectivelyj to 5.3 percent and 3.5 
percent in the first scsenario. 
u. s. imports of Radioactive and associated materials (SITC 515) 
face an average tariff of 3.0 percent which reflects a tariff variation 
from nil for Radioactive chemical elements and isotopes and their com-
pounds and mixtures (5151) to 9.9 percent for Compounds and mixtures, 
n. e. s. of thorium, of uranium, of rare earth metals, of yttrium or of 
scandium (5153) at the four-digit level. The average tariff in the 
preceding section for Radioactive and associated materials (SITC 515) 
is 2.9 percent. Elimination of the high tariff on Compounds and mix-
tures, n. e. s. of thorium, of uranium, of rare earth metals, of yt-
trium, or of scandium (5153), 9.9 percent, would decrease the U. s. 
price of such products by 5.9 percent and increase imports by 12.6 per-
cent of their initial quantity. The lack of approval of the separate 
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agreement on chemicals caused foreign tariffs on u. S. exports of this 
group to be 0.7 of a percentage point greater on average. The foreign 
tariff range of the second scenario is from 0.9 percent for the sub-
group Radioactive chemical elements and isotopes and their compounds and 
mixtures (5151) to 8.7 percent for the subgroup Stable isotopes and 
their compounds (5152), which compares to 0.6 percent and 6.4 percent 
in the alternative assumption previously discussed. 
In the case of Mineral tar and crude chemicals from coal, pe-
troleum, and natural gas (SITC 52l)ll the data indicate that the ap-
proval of the Supplemental Agreement on chemicals does not alter the 
average U. s. tariff on imports. Hence, the effects are the same in 
both scenarios. In the export market, however, the Supplemental Agree-
ment would result in tariff reductions abroad from 4.2 percent to the 
3. 3 percent of the first scenario. The highest tariff for the group 
under the second scenario is on Ammoniacal gas liquors and spent oxide 
produced in coal gas purification (5213) which incurs a 5.7 percent 
rate. That tariff's removal would increase its u. S. price by 4.4 per-
cent and increase u. s. exports 2.8 percent in terms of quantity. 
Comparison of the results at the aggregated three-digit level re-
veals that approval of the Supplemental Agreement by Congress would not 
change, in the case of Mineral tar and crude chemicals from coal, pe-
troleum, and natural gas (SITC 521) ll u. s. imports and would increase 
u. S. exports by $0.374 million. In the case of Synthetic organic dye-
stuffs, natural indigo and color lakes (SITC 531), u. S. imports would 
increase by $5.624 million and exports by $5.226 million. 
The tariffs on u. S. imports of Dyeing and tanning extracts, and 
synthetic tanning materials (SITC 532) range from 2.3 percent on Tanning 
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extracts of vegetable origin (5324) to 9.2 percent on Synthetic tanning 
materials (5323). In the previous discussion which assumed approval of 
the ASP package this range extends from 2.1 percent to 8.2 percent. It 
is estimated that free trade would decrease u. S. prices by 1.9 percent 
for Tanning extracts of vegetable origin (5324) and by 7.2 percent for 
Synthetic tanning materials (5323). The corresponding increases in the 
quantity of imports are 5.8 percent and 21.9 percent. 
The average tariffs incurred by u. s. exports of Dyeing and tan-
ning extracts, and synthetic tanning materials (SITC 532) vary from 3.9 
percent on Dyeing extracts (vegetable and animal) (5321) to 8.6 percent 
on Synthetic tanning materials (5323) under the current assumptions, 
compared to 2.8 percent and 6.4 percent under the previous alternative. 
Their elimination would increase u. s. prices of these products 3.6 
percent and 7.9 percent on Dyeing extracts (vegetable and animal) (5321) 
and Synthetic tanning materials (5323), respectively, and increase their 
respective quantities of u. S. exports by 26.0 percent and 57.1 percent. 
Comparison of the estimates of the short-run changes in the value 
of trade for Dyeing and tanning extracts, and synthetic tanning ma-
terials (SITC 532) indicates that ratification of the Supplemental 
Agreement would increase for the United States imports by $0.129 million 
and exports by $0.411 million. For SITC 533 the comparison reveals that 
ratification would increase u. So imports by $0.343 million and U. S. 
exports by $3.477 million. 
The tariffs existing without ratification are, in the u. s. import 
market for Pigments, paints, varnishes and related materials (SITC 533), 
7.4 Bercent on Coloring materials n.e.s. (5331), 4~8 percent,on Printing 
inks ( 5332) ~ and 13.1 percent on Prepared paints, enamels, lacquen>,, var-
nishes, artists' colors, siccatives (paint driers) and mastics (5333), 
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and, correspondingly in the export ·IJ:)1:q:ket 9 11.1 pers:ent, 11. 5 percent and 
10.6 percent. The average tariffs for the group exceed those of the 
first scenario by 1.2 percentage points in the import market and by 2.9 
percentage points in the export market. 
The Supplemental Agreement does not alter the u. s. tariff aver-
ages on Medicinal and pharmaceutical products (SITC 541) and the effects 
of their elimination remains as discussed in the previous section. The 
foreign tariffs on U. S. exports of Medicinal and Pharmaceutical pro-
ducts (SITC 541) are greater on average by 2.5 percentage points as a 
result of the non-ratification of the separate agreement. The higher 
range of the second scenario extends from 7.4 percent on Glycosides; 
glands and their extracts; sera; vaccines (5416) to 12.6 percent on 
Medicaments (5417). The estimated price increases from the tariff 
elimination and consequent increased foreign demand are 6.4 percent for 
Glycosides; glands and their extracts; sera; vaccines (5416) to 12.6 
percent on Medicaments (5417). The corresponding increases in the 
quantity of exports are 2.4 percent and 4~0 percent, respectively. 
Ratification of the Supplemental Agreement would increase u. S. exports 
by $1.594 million for Glycosides; glands and their extracts; sera; vac~ 
cines (5416) and $4.781 million for Medicaments (5417), respectively. 
For Medicinal and pharmaceutical products (SITC 541) as a whole, the 
value of U. S. exports from ratification totals $14.865 million. 
Under the second scenario, U. S. tariffs are 2.4 percent for Es-
sential oils and resinoids (5511) and 10.3 percent for Synthetic per-
fume and flavor materials and concentrates and enfleurage greases and 
mixtures of alcohol and Essential oils (5512) which can be compared to 
2.2 percent and 9.5 percent, respectively, following ratification. In 
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the export market 9 the tariff averages are 8.0 percent and 9.7 percent, 
respectively 9 which correspond to post-ratification averages of 6.6 
percent and 7.5 percent. 
Ratification of the Supplemental Agreement would increase in the 
short-run U. s. imports of Essential oils and resinoids (5511) by 
$0.099 million and U. s. exports by $0.935 million. Uo s. trade of 
Synthetic perfume and flavor materials and concentrates 9 and enfleurage 
greases and mixtures of alcohol and Essential oils (5512) would ex-
perience a short~run increase of $0.174 million of imports and $0.947 
million of exports. 
Perftnnery and cosmetics, dentifrices and other toilet preparations 
(except Soaps) (SITC 553) contains no disaggregated subgroups at the 
four-digit level. Ratification of the Supplemental Agreement would re~ 
sult in $0.168 million worth and $1.486 million worth of increased im-
ports and exports, respectively. 
In the case of Soaps 9 cleansing and polishing preparations (SITC 
554), non-ratification results in tariffs on u. s. imports which aver-
age 0.6 of a percentage point greater than those effected by ratifica~ 
tion and which range from 6.3 percent for Soaps (5541) to 9.2 percent 
foJ:' __ Poli!)hes 9 pa9tes~ powder an_~ similar_ ptepanati6ns_Jor polishing and 
preserving leather 9 wood 9 metal 9 glass and other materials (5543). 
Foreign tariffs of the second scenario on u. S. exports average 2.5 
percentage points greater; the foreign tariffs on Soaps (5541) average 
13.4 percent and on Polishes, pastes 9 powder and similar preparations 
for polishing and preserving leather, wood, metal~ glass and other ma~ 
terials (5543) average 10.6 percent. 
Elimination of the 8.6 percent Uo S. tariff on 5542, which issues 
149 
from the Kennedy Round without approval of the separate ASP package, 
causes a 5o5 percent fall in the U. S. price and a 2.6 percent increase 
in the duty-free price. The quantity of imports would increase by 5.3 
percent. Elimination of foreign tariffs on Surface-acting agents and 
washing preparations (5542), which average 12.8 percent under the 
second scenario, would increase the U. S. price by 11.1 percent and in-
crease the quantity of exports by 1.8 percent. The percentage figures 
for the U. S. trade effect are deceptive; multilateral movement to free 
trade from the post-Kennedy Round rates of the second scenario would 
yield a short-run increase in imports of $0.748 million and in exports 
of $10.067 million for the u. S. 
Estimation of the effects of approval of the separate ASP package 
on Soaps, cleansing and polishing preparations (SITC 554) as a whole, 
indicate that ratification would beget increased u. S. imports valued 
at $0.072 million and increased U. S. exports of $2.403 million. In the 
case of Fertilizers, manufactured (SITC 561), the data indicate that the 
average of U. S. tariffs is not altered by the ratification assumed 
under the first scenario. The foreign tariffs averaged 2.2 percentage 
points greater under the second scenario. Thus, ratification would not 
alter U. S. imports and would increase U. S~ exports, by reducing 
foreign tariffs 2.2 percentage points, $16.583 million. 
The u. S. tariffs on Explosives and pyrotechnic products (SITC 
571) range from 3.6 percent on Fuses, primers and detonators (5712) to 
14.8 percent on Pyrotechnical articles (5713) and average for the group 
0.3 of a percentage point greater than those of the first scenario. 
The foreign tariffs on the corresponding subgroups average 14.4 percent 
and 11.2 percent. The post-Kennedy Round foreign tariff average without 
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ratification is 11.3 percent for the group as a whole compared to the 
group average of 10.l percent of the first scenario. 
Ratification of the Supplemental Agreement would reduce tariff 
averages in the Uo S. and abroad from those of the second scenario to 
those of the first. It would increase u. S. imports of Fuses, primers 
and detonators (5712) by $0.002 million and of Pyrotechnical articles 
(5713) by $0.028 million; and it would increase u. S. exports by $0.313 
million and $0.274 million, respectively. 
Inaction upon the separate ASP package left intact negotiated tar~ 
iffs on Plastic materials, regenerated cellulose and artificial resins 
(SITC 581) which vary from 7.9 percent to 11.4 percent on U. So imports 
of Other artificial resins and plastic materials (5819) and Products of 
condensation, polycondensation and polyaddition (5811), respectively, 
and from 9.3 percent to 14.4 percent on u. S. exports of Other artifi-
cial resins and plastic materials (5819) and Products of polymerization 
and copolymerization (5812), respectively. Ratification would further 
reduce, in the case of u. S. exports 9 the foreign tariff averages to 
7.3 percent on Other artificial resins and plastic materials (5819) and 
to 11.2 percent on Products of polymerization and copolymerization 
(5812). Hence, it is estimated for SITC 581 that ratification would in-
crease :U~yS, exports by $29.641 million with no effect on U. s. imports. 
For the final group, Chemical materials and products, n. e. s. 
(SITC 599), the second scenario indicates U. s. tariff averages which 
average 0.2 of a percentage point greater than those which issue from 
ratification and foreign tariff averages which are 1.3 percentage 
points greater than those of the first scenario. The U. s. tariffs of 
the second scenario range from 5.7 percent on Wood and resin-based 
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chemical products (5996) to 10.6 percent on Organic chemical products, 
n. e. s. (5997). The corresponding tariffs on u. S. exports which are 
5.1 percent and 10.2 percent are also the extremities of the range of 
foreign tariffs. The ratification by the U. S. Congress of the Sup-
plemental Agreement would increase U. S. imports and exports of Chemical 
materials and products, n. e. s. (SITC 599) by $0.439 million and 
$16.712 million, respectively. 
Effects on the .. Balance of Trade·· -- A Summary 
The entire set of price and trade results, which is .. presented and 
discussed in the preceding section, forms a massive quantity of numbers 
to be assimilated by the reader. Because the net effects on the balance 
of trade are of particular interest, the section will condense the en-
tire set of results into a presentation of the net short-run trade 
balance effects for each scenario at the four~digit level. Each of the 
trade balance effects presented in Table XIV is the difference between 
the change in the value of exports (dVX) and the change in the value of 
imports (dVM) for the short-run which are separately presented in 
Tables IX and X for the first scenario and in Tables XI and XII for the 
second scenario. Table XIV also displays the 1972 value of imports and 
value of exports for each SITC category. 
The data reveal that all but one of the three~digit SITC groups 
show a positive net trade balance effect, i. e., the increase in U. S. 
exports exceeds the increase in u. S. imports, in both scenarios. In 
the case of the first scenario, the positive trade balance effects range 
from $68.5 million fer Plastic materials, regenerated cellulose and ar-
. ' . . . ' . • ' j 
tificial resiris (SITC 581) to $0.9 million for Mineral tar and crude 
chemicals from coal, petroleum and natural gas (SITC 521). The 
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TABLE XIV 
u. s. VALUE OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, AND THE 
SHORT-RUN TRADE BALANCE EFFECTS 
(million $) 
vx v '. . . M f.o.b. V -V X M 1st Scenario . 2nd Scenario· 
SITC (1972) (1972) (1972) [dV X - dVM] [dV X - dVM] 
512 1102. 711 508. 960 +593.751 +66.820 +114.617 
5121 
5122 
5123 
5124 
5125 
5126 
5127 
5128 
5129 
513 262.089 348.079 -85. 990 +18. 997 +28.347 
5131 5.690 
5132 42.899 33.617 +9.282 +2.135 +3. 572 
5133 19.780 16.930 +2. 850 +l. 729 +2. 792 
5134 2.447 
5135 15.283 53.661 -38.378 -1. 884 -1.312 
5136 175.990 243.871 -67.881 +16.807 +23. 785 
514 152.054 78.310 +73. 744 +11.057 +15.197 
5141 
5142 
5143 
5149 
515 181.332 110.104 + 71. 228 +2.138 +4. 553 
5151 112. 520 
5152 19.054 
5153 49. 7 58 
521 30.855 7. 959 +22. 896 +o. 927 +1. 301 
5211 o. 203 1.018 -0.815 +0.001 +0.002 
5213 0.019 
5214 30.633 6.941 +23.692 +l.019 +1.434 
531 53.229 103.890 -50.661 -19.522 -19.920 
5310 
532 3.615 9.794 -6.179 +0.187 +0.469 
5321 1.119 
--- Necessary data not available. 
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TABLE XIV (Continued) 
v v '£ . V -V 
··1st Scenario '2nd Scenario x M .o.b. X M 
SITC ( 1972) ( 1972) (1972) [dVX - dVM] [dVX - dVM] 
5323 1.779 
5324 8. 712 
5325 
533 99 .950 15.888 +84.062 +6.735 +9.869 
5331 15.991 6.079 +9.912 +o. 774 + 1. 338 
5332 10.302 2.982 + 7 .. 32~} +0.848 +1.171 
5333 73.657 6.827 +66.830 +5.573 +7.793 
541 473.516 148.983 +324. 533 +35. 643 +so. 508 
5411 9.931 28.482 -18.551 -0.940 -0.620 
5413 136.467 30.139 +106.328 +11. 024 +15.444 
5414 2.868 20.513 -17.645 -1. 7 55 -1. 704 
5415 32.074 32.823 -0.749 -0.133 +1.167 
5416 57.317 11. 264 +46. 053 ~-t~· 232 +4. 826 
5417 181.470 14. 559 +166.911 +21.055 +25.836 
5419 40.931 1.664 +39.267 +4.111 +5.485 
551 59 .874 72. 655 -12. 781 +3. 805 +s. 561 
55ll 36.643 48 .969 -12.326 +3.261 +4.097 
5512 23.231 23.686 -0.455 +0.964 +l. 737 
553 41.887 26.974 +14.913 +4. 209 +5. 527 
5530 
554 93.443 14.057 + 79. 386 +8.701 +11.032 
5541 7. 390 3.260 +4.130 +0.631 +0.824 
5542 76.823 9.304 +67.519 +7. 539 +9.319 
5543 9.230 1.493 +7.737 . +o. 654 +0.881 
561 298.435 231.664 +66. 771 +8.045 +24.413 
5611 46.657 57.731 -11.074 +Oe 180 +7.299 
5612 52.465 11.077 +41. 388 +2.868 +3.894 
5613 45.332 116. 318 -70.986 +0.409 +l. 323 
5619 153.981 46.538 +107 .443 +11. 516 +19. 258 
571 28.000 21.058 +6.942 +2.460 +2. 908 
5711 6.289 4.170 +2.119 +0.488 +o. 725 
5712 4. 796 1.470 +3. 326 +o. 686 +0.997 
5713 6.096 8.933 -2.837 -0.448 -0.202 
5714 10.819 6.485 +4. 334 +l. 208 +l. 624 
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TABLE XIV (Continued) 
vx VM' f ., b' 
• 0. • VX-VM 1st Scenario 2nd Scenario 
SITC (1972) (1972) (1972) [dVX - dVM] [ dVX - dVM] 
581 696.308 176.610 +519.698 +68.513 +98.154 
5811 211.762 
5812 348.476 
5813 98.091 12.127 +85. 964 +9.026 +11.917 
5819 37.979 1.583 +36. 396 +3.320 +4.312 
599 556.351 139.603 +416.748 +31.062 +39. 905 
5992 96.633 25.491 +71.142 +5. 497 +7.734 
5995 34.145 79.753 -45.608 -3. 528 -3.500 
5996 63.733 3.031 +60. 702 +2. 835 +3.747 
5997 178.568 6.507 +172.061 +15. 9 58 +21. 744 
5999 183.272 24.821 +158 .451 +11.192 +13. 014 
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exceptional three-digit group is Synthetic organic dyestuffs, natural 
indigo and color lakes (SITC 531) with a net trade balance effect of 
$-19.5 million for the first scenario. 
Labor Dislocation 
The price and trade effects, which are discussed above, cause ad-
justments in the quantity of output by domestic producers. Output ad-
justments entail changes in the required quantities of the factors of 
production, for which labor is used as a proxy in this field. This por-
tion of the text recounts the outcome of the analysis which estimates 
the labor dislocation caused by production adjustments to free trade. 
As previously discussed, the analysis for each scenario (approval 
and non-ratification of the ASP package) focuses on two alternative 
f h 1 b k f h h d . . 12 treatments o t e a or mar ets or eac t ree- igit sector. One as-
sumes that the import and export markets are segregated to an extent 
that there is no special interaction between their respective labor ad-
justments. The second alternative assumes that chemical workers dis-
located by import expansion are easily re-absorbed by export expansion 
and only the net labor effect is truly dislocated. 
Tariff Elimination for the First Scenario 
Segregated Markets 
The results for separate treatment of the import and export 
markets~ assuming ratification of the Supplement Agreement on chem-
icals, are shown at the three-digit level of aggregation in Table 
XV. The analysis reveals that the removal of U. S. tariffs, which 
creates import expansion and consequent reduction in domestic output, 
causes for SITC 5 a total of 2944 jobs per year to be eliminated for the 
TABLE XV 
ESTIMATED TOTAL LOSS FROM LABOR DISPLACEMENT ASSUMING 
SEGREGATED MARKETS: FIRST SCENARIO 
Total Annual Total Annual VARIANT I VARIANT II 
SITC 
L'l.1M (# Of Jobs) L'l.Lx (# of Jobs) 
512 
513 
514 
515 
521 
531 
532e 
533 
541 
551 
553 
554 
561 
571 
581 
599 & 532 
-489 
-136 
-125 
-71 
-3 
-1253 
-33 
-178 
-12 
-12 
-10 
-38 
-78 
-277 
-229 
__ ..; Necessary data not available' 
aAverage Duration = 0.2423 years 
b . Average Duration= 0.1212 years 
cAverage Duration = 0.4846 years 
+672 
+265 
+191 
+61 
+5 
+650 
---
+55 
+232 
+24 
+25 
+16 
+96 
+128 
+378 
+334 
a b Annual TL~ Annual TL~ 
(thous. $) (thous. $) 
1653.454 1136. 584 
391. 587 381.667 
383.416 293.051 
208.069 89.419 
9.232 7.696 
3855.796 1000.519 
. --- ---
93.648 78.072 
524.980 342.263 
35.053 35.068 
32.149 33. 503 
31.157 24.936 
92.374 116. 731 
217.455 178.498 
831. 9 59 567.888 
630.014 459.632 
dAverage Duration =_0.2423 years 
eincluded with SITC 599 
c Annual TL~ 
(thous. $) 
3306.908 
783.173 
766.832 
416.138 
18.463 
7711. 591 
---
187.296 
1049.959 
70.107 
64.299 
62.314 
184.748 
434.910 
1663.917 
1260.028 
d-
Annual TLLX 
(thous. $) 
2272. 231 
763.018 
585.860 
178.764 
15.386 
2000.213 
-
156.080 
684.243 
70~107 
66.978 
49.851 
233.366 
356.849 
1135.308 
918.885 
I-' 
V1 
Q\ 
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two-year adjustment period. The groupwith the largest number of workers 
dislocated is Synthetic organic dyestuffs, natural indigo and color 
lakes (SITC 531); the loss of 1253 jobs per year reflects the large es-
timated price change caused by the extremely high elasticity of import 
supply estimate. The second highest dislocation, 489 jobs per year, is 
the Organic chemicals (SITC 512). Under Variant I, which assumes the 
national average duration of unemp Loyment _ho Ids, the number of dislocated 
workers in SITC groups 531 and 512 translates to an annual dollar loss 
of $3855. 796 thousand and $1653.454 thousand, respectively. 
Given that the labor markets are localized sufficiently to incur 
an above average unemployment duration, these losses would be even 
greater. The assumption of a duration of unemployment equal to twice 
the national average, i. e., Variant II, increases these losses to 
$7711.591 thousand and $3306.908 thousand, respectively. 
The group which incurs the smallest dislocation is Mineral tar and 
crude chemicals from coal, petroleum and natural gas (SITC 521), which 
loses three jobs per year. The annual dollar equivalent of this loss, 
incorporating the duration of unemployment, is $9.232 thousand under 
Variant I and $18,463 thousand under Variant II. 
The elimination of the foreign tariffs which result from the ap-
proval of both-Kennedy Round packages:fincreasestthedd:emand~for u. s. ex-
ports. Production expansion to meet this demand creates jobs. It is 
estimated that for the chemical industry, SITC 5, the number of newly 
created jobs would total 3132 per year for the two-year adjustment 
period. The largest increase in the number of jobs is 672 jobs per 
year for two -years in Organic chemicals (SITC 512). This increase re-
quires, given a full employment economy, that other workers leave their 
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jobs to fill these positions. The duration of their frictional unem-
ployment is less than the unemployment of workers dislocated in the im-
port markets; the duration used in this study is one-half that used for 
the import markets. The annual cost of this dislocation created by ex-
pansion of U. S. exports of Organic chemicals (SITC 512) is $1136.584 
thousand for Variant I and $2272.231 thousand for the localized labor 
market assumed in Variant II. 
As in the import markets, the export market for Mineral tar and 
crude chemicals from coal, petroleum, and natural gas (SITC 521) has 
the smallest change in jobs; an increase equal to five jobs per year. 
The increase has an annual cost of $7.696 thousand assuming a large 
labor market (Variant I) and of $15.386 thousand given a localized 
labor market (Variant II). 
Given a large labor market (Variant I), the totals of the total 
losses from labor dislocation for each three-digit group within SITC 5 
are $8990.343 thousand for the import market and $4745.527 thousand for 
the export market. Given localized labor markets (Variant II), for 
which the double durations are assumed, the totals are twice those of 
Variant I. 
Netted Markets 
The alternative treatment of labor dislocation under the first 
scenario (approval of the Supplemental Agreement) is to evaluate the 
dislocation after combination of the job changes in the import and ex-
port markets. The results are shown in Table XVI. 
The alternative treatment yields in 14 of the 16 SITC three-digit 
groups a net increase in jobs. These sectors are evaluated as export 
markets; that is, the job changes are regarded as causing only fric-
tional unemployment with durations equal to 0.1212 years for a large, 
SITC 
512 
513 
514 
515 
521 
531 
532d 
533 
541 
551 
553 
554 
561 
571 
581 
599 & 532 
TABLE XVI 
ESTIMATED TOTAL LOSS FROM LABOR DISPLACEMENT 
ASSUMING NETTED MARKETS: FIRST SCENARIO 
Annual Avg. Total VARIANT Ia L'd"N Lbr.Cost Annual TL~ (# of Jobs) Per Employee (thous. $) 
+183 13955.00 309.516 
+130 11883.26 187.233 
+66 12659.22 101.264 
-10 12094.73 29.305c 
+2 12700.17 3.078 
-603 12700.17 1855. 582c 
+22 11712. 00 31.229 
+54 12172.20 79.665 
+11 12055.76 16.073 
+14 11057. 04 18.761 
+6 12858.94 9. 351 
+58 10032.61 70.525 
+so 11505. 92 69. 726 
+101 12395.63 151. 737 
+104 11354. 33 143.119 
--- Necessary data not available. 
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VARIANT Ilb 
Annual TL~ 
(thous. $) 
618. 777 
374. 311 
202.444 
58. 611 c 
6.155 
3711.165c 
62.432 
159.263 
32.132 
37. 508 
18.694 
140.992 
139. 394 
303.349 
286.120 
alf ti~ > o, like Export Market and ~verage Duration = 0.1212 years; 
if tiLN <:O, Average Duration = 0.2423 years. 
blf fiLN > O, like Export Market and Average Duration 
if fi1N < o, Average Duration = 0.4846 years. 
cTreated like Import Market because tiLN < O • 
dincluded with SITC 599. 
= 0.2423 years; 
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mobile labor market (one-half the national average) and 0.2423 years 
for a localized labor market. The greatest net increase in jobs is in 
the sector, Organic chemicals (SITC 512) for which the annual net in-
crease is estimated to be 183 jobs. The smallest increase for a three-
digit SITC group equals two jobs per year for Mineral tar and crude 
chemicals from coal, petroleum, and natural gas (SITC 521). 
Radioactive and associated materials (SITC 515) and Synthetic or-
ganic dyestuffs, natural indigo and color lakes (SITC 531) have negative 
net annual changes in jobs, equal to -10 and -603, respectively. Thus, 
they are treated as import markets, for which the duration of unemploy-
ment for Variant I is 0.2423 years and 0.4846 for Variant II. The sum 
of the net annual changes in the number of jobs for all 16 of the groups 
is +188. 
The net annual change in jobs is converted to a dollar magnitude 
for each group. If the three-digit sector's net job change is positive, 
it is treated as an export market; if it is negative, the dollar magni-
tude is calculated using the longer unemployment durations of an import 
market. The assumption of a large, mobile labor market (Variant I) 
yields a range of estimated total losses from labor dislocation. The 
group least affected is Mineral tar and crude chemicals from coal, pe-
troleum, and natural gas (SITC 521) whose annual loss is equal to 
$3.078 thousand. The group having the second largest loss, $309.516 
thousand per year, is Organic chemicals (SITC 512). The high net job 
loss estimate for Synthetic organic dyestuffs, natural indigo and color 
lakes (SITC 531) in combination with the longer unemployment durations 
used for a net import market yield an estimate of $1855.582 thousand 
for the largest annual total loss from labor dislocation for any three-
digit sector. 
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These estimated dislocation losses for each three-digit industry 
group combine for a total annual labor loss for each of the two years 
of the adjustment period of $3076.164 thousand. If localized labor 
markets prevail (Variant II) the losses, both disaggregated and total, 
are each doubled. 
Tariff Elimination for the Second Scenario 
The estimates of labor displacement caused by the elimination of 
the tariffs assumed in the second scenario reflect the same relationship 
to those estimates of the first scenario as exists between the tariffs 
of the two assumptions, i. e., they are either greater than or equal to 
those of the first scenario. 
The results for separate treatment of the import and export mar-
kets, assuming that the Supplemental Agreement on chemicals was never 
ratified, are shown at the three-digit level of aggregation in Table 
A'VII. The alternative treatment of labor dislocation under the second 
scenario evaluates the net dislocation subject to the assumption that 
displaced workers in the import markets are easily transferred to the 
expanded export markets. Thus, the analysis considers only the net ef-
fects in the labor markets. The labor market effects from the elimina-
tion of post-Kennedy Round tariffs without implementation of the Sup-
plemental Agreement on Chemicals are presented in Table XVIII and are 
discussed here. 
The positive net changes in the number of jobs from tariff elimi-
nation, given the assumptions of the second scenario, range from +3 for 
Mineral tar and crude chemicals from coal, petroleum, and natural gas 
(SITC 521) to +435 for Organic chemicals (SITC 512). 
TABLE XVII 
ESTIMATED TOTAL LOSS FROM LABOR DISPLACEMENT ASSUMING 
SEGREGATED MARKETS~ SECOND SCENARIO 
Total Annual Total Annual VARIANT I VARIANT II 
"'41 l'ILx 
SITC (# of Jobs) (# of Jobs) 
512 -508 +943 
513 -141 +337 
514 -132 +241 
515 -71 +83 
521 
-3 +6 
531 -1369 +731 
532e 
--- ---
533 -38 +75 
541 
-178 +300 
551 -13 +30 
553 -12 +31 
554 -10 +20 
561 -38 +255 
571 -81 +144 
581 -277 +487 
599 & 532 -236 +400 
--- Necessary data not available. 
a . Average Duration = O. 2423 years 
b Average Duration = O. 1212 years 
c Average Duration = 0. 4846 years 
a Annual TL~ 
(thous. $) 
1717.699 
405.983 
404.887 
208.069 
9.232 
4212.757 
107.838 
524.980 
37.974 
32.149 
31.157 
92.374 
2256819 
831. 9 59 
649. 272 
b Annual TL~ 
(thous. $) 
1594.939 
485. 365 
369.766 
121. 668 
9.236 
1125.199 
106.462 
442.581 
43.835 
41. 544 
31.170 
310.068 
200.810 
731. 645 
550.458 
dAverage Duration = 0.2423 years 
eincluded with SITC 599 
c Annual TL~ 
(thous. $) 
3435.397 
811.967 
809. 77 5 
416.138 
18.463 
8425.514 
215.675 
1049. 959 
75.949 
64.299 
62.314 
184.748 
451. 637 
1663.917 
1298.545 
d 
Annual TLLX 
(thous. $) 
3188.563 
970.329 
739.226 
243.236 
18.464 
2249.471 
212.836 
884.797 
87.633 
83.053 
62.314 
619.880 
401.455 
1462.685 
1100.462 
c-
N 
SITC 
512 
513 
514 
515 
521 
531 
532d 
533 
541 
551 
553 
554 
561 
571 
581 
599 & 532 
TABLE XVIII 
ESTIMATED TOTAL LOSS FROM LABOR DISPLACEMENT 
ASSUMING NETTED MARKETS: SECOND SCENARIO 
Annual Avg. Total VARIANT Ia 
6!.w Lbr.Cost Annual TLL 
(# of Jobs) Per Employee (thous. $)N 
+435 139 55. 00 735.735 
+196 11883.26 282.289 
+110 12659. 22 168. 773 
+12 12094.73 17.590 
+3 12700.17 4.618 
-638 12700.17 1963.286c 
+38 11712.00 53.941 
+122 12172.20 179.983 
+17 12055. 76 24.840 
+18 11057 .04 24.122 
+10 12858.94 15. 585 
+218 10032.61 265.078 
+63 11505. 92 87.855 
+210 12395.63 315.494 
+164 11354. 33 225. 688 
--- Necessary data not available. 
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VARIANT Ilb 
Annual TLL 
(thous. $ ):N 
1471.470 
564.578 
337.545 
35.181 
9.236 
3926. 572c 
107.882 
359. 966 
49.679 
48.244 
31.170 
529.936 
17 5. 709 
630.987 
451.375 
alf LlLN >O~ like Export Market and Average Duration = 0.1212 years; 
if l'iLN <O, Average Duration = 0.2423 years. 
blf 6LN >O, like Export Market and Average Duration 
if 6LN <O, Average Duration = 0.4846 years. 
cTreated like lmport Market because 6LN< 0 • 
dincluded with SITC 599. 
= 0.2423 years; 
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The estimates show that all but one of the subsectors experience 
net job creation as a result of multilateral tariff elimination. The 
sole sector with net job elimination, Synthetic organic dyestuffs, 
natural indigo, and color lakes (SITC 531) suffers an annual net loss 
of 638 jobs for the two-year adjustment period. Furthermore, the signs 
(+ or -) of the net changes in the number of jobs are the same as they 
are in Table XVI with the exception of Radioactive and associated ma-
terials (SITC 515). In the case of that subsector, tariff elimination 
following ratification results in a net loss of jobs, whereas elimina-
tion of post-Kennedy Round tariffs without the implementation of the 
Supplemental Agreement results in the net creation of jobs; this re-
flects the fact that the Supplemental Agreement would have no impact on 
the employment in the import market for Radioactive and associated ma-
terials (SITC 515) but would create 22 jobs in the export market. 
Impact of the Supplemental Agreement 
The preceding description for the second scenario obscures the 
interesting evaluation that can be made of the economic effects which 
approval of the Supplemental Agreement would have had on the labor mar-
kets. Such an evaluation can be obtained by comparing XVII, Estimated 
Total Losses from Labor Displacement -- Segregated Markets, to its 
counterpart of the first scenario which reflects post-Kennedy Round 
tariffs with ASP having been eliminated, i. e., Table XV, and by com-
paring Table XVIII, Estimated Total Losses from Labor Displacement --
Netted Markets, to its counterpart of the first scenario, Table XVI. 
The differences between the estimates of the two scenarios is a measure-
ment of the impact on labor resultant from the ratification of the 
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Supplemental Agreement on chemicals. 
Segregated Markets 
The differences between the estimates of labor dislocation caused 
by tariff elimination for the second scenario and those for the first 
scenario, i. e., Table XVII less Table XV, are shown in Table XIX in 
the case of segregated import and export labor markets. The estimates 
reveal that, for the chemical industry (SITC 5), ratification of the 
Supplemental Agreement would have eliminated 163 jobs per year because 
of increased imports and would have created 951 jobs per year because 
of increased exports for each of the two years required for labor ad-
justments. 
The import sector most severely hurt by ratification of the Sup-
plemental Agreement would be Synthetic organic dyestuffs, natural indigo 
and color lakes (SITC 531) whose employment would be reduced by 116 
. b 13 JO s. The second largest quantity of jobs eliminated is in the larg-
est chemical subgroup, Organic chemicals (SITC 512) and equals 19 jobs 
per year for the two-year time horizon of the short-run. Next in the 
rank is the estimated seven jobs that would be eliminated annually in 
both Other inorganic chemicals (SITC 514) and the combined category of 
Dyeing and tanning extracts and synthetic tanning materials (SITC 532) 
and Chemical materials and products, n. e. s. (SITC 599). 
The export markets, in which the reduced foreign tariffs from rat-
ification would cause expansion, display estimates of the number of jobs 
created which extend from a low of one job per year in Mineral tar and 
Total Annual 
1141 
SITC (# of Jobs) 
512 -19 
513 -5 
514 ;_7 
515 0 
521 0 
531 -116 
532a 
533 -5 
541 0 
551 
-1 
553 0 
554 0 
561 0 
571 -3 
581 0 
599 & 532 -7 
Total for 
SITC 5 -163 
TABLE XIX 
IMPACT OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT ON 
SEGREGATED LABOR MARKETS 
Total Annual VARIANT I 
1141 Annual TL~ Annual TLLX 
(# of Jobs) (thous. $) (thous. $) 
+271 64.245 458.355 
+72 14.396 103.698 
+so 2L471 76~ 715 
+22 o.ooo 32.249 
+l o.ooo 1.540 
+81 356. 961 124~680 
+20 14.190 28.390 
+68 o.ooo 100.318 
+6 2. 921 8.767 
+6 0.000 8.041 
+4 0~000 6~234 
+159 o.ooo 193.337 
+16 8.364 22.312 
+109 0~000 163.757 
+66 19. 258 90.826 
+951 501.806 1419.219 
--- Necessary data not available. 
aincluded with SITC 599. 
VARIANT II 
Annual TLL M 
(thous. $) 
Annual TLLX 
(thous. $) 
128.489 916.332 
28.794 207 .311 
42~943 153~366 
OeOOO 64.472 
o.ooo 3.078 
713~923 249~258 
28.379 56.756 
o.ooo 200~554 
5.842 17.526 
0.000 16.075 
o.ooo 12~463 
o.ooo 386&514 
16. 727 44.606 
0~000 327. 377 
38. 517 181. 577 
1003e614 2837.265 
,...... 
°' Cj\ 
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crude chemicals from coal, petroleum, and natural gas (SITC 521) to a 
high of 271 jobs per year in Organic chemicals (SITC 521). The median 
sector is Other inorganic chemicals (SITC 514) for which the number of 
jobs created by export expansion equals 50 per year for two years. 
The magnitudes of the annual loss to society caused by job changes 
in each export sector are $1.540 thousand for Mineral tar and crude 
chemicals from coal, petroleum, and natural gas (SITC 521) and $458.355 
thousand for Organic chemicals (SITC 512). 14 In the case of Other in-
organic chemicals (SITC 514), which had the median number of newly 
created jobs, the estimated loss from such frictional unemployment in a 
full-employment economy is $76.715 thousand as a result of implementa-
tion of the ASP package. The total loss from the export markets of the 
chemical industry, SITC 5, is $1419.219 thousand. 
Unemployment created in the import markets of the chemical in-
dustry produce a total annual loss of $501.806 thousand, assuming the 
shorter durations of a large labor market (Variant I). The comparison 
of disaggregated results of each scenario yields estimates of the job 
displacement losses to society from the ASP package. The losses in the 
import markets range from $356.961 thousand for Synthetic organic dye-
stuffs, natural indigo and color lakes (SITC 531) and $64.245 thousand 
for Organic chemicals (SITC 512) to zero in sectors unaffected by the 
provisions of the ASP package. 
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Netted Markets 
Focusing upon Table XX, which shows the differences between Table 
XVIII and Table XVI, the estimates indicate that implementation of the 
Supplemental Agreement would have resulted in a net increase in jobs in 
all sectors except Synthetic organic dyestuffs 9 natural indigo and 
color lakes (SITC 531), whose annual net job loss equals 35. The net 
increases vary from 252 jobs per year for Organic chemicals (SITC 512) 
to 1 job per year for Mineral tar and crude chemicals from coal, pe-
troleum, and natural gas (SITC 521). Overall, the net effect of rati-
fication on the chemical industry would have been 790 jobs created per 
year for the two-year adjustment period. Given a full-employment 
economy, the job changes in the chemical industry would create an an-
nual loss to society from frictional unemployment, assuming a large 
labor market, which totals $1332.677 thousand. 
Estimated Changes in Social Welfare 
Introduction 
The impact of free trade on the social welfare derives from many 
factors: the changes in consumers' and producers' surpluses, the elimi-
nation of tariff revenue, and the social cost of transitional job dis-
locations. In addition these effects are flows through time. There-
fore, the quantification of these flows is influenced by the time 
horizon and the discount rate appropriate to the analysis. 
The procedure is to estimate for each three-digit group the tra-
ditional welfare effects (excluding the labor market) for both the 
short-run and long-run in the two types of markets. Then for each time 
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TABLE XX 
IMPACT OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT ON 
NETTED LABOR MARKETS 
Annual VARIANT I VARIANT II 
ll.41 Annual TL~ Annual TL41 
SITC (# of Jobs) (thous. $) (thous. $) 
512 +252 426.219 852. 693 
513 +66 95.056 190.267 
514 +44 67.509 135.101 
515 +22 32.249 64.472 
521 +l 1.540 3.081 
531 -35 107.704 215.407 
532a 
533 +16 22.712 45.450 
541 +68 100.318 200.703 
551 +6 8.767 17. 547 
553 +4 5.361 10.736 
554 +4 6.234 12.476 
561 +160 194.553 388.944 
571 +13 18.129 36.315 
581 +109 163. 7 57 327.638 
599 & 532 +60 82.569 165.255 
Total for 
SITC 5 +790 1332.677 2666.085 
--- Necessary data not available. 
aincluded with SITC 599. 
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horizon the welfare effects of the import and export markets are com-
bined and, in the case of the short-run (assumed to be two years), the 
loss caused by labor dislocation is subtracted from the traditional wel-
fare gain. Thus, the flow of welfare effects over the five-year time 
horizon is composed of the net short-run welfare effect, which includes 
labor dislocation, for the first two years and the long-run welfare ef-
feet for the remaining three years. 
The social welfare effects are estimated for each of the two 
scenarios of this study. Within each scenario~ two sets of estimates 
are presented: the large labor market alternative (Variant I) and the 
localized market alternative which has an above average unemployment 
duration (Variant II). In addition, for each set of estimates, the 
present values of the welfare flows are calculated using, first, an as-
sumed discount rate of 10 percent and, second, a rate of 5 percent. The 
lower discount rate is equivalent to a 10 percent market rate of dis-
count partially offset by a 5 percent rate of growth, as discussed pre-
viously. 
The Present Values of the Estimated 
Flows of Net Social Welfare Effects 
The estimated effects on social welfare from elimination of post= 
Kennedy Round tariff rates are presented in Table XXI, which assumes 
implementation of the Supplemental Agreement on chemicals, and in Table 
XXII, which assumes non-ratification of the separate ASP package. 
The welfare gains from free trade in the chemical industry total 
$880.450 million for a five-year period; this estimate is conditioned 
upon the assumptions of implementation of the Supplemental Agreement, a 
large labor market with average durations of unemployment (Variant I), 
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TABLE XXI 
EFFECTS ON SOCIAL WELFARE: FIRST SCENARIO 
(Present Values of 5 Year Flows) 
VARIANT I VARIANT I VARIANT II VARIANT II 
d = 10/o d = 5% d = 10/o d = 5/o 
SITC (million $) (million $) (million $) (million $) 
512 199. 561 228. 530 199.023 227.953 
513 28. 578 32.817 28.254 32.469 
514 32.293 36. 9 58 32. ll 7 36. 770 
515 6 .9 56 7.967 6.904 7.912 
521 2. 772 3.169 2.767 3.163 
531 76.640 89.754 73. 421 86.305 
532a 
533 20.601 23.564 20.547 23.507 
541 123.857 141. 664 123.720 141. 517 
551 7.264 8.331 7.237 8.302 
553 11.872 13.594 11.841 13.561 
554 30.495 34. 848 30. 477 34.830 
561 12. 058 13.791 11.935 13.659 
571 6.404 7.348 6. 285 7.220 
581 229.944 263.138 229. 682 262.857 
599 & 532 91.155 104.288 90.907 104.022 
--- Necessary data not available. 
alncluded with SITG 599. 
SITC 
512 
513 
514 
515 
521 
531 
532a 
533 
541 
551 
553 
554 
561 
571 
581 
599 & 532 
--- Necessary 
TABLE XXII 
EFFECTS ON SOCIAL WELFARE: SECOND SCENARIO 
(Present Values of 5 Year Flows) 
VARIANT I VARIANT I VARIANT II 
d = 10/o d = 5% d = 10/o 
(million $) (million $) (million $) 
318.790 365.130 317.514 
43.027 49.413 42.536 
42.195 48.303 41.904 
11. 072 12.673 11. 042 
3.604 4.120 3.597 
93.038 108.949 89.509 
29.168 33.374 29.074 
165.837 189.704 165.525 
10. 678 12.248 10.635 
15.172 17.376 15.130 
38.459 43.954 38.433 
36.257 41.512 35.797 
7.443 8.542 7.291 
305.318 349.462 304. 769 
113.494 129.867 113.104 
data not available. 
alncluded with SITC 599. 
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VARIANT II 
d = 5% 
(million $) 
363.764 
48.887 
47.991 
12.642 
4.113 
105.298 
33.273 
189.370 
12.201 
17. 332 
43.926 
41.019 
8.378 
348.874 
129.449 
and a discount rate of 10 percent. 15 Given these same three assump-
tions, elimination of tariffs on products of Plastic materials, re-
generated cellulose and artificial resins (SITC 581) would yield a 
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gain to society equal to $229.944 million, which is greater than any 
other three-digit chemical group. Society would benefit the least from 
trade liberalization of Mineral tar and crude chemicals from coal, pe-
troleum and natural gas (SITC 521), for which the potential gain is es-
timated to equal $2.772 million. 
The incorporation of a 5 percent annual growth rate reduces the ef-
fective discount rate from 10 percent to 5 percent. This single alter-
ation in the set of assumptions increases the total of the welfare gains 
for chemicals to $1009.761 million. Likewise, the welfare gains for 
individual groups extend from $263.138 million for Plastic materials, 
regenerated cellulose and artificial resins (SITC 581) to $3.169 mil-
lion for Mineral tar and crude chemicals from coal, petroleum, and 
natural gas (SITC 521). 
Allowance for localized labor markets by doubling the average du-
ration of unemployment (Variant II) has a relatively small effect on 
the predictions concerning social welfare over the five-year time hor-
izon. Given the ratification of the Supplemental Agreement, a 5 percent 
discount rate and localized labor markets, the welfare gain for Plastic 
materials, regenerated cellulose and artificial resins (SITC 581) is 
$262.857 million and for Mineral tar and crude chemicals from coal, pe-
troleum, and natural gas (SITC 521) equals $3.163 million. For the 
chemical industry as a whole, allowance for localized labor markets, 
under the given assumptions, decreases the welfare gain from free trade 
by $5.714 million to a total of $1004.047 million. 
174 
Without implementation of the Supplemental Agreement, the post~ 
Kennedy Round tariff rates exceed those of the first scenario. There-
fore, their elimination yields social benefits which exceed those of 
the preceding discussion. Assuming a large labor market (Variant I) 
and a 10 percent discount rate, the estimated welfare effects in the 
chemical industry total $1237.177 million under the second scenario. 16 
This figure exceeds the comparable total of the first scenario by 
$356.727 million and is the sum of estimated welfare gains which extend 
from $318.790 million for Organic chemicals (SITC 512) to $3.604 mil-
lion for Mineral tar and crude chemicals from coal, petroleum, and 
natural gas (SITC 521). 
The corresponding estimates discounted instead at a 5 percent rate 
are $1416.703 million, $465.130 million, and $4.120 million for the in-
dustry total, group high (Plastic materials, regenerated cellulose and 
artificial resins (SITC 581)), and group low (Mineral tar and crude 
chemicals from coal, petroleum, and natural gas (SITC 521)), re-
spectively. 
Under Variant II of the second scenario, i. e., small labor mar-
kets without ratification, the elimination of tariffs would increase 
social welfare over a five year time period by $317.514 million in the 
Organic chemicals group (SITC 512) and by $3.597 for Mineral tar and 
crude chemicals from coal, petroleum and natural gas (SITC 521), using 
a 10 percent discount rate. 
The Components of the Welfare Effects 
Although the net welfare effect is the relevant measure of so-
ciety's overall well-being, it is of interest to look at the 
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distribution of the components of the welfare effect among the sectors 
of society. In this study, the net welfare effect is composed of the 
changes in producers' surplus, consumers' surplus, government tariff 
revenue (for the import market only), and the social cost of labor dis-
location. These separate welfare components are computed at the three-
digi t SITC level under two selected sets of assumptions~ (1) tariff 
elimination under the second scenario; integration of the labor effects 
of the import and export markets within each sector; a large mobile 
labor market with shorter unemployment durations, i. e., labor Variant 
I; and a discount rate of 5 percent; and (2) ratification of the Sup-
plemental Agreement on Chemicals; labor market integration; labor 
Variant I; and a 5 percent discount rate. 
The former set of estimates, presented in Table XXIII, includes 
the loss of producers' surplus, the gain of consumers' surplus, and the 
loss of tariff revenue for the import market; the gain of producers' 
surplus and the loss of consumers' surplus in the export market; and 
the social cost of the net labor dislocation. For each of these, where 
applicable, the short-run annual value, the long-run annual value, and 
the present value of their flows over the time horizon are displayed. 
For each of these welfare components, the industry total of the dis-
counted SITC group results also is shown. 
The aggregated results reveal that, because of import expansion at 
lower prices resulting from free trade, the producers' sector would 
lose a total of $9145.553 million, the consumers' sector would gain a 
total benefit flow of $9662.063 million, and the government would lose 
$713.094 million, all discounted over the five-year time horizon. For 
the export market with increased exports at higher prices, the present 
SITC 
512 Short-Run 
Long-Run 
Present Value 
513 Short-Run 
Long-Run 
Present Value 
514 Short-Run 
Long-Run 
Present Value 
515 Short-Run, 
Long-Run 
Present Value 
521 Short-Run 
Long-Run 
Present Value 
531 Short-Run 
Long-Run 
Present Value 
•••Not applicable 
TABLE XXIII 
THE COMPONENTS OF THE WELFARE EFFECT: SECOND SCENARIO, 
LABOR VARIANT I, d = .5i'o 
(million $) 
Im2ort Market Ex2ort Market 
Producers' Consumers' Tariff Producers' Consumers' 
Surplus Surplus Revenue Surplus Surplus 
-330.324 359.858 ... 703.887 -597.221 
-329. 224 360.457 -56.352 708.109 -595.422 
-1427.421 1559.485 -~43.976, 3057.908 -2581. 225 
-47.451 57.049 .. , •· 132.545 -115. 735 
-47.282 57 .150 -15.707 133.688 -us. 233 
-205.022 247.243 -68.003 576. 677 -499.835 
-80.369 83.994 . • .. 162.954 -150. 946 
-80.260 84.049 -4.735 163.368 -150.760 
-347. 688 362.107 -20.500 706.532 -653.061 
-7.438 9.494 .... 13.161 -9.103 
-7.391 9.524 -3.252 13.263 -9.067 
-32.087 41.178 -14.080 57.232 -39.322 
-25.407 25.547 ••• 53.431 -52.402 
-25.404 25.549 -0.218 53.445 -52.395 
-109.992 110.6ll -0.944 231.364 -226.857 
-125.489 153. 77 5 ... 77 .442 -69.700 
-ll7.150 158.;642 -27.558 80.097 -68.473 
-522.706 677. 791 -ll9.312 341.843 -298.735 
Labor Mkt. 
TLL_N 
-0.736 
·- •,. 
-1.369 
-0.282 
..•.. 
-0.524 
-0.168 
-0.312 
-0.017 
-0.032 
-0.005 
... 
-0.009 
-1. 963 
... 
-3.650 1--' 
-i 
0\ 
"' .. , ~--. 
SITC 
532 
533 
541 
551 
553 
554 
TABLE XXIII (Continued) 
lmEort Market 
Producers' Consumers' Tariff 
Surplus Surplus Revenue 
Short-Run -0.062 0.527 ... 
Long-Run -0.052 0.567 -0.458 
Present Value -0.244 2.380 -1.983 
Short-Run -186.952 187.673 ... 
Long-Run -186.899 187.703 -1.738 
Present Value -809.278 812.604 -7.525 
Short-Run -412.222 421.439 ... 
Long-Run -411.839 421.634 -13. 914 
Present Value -1783.769 1825.102 -60.241 
Short-Run -48 .030 50.304 ... 
Long-Run -47.987 50.327 -3.896 
Present Value -207 .840 217. 850 -16.868 
Short-Run -193.422 194.780 ... 
Long-Run -193.386 194.798 -2.375 
Present Value -837.332 843.344 -10.282 
Short-Run -274.027 274.880 ... 
Long-Run -273.998 274.894 -1.188 
Present Value -1186. 328 1190.128 -5.143 
Necessary data not available 
ExEort Market 
Producers' Consumers' Labor Mkt. 
Surplus Surplus TL~ 
0.318 -0.089 
0.380 -0.079 ... 
1.530 -0.361 
396.390 -387.915 -o ... 054 
396.621 -387.786 
1716.741 -1679.159 -0.100 
736.229 -689.459 -0.180 
737.370 -688.924 
3190.322 -2983.858 -0. 335 
111. 439 -107.262 -0.025 
111. 663 -107.154 
483.028 -464.124 -0.046 
471. 533 -466.727 -0.024 
471. 742 -466.623 ... 
2042.018 -2020.437 -0.045 
568.576 -558.204 -0.016 
568.701 -558.142 
2461.958 -2416.591 -0.030 
1--' 
....... 
....... 
TABLE XXIII (Continued) 
Im2ort Market 
Producers' Consumers-' Tariff 
SITC Surplus Surplus Revenue 
561 Short-Run -11. 712 12.938 ... 
Long-Run -11.704 12.942 -1.630 
Present Value -50.687 56.025 -7.057 
571 Short-Run -12.446 13.610 ... 
Long-Run -12.410 13. 630 -1.974 
Present Value -53.796 58. 974 -8. 546 
581 Short-Run -253.493 267 .077 ... 
Long-Run -252.609 267.542 -19.304 
Present Value -109 5. 314 1157. 458 -83. 577 
599 Short-Run -110.094 115. 363 ... 
Long-Run -109.850 115. 492 -10.407 
Present Value -476.049 499.783 -45.057 
599 + Short-Run -110.156 115.890 ... 
532 Long-Run -109.902 116. 059 -10.865 
Present Value -476. 293 502.163 -47.040 
Total for SITC 5 of the -9145.553 9662.063 -713.094 
discounted present values 
Ex2ort Market 
Producers' Consumers' 
Surplus Surplus 
84.729 -74.898 
85.119 -74. 725 
367.798 -323.843 
24. 853 -22.211 
24.981 -22.152 
107.917 -96.017 
521. 992 -438.988 
525.131 -437.662 
2267. 718 -1897.323 
228.324 -194.306 
229.213 -193.921 
990. 725 -840.297 
228.642 -194.395 
229. 593 -194.000 
992.555 -840.657 
18601.611 -17021.044 
Labor Mkt. 
TLL 
N 
-0.265 
-0.493 
-0.088 
-0.164 
-0.315 
... 
-0. 586 
-0.224 
-0.416 
-0.226 
... 
-0.420 
-8.115 
I-' 
-i 
aJ 
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value of the increase in producers' surplus totals $18,601.611 million 
while the consumers lose an estimated $17,021.044 million in benefits 
over a five-year period. The present value of the labor market effects, 
derived by netting out the domestic production effects in the import 
and export markets and assuming the relatively short unemployment du-
rations of a large labor market, yield a total social cost of labor 
dislocation of $8.115 million over a two-year time horizon. 
Combining the industry totals for the import, export, and labor 
markets, the net social welfare effect of tariff elimination under the 
second scenario is a net gain of $1375.868 million, which is composed 
of a net gain for producers of $9456.058 million, a net loss for con-
sumers of $7358.981 million, a loss for the government of $713.094 mil-
lion, and a social cost of labor dislocation of $8.115 million. 17 
The set of estimates derived from the second set of assumptions is 
presented in Table XXIV. The tabular format is identical to that of 
the table inunediately preceding, described above. Aggregating the in-
dustry 1 s group results which are at the three-digit SITC level, the 
component welfare effects of ratification of the Supplemental Agreement 
for the import market reveal a discounted loss of producers' surplus 
equal to $374.204 million, a gain of consumers' surplus equal to a 
present value of $403.095 million, and a discounted loss of tariff 
revenue of $31.333 million. In the expansion of the U. S. export mar-
ket resulting from ratification of the ASP package, the totals of the 
present-value estimates are a producers' surplus gain of $4317.484 mil-
lion and a loss of consumers' surplus equal to $3914.726 million. The 
social cost of the resultant net labor dislocation is $3.331 million. 
The sum of all the component effects of the Supplemental 
SITC 
512 Short-Run 
Long-Run 
Present Value 
513 Short-Run 
Long-Run 
Present Value 
514 Short-Run 
Long-Run 
Present Value 
515 Short-Run 
Long-Run 
Present Value 
521 Short-Run 
Long-Run 
Present Value 
••• Not Applicable 
TABLE XXIV 
THE COMPONENTS OF THE WELFARE EFFECT: 
LABOR VARIANT I, d 
(million $) 
SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT,~ 
~ 
Imeort Market Exeort Market 
Producers' Consumers' Tariff Producers' Consumers' 
Surplus Surplus Revenue Surplus Surplus 
-12. 684 13.851 ... 202.613 -171.358 
-12. 602 13.897 -2.250 204.690 -170.473 
-54. 573 60.082 -9. 741 882.343 -739.708 
-1.895 2.284 ... 28.343 - 24. 623 
-1.881 2.292 -0.728 28.778 -24. 432 
-8. 170 9.908 -3.152 123. 785 -106.133 
-3.918 4.098 ... 33.895 -31. 350 
-3.907 4.103 -0.251 34.049 - 31. 281 
-16.936 17. 7 55 -1.087 147.129 -135. 559 
-0.000 o.ooo ... 3.600 -2.479 
-0.000 o.ooo -0.002 3.647 -2.462 
-0.000 0.000 -0.009 15. 702 -10.691 
-0.000 o.ooo ... 11. 335 -11.115 
-o.ooo o.ooo -o.ooo 11.340 -11.112 
-o.ooo o.ooo -o.ooo 49.087 -48.115 
Labor Mkt. 
TLLN 
-0.426 
... 
-0.793 
-0.095 
... 
-0.177 
-0.067 
-0.126 
-0.032 
-o. 060 
-0.002 
-0.003 
1-~ 
CP 
0 
TABLE XXIV (Continued) 
Im2ort Market ExEort Market 
Producers' Consumers' Tariff Producers' Consumers' Labor Mkt. 
SITC Surplus Surplus Revenue Surplus Surplus TLL N 
531 Short-Run -10.290 13.196 ... 8.656 -7.614 -0.108 
Long-Run -8.940 13.983 -2.873 9.208 -7.358 ... 
Present Value -41.216 59.076 -12.439 38.840 - 32. 332 -0.200 
532 Short-Run -0.006 0.058 ... 0.078 -0.019 
Long-Run -0.004 0.066 -0.053 0.102 -0.015 ... 
Present Value -0.021 0.271 -0.229 0.397 -0.072 
533 Short-Run -18.693 18.769 ... 105.089 -102.808 -o. 023 
Long-Run -18. 683 18. 774 -0.188 105.196 -102. 749 
Present Value -so.9o7 81.273 -0.814 455.247 -444.961 -0.042 
541 Short-Run -0.000 o.ooo ... 167.080 -156.325 -0.100 
Long-Run -0.000 o.ooo -0.000 167.539 -156.110 
Present Value -o.ooo o.ooo -0.000 724. 507 -676.278 -0.187 
551 Short-Run -3.201 3.354 ... 23.340 - 22.404 -0.009 
Long-Run -3.195 3. 357 -0.234 23.388 - 22. 364 ... 
Present Value -13.844 14.528 -1.013 101.169 - 96. 899 -0.016 
553 Short-Run -12.613 12.703 ... 84. 977 -84.087 -0.005 
Long-Run -12.609 12.706 -0.176 85.045 - 84. 053 
Present Value -54. 598 55.005 -0.762 368.076 -363.971 - o. 010 
Necessary data not available 
I'-' 
00 
I-' 
TABLE XXIV (Continued) 
Imeort Market Exeort Market 
Producers' Consumers' Tariff Producers' Consumers' Labor Mkt. 
SITC Surplus Surplus Revenue Surplus Surplus TLLN 
554 Short-Run -20.297 20.362 ... 113. 726 -111. 636 -0.006 
Long-Run -20.293 20.364 -0.093 113. 771 -111. 614 ... 
Present Value -87.866 88.162 -0.403 492.488 -483.274 -0.012 
561 Short-Run -0.000 o.ooo ... 53.001 -46.791 -0.195 
Long-Run -o.ooo o.ooo -o.ooo 53.336 -46.642 ... 
Present Value -0. 000 o.ooo -0.000 230. 295 -202.214 -1.213 
571 Short-Run -0.487 0.534 ... 2.738 -2.438 -0.018 
Long-Run -0.486 0.536 -0.091 2.764 -2.425 
Present Value -2.106 2.317 -o. 394 11. 918 -10.523 -0.034 
581 Short-Run -0.000 0.000 ... 117.271 -98.279 -0.164 
Long-Run -0.000 o.ooo -o.ooo 118. 520 -97. 7 51 
Present Value -o.ooo o.ooo -o.ooo 510.810 -424.195 -o. 304 
599 Short-Run -3.234 3.396 ... 38.115 -32.357 -0.081 
Long-Run -3.220 3.402 -0.298 38.387 -32. 240 ... 
Present Value -13.967 14.718 -1.290 165.691 -139.801 -0.151 
599 + Short-Run -3.240 3.454 ... 38.193 -32.376 -0.083 
532 Long-Run -3. 224 3.468 -0. 351 38.489 -32.255 ... 
Present Value -13.988 14.989 -1. 519 166.088 -139.873 -0.154 
Total for SITC 5 of the -374.204 403.095 -31.333 4317.484 -3914.726 -3.331 
discounted present values I-' 00 
N 
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Agreement.'s ratification is a net social gain of $396.985 million of 
which the producers' sector reaps net benefits of $3943.280 million, 
the consumers' sector suffers a net loss of $3511.631 million, the 
government loses $31.333 million and the loss due to labor dislocation 
totals $3.331 million. 
Comparison of Results from Disaggregated 
Data and from Aggregate Data 
This section compares the estimates of the trade effects obtained 
from the disaggregated three-digit SITC data used in this study to the 
trade effects estimated using aggregate data at the one-digit SITC 
level and apportioned among the three-digit SITC groups according to 
market shares. The estimates used for this comparison are those re-
sulting from the elimination of the tariffs of the first scenario. The 
trade effects, i. e., the change in the value of imports and the change 
in the value of exports, from both estimation methods are displayed in 
Table XXV for both SITC 5, the chemical industry, and the three-digit 
groups contained within the chemical industry. In addition, the table 
shows for each group the ratio of the aggregate estimate to the dis-
aggregated estimate in both the import and export markets. 
These ratios demonstrate that the aggregate estimates and their 
apportionment do obscure much of the variation revealed by the disag-
gregated estimates. In the import market, the ratio of the aggregate 
to the sum of the disaggregated estimates for SITC 5 is approximately 
1.6; whereas, for the three-digit product groups within the chemical 
industry, the ratios of aggregate to disaggregated import changes vary 
from 0.285 for Synthetic organic dyestuffs, natural indigo and color 
lakes (SITC 531) to 13.773 for Manufactured fertilizers (SITC 561). For 
SITC 
5 
512 
513 
514 
515 
521 
531 
532 
533 
541 
551 
553 
554 
561 
571 
581 
599 
TABLE XXV 
COMPARISON OF TRADE EFFECTS ESTIMATED FROM DISAGGREGATED DATA AND THOSE 
FROM AGGREGATE DATA: FIRST SCENARIO 
(million $) 
Apportionment Ratio of Apportionment Aggregate dVM 
of of 
Aggregate Disaggregated Disaggregated Aggregate Disaggregated 
dVM dVM dVM dVX dVX 
339.033 212e570 1. 595 895.121 462.347 
86. 794 56.447 1.538 238.786 123.267 
59.560 15.833 3.762 56. 7 54 34.830 
13.598 4.833 2.814 32.926 15.890 
17. 624 5. 552 3.174 39.266 7.690 
1.351 0.369 3.661 6.681 1.296 
16.973 59. 484 o. 285 11. 526 39. 962 
1.817 1.064 1.708 0.783 1.251 
2.674 2.754 0.971 21.644 9.489 
24.218 14.137 1. 713 102.537 49.780 
11. 7 56 3.529 3.331 12.965 7.334 
4.554 2.117 2.151 9.070 6.326 
2.418 1.043 2.318 20.235 9.744 
38. 359 2. 785 13.773 64.625 10.830 
3.502 1.805 1.940 6.063 4.265 
30.315 25.374 1.195 150.782 93.887 
23.518 15.444 1. 523 120.475 46.506 
Ratio of 
Aggregate dV 
x 
Disaggregated 
dVX 
1.936 
1.937 
1.629 
2.072 
5.106 
5.155 
0.288 
0.626 
2.281 
2.060 
1.768 
1.434 
2.077 
5.967 
1.422 
1.606 
2. 590 
I-" 
00 
.p-
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the estimated changes in exports, the aggregate-disaggregate ratios at 
the three-digit level range from 0.288 for Synthetic organic dyestuffs 
natural indigo and color lakes (SITC 531) to 5.967 for Manufactured fer-
tilizers (SITC 561). The export market's ratio for the industry, SITC 
5, is 1.936. 
The comparison also reveals that, in general, the estimates ob-
tained from aggregate data exceed the disaggregated estimates in both 
the import and the ,export markets. There are two groups within each 
market for which this is not true. In the import market, they are Syn-
thetic organic dyestuffs, natural indigo and color lakes (SITC 531) and 
Pigments, paints, varnishes and related materials (SITC 533). In the 
export market, the exceptions and Synthetic organic dyestuffs, natural 
indigo, and color lakes (SITC 531) and Dyeing and tanning extracts, and 
synthetic tanning materials (SITC 532). 
Summary 
This chapter presents the empirical results from the analysis. One 
of the hypothesized advantages of this study is that the analysis is 
conducted on the most disaggregated level feasible given the limitations 
imposed by the available data. As the survey of the literature in Chap-
ter III revealedj previous studies have been limited to aggregate data. 
Hence, this chapter concludes with a comparison of the trade effects ob-
tained from disaggregated data to those obtained by apportionment among 
the three-digit groups of the estimates from aggregate data. The com-
parison reveals that the aggregate estimates for the chemical industry 
exceed the sum of the disaggregated estimates for the industry. For the 
import market, the aggregate estimate is 59 percent larger than the im-
port expansion estimate obtained from disaggregated data; for the export 
market~ the aggregate data is 94 percent larger. Furthermore, the com-
parison demonstrates that, holding the difference in magnitude constant, 
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the apportionment of the aggregate estimates does distort the variation 
revealed by estimates obtained from the disaggregated data. 
Although it is difficult to summarize the disaggregated estimates 
computed in this study, an attempt at formulating a condensation of the 
results seems warranted in view of the multitude of results displayed 
in the chapter. Since one of the ~urposes of this study is to proceed 
with an analysis of a disaggregated level, a summary in terms of aver-
ages and industry totals of the results is rather abhorrent. But aver-
ages and totals seem a necessity for a succinct description of the di-
verse results. The averages presented in this summary are simple, 
unweighted averages of the 16 three-digit SITC estimates. The usual 
warnings that, averages conceal much variation and that unweighted aver-
ages yield biased figures apply to these summary averages. 
The chapter begins with the presentation of the price elasticity 
estimates for each of the 16 three-digit SITC groups. For the U. s., 
these are supply and demand price elasticities for each group's import 
market, export market, and domestic market. For the other countries of 
this study, only import demand and export supply elasticities are esti-
mated. The elasticities are derived from trade shares and independently 
estimated values of the elasticity of import demand. The unweighted 
average of the U. s. import demand elasticities for the three-digit SITC 
sectors is -1.73 and the average elasticity of import supply is 6.54. 18 
For the export markets, the export demand.elasticities average -29.90 
and the average of the export supply elasticities is computed to be 
1. 57. Disregarding the two "suspect" sectors (SITC 531 and SITC 532), 
the averages become -1.54, 2.21, -3.82 and 0.85, respectively. In 
the domestic market, the unweighted averages for the industry are 
-0.17 for the domestic price elasticity of demand and 0.34 
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for the price elasticity of domestic supply. 
The empirical estimates of the effects of free trade on the United 
States' chemical industry are derived in this study under two alterna-
tive scenarios. The first scenario assumes that both concession pack-
ages issued from the Kennedy Round of GATT became effective; that is, 
the first scenario eliminates post-Kennedy Round tariff duties which 
include ratification of the ASP package. The second scenario employs 
tariff rates which issue from only the so-called Kennedy Round conces-
sion package; hence, the additional concessions of the ASP package, 
which include elimination of ASP by the United States~ are not re-
flected in the tariff rates of the second scenario. The economic im-
pact of the Supplemental Agreement on Chemicals is measured by the dif-
ferences between the estimates obtained under the two scenarios; the 
Congressional approval of the ASP package necessary for it to become 
effective was never received. 
The chapter presents the price effects as well as the long- and 
short-run effects on trade quantities and values at both the four- and 
three-digit SITC levels. The price and trade effects cause production 
adjustments and, consequently, resource-use adjustments, in the domestic 
markets. Estimates of the resultant labor dislocation, which is used 
as a proxy for resource-use adjustment, are presented in the chapter 
for the three-digit SITC groups in terms of both the number of job 
changes and the social cost of such job changes. 
The labor market effects are treated in two alternative ways in 
the study. One assumes that the import and export markets are without 
interaction and, in effect, are segregated. The second alternative as-
sumes that labor dislocated by import expansion is quickly reabsorbed 
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in the same three-digit sector because of export expansion. Only the 
cost of this net labor effect is summarized here, although the results 
of both alternatives are fully presented in the chapter. 
The changes in the import, export and labor markets caused by free 
trade have implications for the social welfare. The impact on social 
welfare derives from changes in consumers' and producers' surpluses, 
the elimination of tariff revenue and the social cost of transitional 
labor dislocation. Each of these effects is a flow through time and is, 
therefore, discounted assuming time horizons of a two-year short-run 
and a five-year long-run. The social welfare effects are presented in 
the chapter at the three-digit SITC level. 
The first scenario has an average U. S. tariff of 7.6 percent on 
chemical imports. Its reduction to zero would reduce the u. s. price of 
the chemical imports by 4.6 percent on average, while foreign producers 
would find their chemical prices increased by 2.5 percent as a result 
of increased demand for their products. The foreign tariffs on U. S. 
chemical exports average, in the first scenario, 7.2 percent. Their 
elimination would increase the foreign demand for u. s. chemicals and 
increase u. s. prices by an average of 6.0 percent. In the short-run, 
the value of u. S. imports would increase by a total of $212.570 million 
while u. S. exports would increase by $462.347 million. Using long-run 
elasticities, the increases become, respectively, $524.433 million and 
$875.611 million. 
Under the first scenario, the sum of the net annual changes in the 
number of jobs for the 16 groups over a two-year period is +188. Of 
the 16 SITC three-digit groups 14'show a net increase in jobs. The job 
changes to fill these net increases result in frictional unemployment 
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of relatively short duration, i. e., 0.1212 years if the labor market 
is large and mobile, and 0.2423 years for localized labor markets. The 
net job loss in the remaining two sectors is assumed to create unemploy-
ment of longer duration, specifically, twice as long. The total annual 
cost of the labor dislocation from free trade, assuming the first 
scenario, is estimated to be $3.076 million given a large, mobile 
larger market and twice that amount if localized labor markets prevail. 
Given the tariffs of the first scenario, large labor markets, and 
a 5 percent discount rate, the social welfare gain for the u. S. from 
free trade totals $1009.761 million. Application of a 10 percent dis-
count rate to the same social welfare flows, which assume large labor 
markets and tariffs of the first scenario, reduces the net welfare gain 
to $880.450 million. Allowance for localized labor markets with longer 
unemployment durations, given the tariffs of the first scenario and a 5 
percent discount rate, yields a net welfare gain to the industry of 
$1004.047 million. 
The second scenario with its assumption of the non-ratification of 
the Supplemental Agreement analyzes the effects of the elimination of a 
set of higher tariffs than those of the first set. Since Congress al-
lowed the agreement to die, the second scenario is the ''tru~' starting 
data if tariff elimination were effectuated today. The U. S. tariffs 
average 8.1 percent. Their elimination would decrease the u. S. price 
of imported chemicals by 4.9 percent while the average price received by 
foreign producers would increase 2.6 percent. The elimination of the 
tariffs faced by Uo S. chemical exports to the rest-of-the-world, which 
average 9.2 percent, would increase U. s. prices by 7.6 percent on the 
average. The short-run increases in the u. s. imports and exports 
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resulting from the replacement of the present tariff barriers with free 
trade are $222.768 million and $615.424 million, respectively. Given 
time for complete adjustment, these increases in the value of trade 
would be $550.963 million of imports and $1163.521 million of exports. 
For the second scenario, the sum of the net annual changes in the 
number of jobs for the 16 groups which would occur over a two-year 
period is +978. The resultant job changes would cost society an esti-
mated $4.365 million if the labor markets were large and mobile. As-
suming a large labor market and a 5 percent discount rate, the net 
social welfare gain for the u. S. resulting from the elimination of the 
higher tariffs of the second scenario totals $1416.703 million. 
Comparison of the effects of tariff elimination assuming the tar-
iff data of the first scenario to those resulting from the second 
scenario show that approval by Congress of the Supplemental Agreement 
on Chemicals, i. e., the ASP package, would have reduced the average 
foreign tariff on chemicals from 9.2 percent to 7.2 percent in response 
to au. S. reduction from an 8.1 percent average to a 7.6 percent aver~ 
age. The difference between the estimated effects in the short-run on 
trade volume indicate that the ratification of the ASP package would 
have increased imports by $10.198 million and exports by $153.077 mil-
lion. The difference between the estimated net social welfare effects 
indicates a gain of $406.942 million which includes the social cost of 
labor dislocation. 
A remaining section of the chapter separates the net social welfare 
effects into the component parts: producers' surplus, consumers' sur-
plus, tariff revenue, and labor dislocation. Assuming large, integrated 
labor markets and a 5 percent discount rate, the chapter presents, at 
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the three-digit SITC level, the component welfare effects for the impact 
of tariff elimination under the second scenario and for the impact of 
Congressional approval of the supplemental ASP agreement. 
For the latter set of results, i. e., the impact of the ASP pack-
age, this study finds for the chemical industry that the present values 
of the welfare components for the import and export markets combined 
are: a net gain in producers' surplus of $3943.280 million, a net loss 
in the consumers' sector of $3511.631 million, a revenue loss for the 
government sector of $31.333 million, and a loss due to labor disloca-
tion of $3.331 million; the sum of these component effects is a net so-
cial welfare gain due to the implementation of the ASP package of 
$396.985 million. 
The components for the import market, disregarding export expan-
sion and its consequences, reveal very different outcomes for producers' 
and consumers' surpluses. In the import market, there is a loss in pro-
ducers' surplus of $374.204 million and a gain in consumers' surplus of 
$403.095 million. 
ENDNOTES 
1The extremely large elasticities are a result of a chain of con-
tributing factors, which can be demonstrated with reference to the 
elasticity equations in Chapter IV. The very large estimates of the 
elasticity of demand for U. S. exports result primarily from the very 
small share of world exports originating from the u. s., i. e., the ex-
port ratios in Equation 4.10 are relatively large. Additionally, the 
world import demand and the rest•of-the-world export supply elasticities 
are well above average. These high estimates reflect, in turn, the com-
bination of somewhat large import demand, export supply, and domestic 
demand and supply elasticities and of relatively large import and export 
shares for the EEC. 
2Mordechai E. Kreinin, "Price Elasticities in International Trade," 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 49 (1967), p. 515. 
3Mordechai E. Kreinin, "Disaggregated Import Demand Functions--
Further Results," Southern Economic Journal, 40 (1973), p. 24. 
4Kreinin, using data from the 1955-56 CATT negotiations, compares 
changes in price and volume of imports of commodities with tariff rate 
reductions to immediate substitutes which had no reductions. He finds 
that "close to half of the benefit from tariff concessions granted by 
the United States accrued to foreign exporters in the form of increased 
export prices•" Mordechai E. Kreinin, "Effect of Tariff Changes on the 
Prices and Volume of Imports," American Economic Review (1961), P• 317. 
5The explanation for the long-run increases in the value of imports 
being less than three times those of the short~run rests on the fact 
that the percentage price changes are the same for either time horizon. 
This is demonstrated with Equation 3.4: 
d [ (dP) + (dM) (dP) (dM) ] VM = VM J? M + P M • 
Thus, for the long-run~ 
i. e., 
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6As discussed in the preceding section, which describes the first 
scenario, the percentage increases in the quantity of imports are es-
timates for the short-run, The long-run estimates are three times those 
of the short-run. They are neither described in the text nor displayed 
in Table VI. 
7SITC group 553 is not discussed here as it is composed of only 
5530. 
8comparable data to estimate the probable increase in the value of 
imports are not available. 
9That is, a discussion of the comparison of Table XI to Table IX 
for the import markets and of Table XII to Table X for the export mar-
kets, 
10 Comparable disaggregated data on the value of imports are not 
available. 
11The considerable difference between the magnitudes of the effects 
in the import and export markets for Organic chemicals (SITC 512) re-
flects two factors. First, ratification of the Supplemental Agreement 
would have resulted in the reduction of U. s. tariffs by only 0.4 per-
centage points compared to a reduction in the composite foreign tariff 
of 3.6 percentage points. Furthermore, the u. S. tariff reduction is 
applicable to u. S, imports which total $509.0 million whereas U. S. 
1972 exports total $1102.7 million, 
12The discussion of the theoretical basis for the analysis of re-
source dislocation begins on page 43. 
13This is the difference between the estimates of Table XVII and 
Table XV. The large magnitude reflects both the predominance in this 
sector of the ASP system of valuation and the large estimate of the de-
crease in the u. S. price of the imported commodity (which in itself 
reflects the large elasticity of import supply estimate), 
14 These results assume the shorter durations of unemployment of a 
larger labor market (Variant I). 
15see the first column of Table XXI. 
16see the first column of Table XXII. 
17The net gain in social welfare obtained from the sum of the es-
timates of the component parts differs somewhat in magnitude from the 
net social welfare effect obtained from direct estimation. In this 
example, the net welfare gain from the component parts equals $1375.868 
million compared to the $1373.115 million total gain resultant from the 
direct estimation (see Table XXII). 
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18It is of interest to compare the unweighted average of the im-
port demand elasticities to the weighted averages; the weighted-by-
world imports average of the u. s. import demand price elasticities is 
-1.54 and the weighted-by-U. S. imports average equals -1.53. The 
averages of this study's disaggregated import demand elasticities for 
the chemical industry either approximate or are less than the unad-
justed estimates of the import demand elasticities for the chemical in~ 
dustry obtained by other studies, which indicates adjustment of the 
disaggregate elasticities by three standard errors is realistic. See 
Kreinin, "Price Elasticities in International Trade," P• 515; n = -2.0 
and J. David Richardson, "The Response of Imports and Domestic tlemand to 
Price, Tariff and Exchange Rate Changes: A Structural Estimation Study 
for Selected u. S. Manufactures," (unpublished paper, 1972), p. 27; 
nM = -1. 70. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The debate between those espousing the gains from free trade and 
those concerned with protecting domestic industry has had a long his-
tory. Although international trade negotiations under the auspices of 
GATT have made much progress toward the goal of free trade, formidable 
problems remain for future negotiations of trade agreements. The pres~ 
ent study has estimated the economic impact of trade liberalization for 
the United States chemical industry. 
Summary 
This study began with a discussion of the chemical industry, the 
barriers incurred by internationally traded chemical products, and a 
history of u. S. participation in international trade negotiations. 
Thus 5 Chapter II established a frame of reference for the analysis of 
the study. The chapter found that the chemical industry is predomi-
nantly oligopolistic in structure and behavior. Additionally, the in-
dustry is extremely international in outlook. Chemicals comprise a 
sector of major significance in world trade as well as in the trade of 
each of the major industrial countries of the world. 
The United States tariff structure on chemicals was the cause of 
heated controversy during the Kennedy Round of the GATT negotiations 
because of its .American Selling Price system of customs valuation. ASP 
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for chemicals applies only to certain benzenoid chemicals; thus~ al-
though it has both tariff and non-tariff barrier effects 9 the value of 
trade affected is relatively small. Still 9 the discussion became po-
larized to such an extent that only separate treatment for the chemical 
sector and a "two-package" approach within the chemical negotiations 
rescued the negotiations from failure. The first Kennedy Round package 
contained major tariffs reductions on chemicals by the u. s. and lesser 
reductions by the other major chemical trading nations. The second 
package contained the elimination of ASP by the Uo s. and significant 
tariff reductions by the other major chemical trading countries; it also 
required, but never received, Congressional approval. 
The most recent u. s. trade legislation of major significance is 
the Trade Act of 1974. It includes authorization for the President to 
enter into new trade agreements between 1975 and 1979 and to reduce 
most tariff duties by up to 60 percent. In contrast to that legisla-
tion, this study considered 9 in the case of the second scenario, the ef-
fect of the elimination of the post-Kennedy Round tariff duties. 
The study proceeded 9 in Chapter 111 9 with a review of other stud-
ies relevant to the analysis of this research and with a presentation 
of the theoretical model used in the analysis. The estimated economic 
effects, which were obtained from separate analyses of both the import 
and export markets 9 were changes in prices and in the quantities and 
values of trade. These static trade effects were utilized to calculate 
the resultant adjustments in the labor markets. Lastly, the net social 
welfare effects, i. e., the welfare gains from trade expansion less the 
social costs of labor dislocation, were derived. These net welfare 
flows were discounted over appropriate time horizons to obtain their 
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present values. 
The estimates were made at a disaggregated level. The collection 
of the data presented a challenge because of the variety of sources 
and, mo9t especially, the variety of classification systems used. For 
this study 9 all data were transformed to the four- and three- digit 
levels of the Standard International Trade Classification, Revised 
(SITC). Their sources and adjustments were described in detail in 
Chapter IV. 
The model was applied to two sets of tariff data. One set was 
composed of tariff rates which would have resulted had both Kennedy 
Round packages become effective; this set is called the first scenario. 
The other set of tariff data, that of this study's second scenario, was 
composed of tariff rates resultant from only the so-called Kennedy 
Round package. The economic impact of the ASP package had it become 
effective is indicated by the differences between the estimated effects 
of the two scenarios. 
The empirical results of the study were presented in Chapter V. 
One of the purposes of this research was to estimate the economic ef-
fects of trade liberalization from data at a disaggregated level. The 
numerous sub-sectors within the chemical industry in combination with 
the two alternative scenarios 9 as well as their comparison in order to 
evaluate the Supplemental Agreement on Chemicals, created a multitude 
of results for the several effects considered in the study. 
This study found that in the short-run the impact of free trade 
superseding the tariff rates of the second scenario, i. e., post-
Kennedy Round tariffs with the continued existence of ASP, would be an 
increase in imports of $222.768 million and in exports of $615.424 
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million. The average price of U. S. chemical imports would fall by 4.9 
percent; whereas the average price of u. s. chemical exports would rise 
by 7.6 percent. The expansion of international trade would create 978 
jobs (net) annually for two years following free trade. The resultant 
transitional labor dislocation would cost society an estimated $4.365 
mil lion if the labor markets were large and mobile. Assuming a 5 per-
cent discount rate, the net gain in social welfare for the United 
States would be $1416.703 million. 
The comparison of the effects of the first scenario to those of 
the second scenario revealed that approval by Congress of the Supple-
mental Agreement on Chemicals would have reduced the average foreign 
tariff on chemicals from 9.2 percent to 7.2 percent in response to a 
U. S. reduction from an 8.1 percent average ad valorem tariff equivalent 
to a 7.6 percent average. The differences between the estimated ef-
fects in the short-run on trade volume indicate that the ratification 
of the ASP package would have increased imports by $10.198 million and 
exports by $153.077 million. The differences between the directly es-
timated net social welfare effects indicated a gain of $406.942 mil-
lion~ which included the social cost of labor dislocation. 
In addition~ the component parts of the net social welfare effects 
were calculated. Assuming large, integrated labor markets and a 5 per-
cent discount rate, this study found that implementation of the Supple-
mental Agreement on Chemicals would have resulted in a net gain in pro-
ducers' surplus of $3943.280 million~ a net loss in consumers' surplus 
of $35ll. 631 million, a revenue loss for the goverrunent of $31. 333 mil-
lion, and a loss due to labor dis location of $3. 331 million. The sum 
of these component effects is a net social welfare gain due to the 
implementation of the ASP package equal to $396.985 million. 
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Disregarding the expansion of·u. S. exports which would have resulted 
from the ASP package, the producers' and consumers' surpluses for the 
import market alone revealed a loss in producers' surplus of $374.204 
million and a gain in consumers' surplus of $l:03.095 million. 
Chapter V, which presented the empirical results~ is concluded by 
a comparison of the trade effects obtained from disaggregated data to 
those obtained by apportionment among the three=digit groups of the ef-
fects estimated from aggregate data. The comparison revealed that for 
the industry the aggregate estimates exceed the sum of the disaggregated 
estimates. Furthermore, the comparison demonstrated that apportionment 
of the aggregate estimates does distort the variation revealed by the 
estimates obtained from disaggregated data. 
Conclusions 
The findings of this study indicate that aggregate data, as used 
in previous studies, do distort the results obtainable from disaggre-
gated data. The results also indicate that any relatively balanced~ 
multilateral reduction of tariff duties levied on chemicals would 
create a net gain for the United States in terms of both the balance of 
trade and social welfare. 
Furthermore, the empirical results of this study indicate that the 
United States would have benefited from Congressional approval of the 
Supplemental Agreement on Chemicals which had been negotiated during the 
Kennedy Round of GATT. The improvement in the United States' trade 
. balance is an increase in net exports of $142.879 mill.ion. In terms of 
net social welfare, the benefits to the United States were calculated 
to be $406.942 million. 
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Industry opposition to the ASP package was strong, despite the 
fact that the producers' surplus component of social welfare would have 
been increased substantially by the Supplemental Agreement. Thus, it 
appears that the chemical industry, and perhaps therefore Congress, fo-
cused only on the concessions granted by the Uo s. in the agreement and 
neglected the receipt of foreign concessions. With a myopic viewpoint 
limited to the market loss due to import expansion, the industry may 
have seen the loss of producers' surplus in the import markets and dis-
regarded the potentially greater gain in producers' surplus which would 
result from export expansion. 
Thus, Congress, acting presumably in the national interest and the 
chemical industry, acting in its own self-interest, erred in opposing 
the Supplemental Agreement. In both cases, it may have been an inad-
vertent result of incomplete analysis or of exaggerated importance given 
to the import markets. 
It is surprising that the vigorous u. s. chemical industry seeming-
ly had so little faith in its own ability to respond to the significant 
enlargement of potential export markets. As a result, other possible 
reasons for industry opposition come to mind. First, perhaps the non-
tariff effects of ASP as a barrier are especially strong and off er a 
high level of effective protection. Such strength is enhanced by the 
industry structure. For although the chemical industry is large, di-
verse and technologically competitive, it is composed of a variety of 
subindustries; the common characteristic of these subgroups is an oligo-
polistic market structure accompanied by relatively stable prices. Do-
mestic price control,increases the protection granted under the ASP 
system of valuation. 
In addition, the oligopolistic structure of the sub-sectors may 
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conceal the existence of monopolies for particular chemical products. 
For these monopolists, the tariff aspect of the ASP system may serve as 
a barrier to entry with which to maintain the monopoly position. Or 
perhaps, the priorities of oligopolists place profit-maximization second 
to market-share maintenance. 
With regard to additional research of a similar nature, the prob-
lems with data encountered in this study give rise to the usual appeal 
for improved and more highly disaggregated data. Most particularly, 
the appeal is for data collected in terms of a common classification 
system. The transition by the United States and Canada from their own 
unique systems to those used by the rest-of-the-world, including the 
United Nations, would be a major step in that direction. This study is 
affected indirectly, too, by the lack of reliable, comprehensive price 
data, which hinders the estimation of price elasticities on a disag-
gregated level. The paucity of such elasticity estimates limited the 
effectiveness of this analysis. 
Further work similar to this study should be pursued, especially 
at a relatively disaggregated level of data. A significant advance 
would be the development of a more sophisticated model, particularly one 
that would integrate the treatment of the import and export markets. 
Studies with purposes similar to this one are needed with regard to non-
tariff barriers if future trade negotiations are to succeed in the trade 
liberalization goal of GATT. The primary obstacle to such analysis is 
the lack of information with which to quantify such barriers. 
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THE CONCESSIONS OF BOTH KENNEDY ROUND PACKAGES 
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The Kennedy Round Concessions 
The major concessions in the Kennedy Round were the following: 
1. The United States undertook to make only 20% cuts on most low-
duty chemicals. 
2. It excepted from any reduction certain other chemicals. 
3. It agreed to reduce by 50% over five equal stages the duties 
on all other chemicals. 
4. It retained the ASP system of valuation for benzenoid chemic-
als. 
These concessions averaged out to a 43% cut on $325 million of our 
imports in the base year, 1964 •. 
The European Community agreed in the Kennedy Round to: 
1. Less than 50% reductions, ranging between l~h and 40%, on some 
chemicals, and no reductions on three chemicals. 
2. 30% reductions on chemicals with duties of 25% or higher. 
3. 35% reductions on chemicals for which Switzerland is its 
principal supplier. 
4. 20% reductions on most other items. 
These concessions averaged out to a 20% cut on $465 million of im-
ports from the United States in the base year. 
The United Kingdom agreed in the Kennedy Round to: 
1. Partial or no reductions on a limited number of chemicals, in-
cluding certain of its domestic revenue duties. 
2. No reductions on most plastics, products which now generally 
have 10% or lower rates. 
3. 3~h reductions on chemicals with duties of 25% or higher. 
4. 20/o reductions on al 1 other chemicals. 
These concessions averaged out to a 25% reduction on $110 million 
of imports from the United States in the base year. 
Switzerland and Japan agreed to make their entire reductions in the 
Kennedy Round. Together with the United Kingdom and the EEC, the average 
cut of these countries on imports in the base year will be about 26% on 
$890 million of imports from the United States. The remaining countries 
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did not participate in the separate ASP negotiation and their entire re~ 
ductions will take place as specified in the Kennedy Round agreement. 
The ASP Concessions 
Under the separate ASP agreement, the United States agreed con-
ditionally to: 
1. Convert duties based on ASP to normal bases of valuation. 
2. Reduce by a further 30% the low duty items cut by only 20% in 
the Kennedy Round. 
3. Further reduce certain chemical duties to rates which on the 
basis of 1964 trade would average 20% but are not limited to that level. 
4. Establish duties of more than 25% for sulfa drugs and 30% for 
dyes and pigments. 
The average u. S. reduction would be five percent~ or a total of 
48% in both agreements combined. 
The European Community undertook in the ASP agreement to: 
1. Reduce by a further 30% on all items, except those for which 
only partial or no reductions were made in the Kennedy Round. The 
average reduction would be 26% or a combined total of 46% in both agree-
ments. 
2. Modify its road tax system to eliminate discrimination against 
American automobiles. 
The United Kingdom undertook in the ASP agreement to~ 
1. Reduce duties on plastics, where necessary, to the level of 
European Community duties on plastics~ and bind all duties on plastics. 
2. Reduce by a further 30% on all items cut by 20% in the Kennedy 
Round. 
3. Further reduce by varying percentages duties of 25% or higher 
to bring them to a level of 12.5%. 
4. The average reduction would be 22%~ for a combined reduction of 
47% in both agreements. They would also reduce the preferential tariff 
margin on tobacco imports. 
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Switzerland agreed to modify its regulations on canned fruit im-
ports when the ASP agreement becomes effective. Its average tariff cut 
would be 49%, while that of Japan would be 44%. In short, all major 
participants agreed to make about the same average overall percentage 
reduction in their chemical tariffs. 
SOURCE~ Quoted from the testimony of William M. Roth in United States 
House of Representatives. Committee on Ways and Means. ~­
..;...i..;...n_..g""s---'o_n_F_o.._r_e_i_.· g_.,n_T_r_a_d_e_a_n_d_T_a_r_i_f_f_P_r_o_.p ... o_s_a_l_s. Washington, DC: 
U. So Government Printing Office, 1968. 
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Equation 3.,1 
The fall in the import price is a fraction, s, of the absolute height, 
T, of the barriers: 
P' = (1 + t)P 
dP' = -sT and dP = (1 - s)T = (1 - s)tP 
dP' dP' 
pr=P+T where:: 
( -st . ( 1 ) ( P ) 1 + t) -;::--- dP 
M 
. -st , ( 1 ) ( 1 ) 
(1 + tJ CM (1 - s)t 
S) t = str1 
- M 
( dP_' ) (1 + t) = 
p + T 
Equation 3.,2 
dP 
- = (1 - s)t p 
-stn M 
2 
tMt + LMt 
nM - t.M - cMt 
<:Mt (1 + t) 
11M - ':11 - crl 
dP M . M dP' P + T (p-) (dM) = (l - s) t (dM) (p + T) (-~) 
t = ; 
1 (1 
t::M 
1 (1 
SM 
-11 st M 
!g_uation 3. 3 
dM = dM 
s)t(-!-) (p d;'T) -
nM 
s) t (__!__) (1 + t) 
-
n -st M 
(1 - s)t(l + t)E.'.M 
2 (1 - s)tsM + (1 - s)t cM 
dM = ( MdM) (p + T) ( dP ' ) 
M dP' P+T 
Substituting Equation 3.1: 
dM 
-= 
M n c t: t M - M - M 
Equation 3.4 
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The increase in the duty-free value of imports can be seen in Figure 5, 
where the original duty-free value of imports, VM, equals (P x M) as 
shown by area 1. The new duty-free value of imports equals [P x (M + 
0 
dM) ] , i.e. , areas 1 + 2 + 3 + 4. Hence, the change in the value of im-
ports, dVM' equals areas 2 (= MdP), 3 (= PdM), and 4 (= dMdP). 
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--~~------~~~~~~· M 0 M I 0 
dM 
Figure 5. Import Demand 
dVM = M(dP) + P(dM) + (dM)(dP) 
dVM = M(dP) (~) + P (dM) (~) + (dM) (dP) (:) (t) 
dV = (MP)(dP) + (MP)(dM) + (MP)(dM)(dP) 
M P M M P 
This equation can be written in terms of elasticities by substituting 
Equations 3.2 and 3.3 into 3.4 which yields: 
tn E M M -1 dV = V tn [1 + E + ](~ - ~1 - Et) M M M M TlM - cM - r::Mt M 1 M 
Equation 3.5 
( <O) ( <0) (<O) (>O) (>O) c~o) 
dWM = ildP' I lctsl + IidP' I !ctn! - IMI lctPI 
dW = l_(-dP I) (-dS) + !2 (-dP I) (dD) - (M) (dP) M 2 
dWM = - l(dP')(-dS + dD) - M(dP) 
dWM = - t(dP')(dM) - M(dP) 
dW = - l_(dP')(p + T)dH - M(dP) 
M 2 P + T 
By definition: 
i.e., 
Thus, substituting: 
1 dP' 2 . 
dWM = - Z(P + T) (P + tP)MnM - M(dP) 
Equation 3.5.a 
dW = Area C M,p 
dW~1 = l_(Q + Q I) I dP I I 
I: ,p 2 s s 
aw = lcq + Q ')(-dP) M,p 2 S S 
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1 · . dP' 
dWM - -(2V + dVS)(P + T) 
,p 2' .. s 
By definition: c D 
i .. e., 
Thus, substituting: 
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Since the product may also be exported, the proper supply figure for 
use in the import market is not the nation's gross supply but is the 
output consumed within that country. Thus, VS should be replaced with 
<vs - vx): 
dW M,p 
Equation 3.5.b 
dWM,c = Areas c + D + F + H = tcQD + Qn') idP' I 
dWM,c = i(QD + QD + dQD)(-dP') 
dV 
d f . . . n.'.D -- (-V.Q_) (Pd+P'T) By e inition: ,., 
-n 
i.e. , 
Thus, substituting: 
Equation 3.5.c 
dWM,t = Areas F + G = jdP' I (M) + (dP) (M) 
dWM, t = (-dP I) (M) + (dP) (M) 
awM, t (p..;.~-'T) (M) (P + T) + (~) (M) (P) 
dWM, t c;~ 1T) (M) (P + tP) + c;p)(M) (P) 
Equation 3.6 
dJ;>,=(l-f)T where 0 :$; f ::::: 1 and therefore dP' = -fT 
dP' t dP 
and p + T = (-f) (1 + t); thus, p .""" (1 - f)t 
( dP)(_!_) (' )'( )(X)( dP' )(p + T) p dX = 1 - f t dX p + T dP I 
1 
s x 
1 P + T (1 - f) (t) (n~) ( dP' ) 
(1 
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2 
-tnx = (1 - f)tEx + (1 - f)t Ex - (1 - f)tnx 
dP tnx 
-=------p n - c: - tc: 
x x x 
Equation 3. 7 
dX = dX 
dP dX = Xs (-) x p 
Substituting in Equation 3.6 yields: 
dX 
x 
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Equation 3. 8 
dV = V [dP + dX + (dP)(dX)] 
x x p x p x 
The derivation is directly analagous to that of Equation 3. 4-. 
p 
0 XL._y--} 
dX 
Figure 6. Export Supply 
x 
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Equation 3.9 
(<O) (>O) 
dWX = t<<lP) I dD I + t<<lP) I dS I + X(dP) 
. dWX = t(dP) (dS - dD) + X(dP) 
dWX = %-caP) (dX) + X(dP) 
dWX = %-ca:) (P) (dX) + X(dP) 
dX) ( P) By definition: cX = (X dP 
i.e. 
t:X(X) (dP) 
dX=----p 
Substituting into the above.: 
t: X(dP) 
dW = l_(dP) (P) [ X ] + X(dP) x 2 p p 
1(dP)2 ( ) ( ) <dpP) (·vx.) dWX = 2 p sX VX + 
Equation 3.9,a 
dWX,c = %-(QD + QD + dQD)(dP) 
aw = l(2v ) <aP) + lcav ) <dP) 
X,c 2 D P 2 D . P 
By definition: n = D 
i.e. , 
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Thus, dWX 
,c 
dWX 
,c 
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Since the product may also be imported, the proper demand figure for 
use in the export market is not the gross demand but is the demand for 
domestic production. Thus, VD should be replaced with (VD - VM): 
dWX 
,c 
Equation 3.9.b 
1 Areas E + F + G + H +I= ~(Qs + Qs')(dP) 
qW:X,p = tc2Qs) (dP) + tCdQS) (dP) 
dWX 
,p 
By definition: 
v cdP) + lcdv )(dP) 
s p 2 s p 
s = D 
d (dP) (V ) [ 1 + lcdP) c· ) ] wx' p p s . 2 p SD 
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